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ABSTRACT 
Mainstream investors are mostly interested in how they can benefit financially from a specific 
investment. Although this is the case, an increasing number of so-called responsible investors 
are also beginning to integrate environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) aspects 
into their investment analysis and ownership practices. Corporate governance compliance is 
often the first level of ESG interest for these investors. 
Previous researchers considered the relationship between corporate governance and various 
financial performance measures, but reported inconclusive evidence on the nature of the 
relationship. Even though the three King Reports provide a well-developed framework for 
corporate governance compliance in South Africa, no comprehensive academic study has 
previously been conducted on the above-mentioned relationship in the South African context. 
The primary objective of the current study was therefore to investigate the relationship 
between corporate governance and the financial performance of selected JSE industries. The 
chosen study period (20022010) coincided with the launch of the King II Report and 
included the 20072009 global financial crisis. 
A combination of convenience and judgement sampling was used to draw a sample from six 
JSE industries. In an attempt to reduce survivorship bias, the sample included both listed 
firms and firms that had delisted during the study period. The complete sample comprised 227 
companies (1 417 annual observations). When the study commenced, there was a lack of 
reliable, readily available ESG data for JSE-listed firms. An existing corporate governance 
research instrument was therefore refined to develop standardised data on the corporate 
governance compliance of the selected firms. An annual corporate governance score (CGS) 
was compiled for each of the firms by means of content analysis of its annual reports. 
Five financial performance variables were considered, namely return on assets (ROA), return 
on equity (ROE), earnings per share (EPS), total share return (TSR) and risk-adjusted 
abnormal return (alpha). The selection of these measures was based on previous research. The 
secondary financial data were sourced from the McGregor BFA database and the Bureau for 
Economic Research. 
The resulting panel dataset was analysed by means of various descriptive and inferential 
analyses. The descriptive statistics revealed an overall increasing corporate governance 
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compliance trend. Both the disclosure and acceptability dimensions of the sample companies’ 
CGSs improved over time. The sample firms complied with approximately 68 per cent of the 
corporate governance criteria on average. 
The panel regression analysis showed a significant positive relationship between CGS and the 
accounting-based EPS ratio. Although this result is encouraging, it should be kept in mind 
that managers can have an influence on both these variables. On the other hand, a significant 
negative relationship was observed between the market-based TSR measure and CGS. 
The TSR measure is not adjusted for risk. Risk-adjusted abnormal returns were thus also 
estimated for four corporate governance-sorted portfolios. In a positive change of events, both 
the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and the FamaFrench three-factor estimations 
showed positive alphas for the portfolio consisting of firms with the highest CGSs. These 
encouraging results were observed for the overall study period and the period before May 
2008. Investors could thus have benefitted, in risk-adjusted terms, by investing in the sample 
firms with high corporate governance compliance. In the period after May 2008, the 
FamaFrench three-factor estimations revealed that the risk-adjusted market-based 
performance of almost all the sample firms were negatively affected by the global financial 
crisis of the late 2000s. The reported alphas for this period were, however, not significant. 
Based on these results, the researcher recommends that directors, managers and shareholders 
should consider the valuable opportunities associated with sound corporate governance 
compliance, rather than merely regarding it as a “tick-box” obligation. 
KEY WORDS: corporate governance; compliance; South Africa; JSE; financial 
performance; CAPM; FamaFrench three-factor model; financial crisis 
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OPSOMMING 
Hoofstroombeleggers is veral geïnteresseerd in hoe hulle finansieel by ŉ spesifieke belegging 
kan baat. Alhoewel dit die geval is, begin ŉ toenemende aantal sogenaamde 
‘verantwoordelike beleggers’ ook die omgewing, sosiale en korporatiewe bestuursaspekte 
(ESG-aspekte) in hulle beleggingsanalise en eienaarskapspraktyke integreer. Korporatiewe 
bestuursnakoming is dikwels die eerste vlak van ESG-belangstelling vir hierdie beleggers.  
Vorige navorsers het die verwantskap tussen korporatiewe bestuur en verskeie maatstawwe 
van finansiële prestasie ondersoek, maar het onbesliste resultate ten opsigte van die aard van 
die verhouding gerapporteer. Ongeag die drie King-verslae wat ŉ goed ontwikkelde 
raamwerk vir die nakoming van korporatiewe bestuur in Suid-Afrika verskaf, is daar tot 
dusver nog geen omvattende akademiese studie oor die bogenoemde verwantskap in Suid-
Afrika gedoen nie. Die primêre doelstelling van hierdie studie was dus om die verwantskap 
tussen korporatiewe bestuur en die finansiële prestasie van JSE-genoteerde maatskappye te 
ondersoek. Die geselekteerde studie tydperk (20022010) het die wêreldwye finansiële krisis 
van 20072009 ingesluit en het saamgeval met die bekendstelling van die King II-verslag. 
ŉ Kombinasie van gerieflikheids- en oordeelkundige steekproefneming is gebruik om ŉ 
steekproef vanuit ses JSE-nywerhede te selekteer. In ŉ poging om oorlewingsydigheid te 
verminder, het dié steekproef sowel genoteerde maatskappye as maatskappye wat gedurende 
die studietydperk gedenoteer het, ingesluit. Die volledige steekproef het uit 227 maatskappye 
(1 417 jaarlikse waarnemings) bestaan. Met die aanvang van die studie was daar ŉ gebrek aan 
betroubare, geredelik beskikbare ESG-data vir JSE-genoteerde maatskappye. ŉ Bestaande 
navorsingsinstrument vir korporatiewe bestuursnakoming is dus verfyn om 
gestandaardiseerde data rakende die gekose maatskappye se korporatiewe bestuursnakoming 
te verkry. ŉ Jaarlikse korporatiewe bestuur telling (CGS) is deur middel van inhoudsanalise 
van die betrokke maatskappy se jaarstate vir elk van die maatskappye saamgestel. 
Vyf finansiële prestasie veranderlikes is oorweeg, naamlik ondernemingsrentabiliteit (ROA), 
rentabiliteit van ekwiteit (ROE), verdienste per aandeel (EPS), totale aandeelopbrengs (TSR) 
en risiko-aangepaste abnormale opbrengs (alfa). Die keuse van hierdie maatreëls was op 
vorige navorsing gegrond. Die sekondêre finansiële data was afkomstig van die McGregor 
BFA-databasis en die Buro vir Ekonomiese Ondersoek. 
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Verskeie beskrywende en inferensiële analises is gebruik om die gevolglike paneeldatastel te 
ontleed. Die beskrywende statistiek het gedui op ŉ algeheel toenemende tendens in 
korporatiewe bestuursnakoming. Beide die bekendmaking- en aanvaarbaarheidsdimensies van 
die steekproef maatskappye se CGS’s het met verloop van tyd verbeter. Die steekproef 
maatskappye het gemiddeld aan ongeveer 68 persent van die korporatiewe bestuurskriteria 
voldoen. 
Die paneel regressie-analise het ŉ beduidende positiewe verwantskap tussen CGS en die 
rekeningkundig-gebaseerde EPS-verhoudingsgetal getoon. Alhoewel die resultaat 
bemoedigend is, moet daar in gedagte gehou word dat bestuurders ŉ invloed op beide hierdie 
veranderlikes kan hê. Aan die ander kant is ŉ beduidende negatiewe verband tussen die 
markgebaseerde TSR-maatstaf en CGS waargeneem. 
Die TSR-maatstaf is nie vir risiko aangepas nie. Risiko-aangepaste abnormale opbrengste is 
dus ook bepaal vir vier korporatiewe bestuursgesorteerde portefeuljes. In ŉ positiewe 
wending het beide die kapitaal-bate prysmodel (CAPM) en die FamaFrench drie-faktor 
beramings positiewe alfas vir die portefeulje bestaande uit maatskappye met die hoogste 
CGS’s getoon. Hierdie bemoedigende resultate is vir die volle studietydperk en die tydperk 
voor Mei 2008 gerapporteer. Beleggers kon dus, in risiko-aangepaste terme, baat gevind het 
deur in die steekproef maatskappye met hoë korporatiewe bestuursnakoming te belê. In die 
tydperk ná Mei 2008 het die FamaFrench drie-faktor beramings aangetoon dat die risiko-
aangepaste markgebaseerde prestasie van byna al die maatskappye in die steekproef negatief 
geraak is deur die wêreldwye finansiële krisis van die laat 2000’s. Die gerapporteerde alfas 
vir hierdie tydperk was egter nie beduidend nie. 
Na aanleiding van hierdie resultate beveel die navorser aan dat direkteure, bestuurders en 
aandeelhouers die waardevolle geleenthede wat met standvastige korporatiewe 
bestuursnakoming verband hou oorweeg eerder as om dit bloot as ŉ “afmerk”-verpligting te 
beskou. 
SLEUTELWOORDE: korporatiewe bestuur; nakoming; Suid-Afrika; JSE; finansiële 
prestasie; CAPM; FamaFrench drie-faktor model; finansiële krisis 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
1.1 Introduction 
“There are three steps in the revelation of any truth: ‘firstly, it is ridiculed; secondly, it is 
resisted and thirdly, it is considered self-evident’.” 
This quote by the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) (in Viviers, Bosch, 
Smit & Buijs, 2009: 3) is especially appropriate in the light of increasing numbers of 
responsible investors who actively integrate environmental, social and corporate governance 
(ESG) considerations into investment analysis and ownership practices (Roy & Gitman, 
2012). These investors are recognising the possible effect of ESG risk management on 
corporate financial performance (UNEP FI & Mercer, 2007). 
All investors, including responsible investors, need data to make scrupulous investment 
decisions. Corporate role players should hence acknowledge the importance of responsible 
business practices and the reporting thereof (Kaptein, 2004: 13). One of the main sources of 
financial and ESG data is the annual reports published by firms (Jeffrey, 2010: 43). Given 
environmental and social data constraints, focus was placed on corporate governance 
compliance in the current study. The term compliance was based on the “comply or explain” 
approach as discussed in the King II Report on corporate governance in South Africa. 
According to this approach, firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) have to 
report on their compliance with the King II guidelines or explain non-compliance. 
Consideration was given to both disclosure and acceptability compliance criteria. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, a background to the study is provided. 
This is followed by the problem statement and research objectives. Thereafter, the research 
methodology, prior academic research on the topic, the contribution and limitations of the 
study as well as the key concepts are presented. Finally, the structure of the dissertation is 
provided. 
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1.2 Background to the study 
In the current study, the researcher reflected on the concept of ‘responsible investing’. This 
phenomenon has several names, such as ‘ethical investing’ and ‘sustainability investing’. For 
the purpose of this study, reference is made to responsible investing (RI). The term RI has 
been widely used in academic literature in response to the launch of the United Nations 
Principles for Responsible Investment (UN PRI) in 2006 (Eccles & Viviers, 2011).  
As mentioned previously, all investors need data to make scrupulous investment decisions. 
However, a report by the United States Social Investment Forum (US SIF, 2009) indicates 
that few firms in emerging countries published comprehensive ESG reports in 2008. South 
Africa was noted as an exception, since the considered JSE-listed firms exhibited the most 
transparent non-financial reporting compared to the other companies. According to the US 
SIF (2009) report, South African firms focused on issues related to corporate governance. 
This finding could be attributed to the fact that many of the South African firms in the study 
have adopted the guidelines of the first two King Reports (published in 1994 and 2002). 
The need for sound corporate governance was highlighted during the global financial crisis 
which began in 2007. This crisis had a serious adverse effect on financial markets worldwide 
(UN, 2010). Based on the notion that ESG factors might influence financial performance 
(UNEP FI & Mercer, 2007), the question could be asked whether there was a relationship 
between corporate governance and the financial performance of JSE-listed firms during the 
2002–2010 period. Note that this period includes the 2007–2009 global financial crisis. 
A background sketch of RI is provided to explain ESG engagement. Based on the above-
mentioned question, three main constructs of this study will then be considered, namely 
corporate governance, financial performance and the 2007–2009 global financial crisis.  
1.2.1 Responsible investing 
Since the inception of modern RI in 1928, three prominent strategies had been developed by 
responsible investors, namely screening, shareholder activism and impact investing 
(Schwartz, 2003). Screening entails the exclusion of securities of firms that are observed to 
operate in an undesirable manner from an investor’s portfolio or the inclusion of securities of 
firms that operate in a desirable manner. Shareholder activism involves that shareholders 
actively engage with boards on a variety of ethical and ESG issues. Shareholders can engage 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
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companies through private negotiations, voting at annual general meetings (AGMs) and 
divesting from firms that fail to transform. Impact investing entails that investors support 
particular causes by investing directly in these, such as social infrastructure development 
(Viviers, Bosch, Smit & Buijs, 2008: 39). 
Irrespective of the chosen strategy, responsible and conventional investors need ESG data to 
make informed decisions. The growing RI market globally and in South Africa has 
emphasised the importance of ESG considerations. As ethical and ESG considerations might 
have an impact on financial performance, specific attention should be given to the 
phenomenon. Shareholders, who do not have adequate ESG information, might be exposed to 
financial risks that could lead to lower returns on their investments (Hummels & Timmer, 
2004: 73). The availability of ESG data is thus not only relevant to responsible investors, but 
to all investors.  
Due to the lack of standardised environmental and social data, the focus in the current study 
was on corporate governance data. Corporate governance is typically the first level of ESG 
engagement for investors (World Federation of Exchanges, 2010: 2). In addition, research has 
shown that many investors regard ESG risk management to be narrowly concerned with 
corporate governance considerations (World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
& UNEP FI, 2010: 7). In the current study, the corporate governance compliance of JSE-
listed companies was considered. 
1.2.2 Corporate governance 
Different definitions exist for ‘corporate governance’. In this study, the definition of corporate 
governance as formulated in the first King Report was used, namely “the system by which 
firms are directed and controlled” (IoDSA, 1994). From the early 1990s, an increasing 
number of corporate governance guidelines and codes were published globally to safeguard 
the interests of stakeholders, and particularly those of shareholders (Bjuggren & Mueller, 
2009: 361; Demirag, Sudarsanam & Wright, 2000: 341; Fombrun, 2006). 
Amongst all emerging countries, South Africa pioneered the way with the publication of 
corporate governance guidelines when the first King Report was published in 1994 
(Armstrong, Segal & Davis, 2005). The focus of this report was on issues relating to the board 
of directors and shareholder protection (West, 2009: 11). Due to changes in legislation and the 
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global corporate governance environment, the King II Report was published in 2002. This 
report provided guidelines on how JSE-listed firms could, amongst others, voluntarily comply 
with recommendations on the remuneration and structure of their boards and board 
committees (IoDSA, 2002; Mallin, 2007: 248). 
In 2009, the third King Report was published. This report was based on international 
corporate governance trends, as well as changes in the South African corporate environment. 
The King III Report focused on sustainability and integrated reporting (IoDSA, 2009). As in 
1994 and 2002, the JSE adapted its listing requirements accordingly. Since 2011, JSE-listed 
firms have been required to publish integrated reports that encapsulate both financial and non-
financial (ESG) data (Pretorius, 2011). As the need for non-financial data increased over the 
past few years, companies increasingly started to report on these considerations in addition to 
their financial performance (Epstein & Buhovac, 2014). However, as previously mentioned, 
firms mainly reported on corporate governance compliance. 
After a thorough literature review was conducted, it became evident that the majority of 
empirical research on corporate governance had been conducted in developed countries. 
Researchers have reported inconclusive evidence on the nature (positive or negative) of the 
relationship between corporate governance and financial performance (Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2006; Judge, Naoumova & Koutzevol, 2003; Omran, Bolbol & Fatheldin, 2008). In addition, 
previous African researchers mainly concentrated on board-specific corporate governance 
variables (such as Babatunde & Olaniran, 2009; Ehikioya, 2009; Kajola, 2008; Kyereboah-
Coleman, 2007; Mangena & Chamisa, 2008; Sanda, Mikailu & Garba, 2005).  
Specific attention was given to three South African studies. For each of these studies, the 
researcher will explain how the study differed from the current research. Moloi (2008) 
assessed the corporate governance reporting of the Top 40 JSE-listed firms in 2006. He used a 
corporate governance checklist based on specific King II recommendations. Moloi reported 
that the majority of the firms adhered to good corporate governance practices. Two limitations 
of his study were that only the 40 largest listed firms were examined for only one year. In 
contrast, small, medium and large firms (based on market capitalisation) were considered over 
a longer study period (nine years) for this PhD project. 
South African researchers Ntim, Opong and Danbolt (2012) examined the relationship 
between corporate governance disclosure practices (based on 50 King II provisions) and firm 
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value (measured by total share return [TSR] and Tobin’s Q) for the period 20022007. These 
authors reported a positive association between firm value and corporate governance 
disclosure practices. However, they only focused on disclosure and did not assign an 
acceptability score. In the current study, both the disclosure and acceptability dimensions of 
the corporate governance practices of a sample of JSE-listed firms were considered over the 
period 20022010. 
Abdo and Fisher (2007: 46) considered the impact of reported corporate governance 
disclosure on the financial performance of 97 companies listed in nine sectors of the JSE over 
a three-year period (June 2003June 2006). Their corporate governance measure consisted of 
29 corporate governance considerations, based on the King II Report and the Standard and 
Poor’s International CGS Index. Financial performance was measured in terms of only 
market-based measures (TSR, market-to-book ratio and price–earnings ratio). Corporate 
governance was found to be positively correlated with TSR. 
In the current study, a more extensive corporate governance research instrument was used. As 
will be pointed out in Chapter 4, this research instrument consisted of nine categories and 39 
corporate governance factors, based on recommendations of the King II Report (IoDSA, 
2002) and the Public Investment Corporation Limited (PIC, 2011). Abdo and Fisher (2007) 
excluded firms that delisted during the study period and ignored accounting-based 
performance measures. In contrast, the sample for the current study included both listed and 
delisted firms. Accounting-based and market-based performance measures were employed. 
Risk-adjusted abnormal returns, incorporating risk, size and value/growth considerations were 
furthermore taken into account. 
The reference for the King II Report is the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (IoDSA, 
2002). This reference was not repeated for further referrals to the King II Report in this 
dissertation. The only exception was when some of the King guidelines were considered, but 
the report’s name was not explicitly mentioned. 
1.2.3 Financial performance 
Inconclusive empirical evidence exists on the nature (positive or negative) of the relationship 
between corporate governance and financial performance. Depending on the selected 
financial performance measure(s), previous researchers reported a positive, negative or no 
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significant relationship between the above-mentioned variables. See Section 3.4 for a 
comprehensive discussion on previous corporate governance and financial performance 
studies. It was thus challenging to decide on the appropriate financial performance measures 
to use in this study. 
The researcher had to decide between accounting-based and/or market-based performance 
measures. Accounting-based performance measures (such as return on assets [ROA]) reflect 
on a firm’s past performance. Market-based performance measures (for example TSR and 
risk-adjusted abnormal return), on the other hand, evaluate the market’s perceptions of a 
firm’s current and anticipated performance and risk (Verweire & Van den Berghe, 2004: 20). 
Since specific performance aspects can be evaluated by using accounting-based and market-
based measures respectively, a combination of these measures were used in the current study. 
Classic management theorists consider profit maximisation as a legitimate objective of profit-
orientated firms (Verweire & Berghe, 2004: 20–21). The first King Report also indicated that 
profitability is amongst the most important drivers of corporate governance compliance. 
Without profitability, none of the stakeholders will have any enduring interest in a firm 
(IoDSA, 1994).  
In line with previous corporate governance research, the accounting-based profitability 
measures ROA, return on equity (ROE) and earnings per share (EPS) were used in the current 
study. The researcher realises that the selected accounting-based measures have possible 
limitations, including artificial manipulation by managers and distortion due to inflation 
(Haberberg & Rieple, 2008; Venanzi, 2012; Whittington, 2007). The ROA, ROE and EPS 
accounting-based performance measures were nonetheless used for comparative purposes to 
previous research findings. 
The market-based TSR measure was also used in the current study. This measure includes 
share price changes and dividend income over a specific period (Megginson, Smart & Lucey, 
2008: 194). The TSR measure is not adjusted for risk. Both the single-factor capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM) and the multi-factor FamaFrench three-factor model were hence 
employed to estimate risk-adjusted abnormal returns for four corporate governance portfolios 
(Fama & French, 1992; Kürschner, 2008: 7). The portfolios were compiled based on the 
sample firms’ CGSs. See Sections 2.4.3 and 2.4.5 for detailed discussions on these two 
models. 
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The 20072009 global financial crisis had an effect on the financial performance of firms 
worldwide, including South Africa. This crisis period was hence deliberately included as a 
third construct in the current study. 
1.2.4 The 20072009 global financial crisis 
The early and mid-2000s were marked by economic growth, followed by the 20072009 
global financial crisis. Previous researchers noted that monetary excesses could lead to a 
period of prosperity followed by a financial collapse (Kamin, 1999; Kindleberger 1978; 
Taylor, 2009). Refer to Section 2.6 for a detailed discussion on the causes and consequences 
of the 2007–2009 crisis. For the purpose of the current study, a financial crisis was defined as 
a disruption to financial markets (Portes & Swoboda, 1987: 10).  
With regard to corporate governance compliance during a crisis period, Mitton (2002) 
indicates that weak corporate governance compliance could aggravate a crisis once it has 
started. The 20072009 crisis period had a considerable effect on the South African economy 
and hence the share market (Madubeko, 2010). However, to the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge, none of the previous South African corporate governance researchers had 
included the 20072009 crisis period as part of their considered study period.  
1.3 Problem statement 
Initial empirical research on corporate governance and financial performance was mainly 
conducted in developed countries. Relatively fewer corporate governance studies have been 
conducted in emerging countries. In addition, previous researchers (such as Abdo & Fisher, 
2007; Babatunde & Olaniran, 2009; Klapper & Love, 2004) reported inconclusive evidence 
on the nature of the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance. 
The main motivation for conducting corporate governance research in South Africa, an 
emerging country, was that a gap in the literature would be addressed. Secondly, South Africa 
is a global corporate governance pioneer and thus provides a suitable corporate governance 
research environment (Armstrong et al., 2005: 7).  
Since 1994, JSE-listed firms operate within a well-developed corporate governance 
framework provided by the King Reports (Armstrong et al., 2005: 7). However, only a few 
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corporate governance studies have so far been conducted in the country. The main reason for 
the paucity of research is a lack of readily available corporate governance data. Corporate 
governance compliance (or the lack thereof) is typically a sensitive matter, since it can harm a 
firm’s reputation. Corporate governance rating agencies therefore rarely make firm-specific 
corporate governance data publicly available. 
In this study, an existing corporate governance research instrument was refined. This 
instrument was used to compile annual corporate governance scores (CGSs) for each of the 
JSE-listed firms in the sample by means of content analysis. Since the data constraint was 
dealt with, the researcher could turn her attention to corporate governance compliance in 
South Africa.  
The current study was hence undertaken to investigate the relationship between corporate 
governance and the financial performance of selected JSE industries for the period 
20022010. A justification for this period is provided in Section 1.5.2. 
1.4 Research objectives and hypotheses 
In the following section, details are provided on the primary and secondary research 
objectives, as well as the research questions and hypotheses. 
1.4.1 Primary research objective 
In line with the problem statement, the primary research objective of this study was to 
investigate the relationship between corporate governance and the financial performance of 
selected JSE industries. 
1.4.2 Secondary research objectives 
To give effect to the primary research objectives of this study, the following secondary 
research objectives have been formulated: 
 to conduct a thorough review of the literature on corporate governance, financial 
performance and financial crises; 
 to select the most appropriate research design and methodology for this study based on 
the primary research objective; 
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 to formulate research hypotheses; 
 to refine the PIC Corporate Governance Rating Matrix (initially designed by the 
Centre for Corporate Governance in Africa at the University of Stellenbosch Business 
School (USB) on behalf of the PIC). To use this instrument to compile annual CGSs 
for each of the sample companies by means of content analysis; 
 to collect and analyse the secondary data for this study; and 
 to provide pertinent conclusions and recommendations based on the literature review 
and empirical findings. 
1.4.3 Research questions 
Given the purpose of the research and the stated research objectives, a number of research 
questions were formulated: 
 What does ‘RI’ entail? 
 What is meant by ‘corporate governance’? 
 How can corporate governance be measured? 
 How important was sound corporate governance compliance for the sample firms? 
 What was the corporate governance compliance trend in the sample of JSE-listed 
companies over the research period? 
 What was the trend in the disclosure and acceptability dimensions of the CGSs over 
the research period? 
 Are there differences between the corporate governance compliance of JSE-listed 
companies and that of delisted companies? 
 Are there differences between the corporate governance compliance of companies 
listed in different JSE industries? 
 Which measures can be used to evaluate financial performance? 
 Was the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance 
noticeable immediately (in the given year) or only after a period of time? 
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 Was there an association between the corporate governance compliance of the top 
CGS firms in the sample and their risk-adjusted financial performance? 
 What is meant by a financial crisis? 
 Does 2008, the midpoint of the 2007–2009 global financial crisis, represent a 
structural break in the financial dataset? 
 What was the effect of the 20072009 global financial crisis on the financial 
performance of JSE-listed companies included in the sample? 
 Which stakeholders could benefit from corporate governance compliance globally and 
in South Africa? 
1.4.4 Research hypotheses 
Based on the primary research objective, the following research hypotheses were formulated: 
𝐻01: There is no relationship between corporate governance and the accounting-based 
performance of JSE-listed companies.  
𝐻02:  There is no relationship between corporate governance and the market-based 
performance of JSE-listed companies. 
In Section 1.5, this study’s research design and methodology is explained. 
1.5 Research design and methodology 
Business research is a practical, systematic activity to observe aspects about business matters 
to solve problems in a timely manner (Coldwell & Herbst, 2004). A nine-step research 
process was followed in this study (Cant, Gerber-Nel, Nel & Kotzé, 2003). Firstly, the 
research problem and research objectives were defined, as reported in Sections 1.3 and 1.4. 
Thereafter, the research design was developed. 
1.5.1 Development of a research design 
As indicated in Section 5.3, various research types can be used to investigate the research 
problem. The current study was descriptive in nature in that it provided a description of the 
characteristics of the observed phenomena (Struwig & Stead, 2013). A process of deduction 
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was used to formulate and test a number of hypotheses on the relationship between corporate 
governance and financial performance. 
Both positivistic and phenomenological research paradigms can be used by researchers. A 
positivistic paradigm is followed when quantitative data are considered. A quantitative 
research method infers, describes and resolves problems by using numbers (Coldwell & 
Herbst, 2004). On the other hand, a phenomenological paradigm is employed to study 
qualitative data if information cannot be analysed in numerical terms (Coldwell & Herbst, 
2004; Remenyi, Williams, Money & Swartz, 1998). In the current study, a positivistic 
paradigm was adopted, which called for the collection and analysis of quantitative data. 
As explained in Section 5.4, time measurement was of specific concern to the research design, 
due to the panel nature of the data. An unbalanced panel design was used by making annual 
corporate governance observations for each of the sample firms for the years that they were 
listed over the period 20022010. 
1.5.2 Secondary research 
Researchers can collect both secondary and primary data. Secondary data are already in 
existence, whereas primary data are collected for the first time (Zikmund & Babin, 
2010: 163). In this study, no primary research was conducted. Two sets of secondary data 
were collected. Firstly, a number of international and national journal articles, books and 
websites were considered in a thorough analysis of the existing literature. Secondly, the 
corporate governance and financial data were sourced. 
The corporate governance data were not available in a usable format. The corporate 
governance research instrument of the Centre for Corporate Governance in Africa at the USB 
and the PIC (2011) was consequently refined by the researcher for the purpose of the current 
study. This instrument was used to compile a CGS for each of the sample firms by means of 
content analysis. See Section 5.9.3 for more detail on the coding of the corporate governance 
data. For this purpose, annual reports were sourced from the McGregor BFA (2013) database. 
Following the acquisition of I-Net Bridge by McGregor BFA, the database is now known as 
INET BFA (Bowie, 2014). In this dissertation, reference is still made to McGregor BFA. 
To collect comparative corporate governance data, the period 2002, the year that the King II 
Report became effective, to 2010 was considered. Although the King III Report became 
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effective from 1 March 2010, it only became mandatory for JSE-listed firms to incorporate 
ESG analysis in their annual reports from 2011 onward (Pretorius, 2011). For consistency 
sake, the recommendations of the King II Report were applied for the entire study period. 
Based on existing literature, standardised financial data (ROA, ROE, EPS and TSR) were 
sourced from the McGregor BFA (2013) database. The CAPM and Fama–French three-factor 
models were used to estimate risk-adjusted abnormal returns. Data on the risk-free rate of 
return and the market proxy in South Africa (the Financial Times Stock Exchange 
[FTSE]/JSE All Share Index) were obtained from the Bureau for Economic Research (BER, 
2013), a research institute at Stellenbosch University. 
1.5.3 Population and sample 
The population consisted of all JSE-listed firms for the period 20022010. A combination of 
judgement and convenience sampling was used to draw a sample from six JSE industries. The 
considered industries were Health Care, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Industrials, 
Telecommunications and Technology. Extensive details on the sample selection process are 
provided in Section 5.8. 
Survivorship bias refers to the consequence of excluding firms that delisted during the study 
period from a study’s dataset (Pawley, 2006: 21). The exclusion of delisted firms can skew 
the results of a study, since the firms that remain listed are often financially more successful 
than the ones that delisted. Another form of sampling bias can result from the exclusion of 
small firms from the sample. Previous corporate governance researchers in South Africa 
tended to focus on large listed firms. In an attempt to reduce survivorship and sampling bias, 
listed firms and companies that delisted during the study period were included in the sample. 
The considered firms included large, medium and small firms based on market capitalisation. 
Details on this study’s population and sample are provided in Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1: Details on the population and sample utilised in this study 
Year Population
a)
 Complete sample
 
2002 451 188 
2003 411 190 
2004 389 165 
2005 373 159 
2006 389 144 
2007 411 139 
2008 411 144 
2009 398 149 
2010 397 139 
a) Data sourced from the World Federation of Exchanges (2014) 
Source: Researcher’s own construction 
1.5.4 Data collection 
The collection of data entails the systematic gathering of data for a specific purpose from 
various sources (Silber & Foshay, 2010: 96). As part of this process, the variables for the 
current study were identified. Table 1.2 provides a summary of the variables, as well as the 
relevant data sources. 
Table 1.2: Summary of the variables considered in the current study 
Variable Source 
Corporate governance  
Annual CGS 
Compiled by the researcher from the firms’ annual 
reports (sourced from McGregor BFA, 2013) by 
means of content analysis 
Accounting-based performance measures 
Annual ROA Sourced from McGregor BFA (2013) 
Annual ROE 
Calculated by the researcher based on financial data 
obtained from McGregor BFA (2013) 
Annual headline EPS Obtained from McGregor BFA (2013) 
Market-based performance measures 
Monthly TSR Obtained from McGregor BFA (2013) 
Risk-adjusted abnormal return 
Estimated by the researcher for four corporate 
governance portfolios based on regression analysis 
Estimation models 
CAPM (market model) 
Data provided by the McGregor BFA (2013) database 
and the BER (2013) 
Fama–French three-factor model 
Data provided by the McGregor BFA (2013) database 
and the BER (2013) 
Data required for the estimation of alphas 
Book value of ordinary shares (BE) (year t-1) Sourced from McGregor BFA (2013) 
Size (year t-1) Sourced from McGregor BFA (2013) 
Monthly risk-free rate (Bond exchange yield on the 
long-term R186 government bond) 
Data provided by the BER (2013) 
Monthly return on the market (FTSE/JSE All Share 
Index; average calculated monthly TSR based on 
equally-weighted portfolio construction) 
Data provided by the BER (2013) 
Source: Researcher’s own construction 
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1.5.5 Data processing 
Once collected, the quantitative data were processed by means of descriptive and inferential 
statistics. Descriptive statistics (the mean, median, minimum value, maximum value and 
standard deviation) were used to summarise the collected data (Coldwell & Herbst, 2004). A 
Chow test was employed to determine whether 2008, the midpoint of the 20072009 global 
financial crisis, represented a structural break in the financial dataset. This was done to 
examine whether or not the financial variables were stable over time. 
Inferential statistics were used to consider the association between the dependent and 
independent variables. A mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to determine 
whether the mean CGSs of the listed firms differed significantly from those of the delisted 
firms, as well as over the research period. The ordinary least squares regression (OLS) model 
was used in many previous studies to test for an association between corporate governance 
and financial performance (Ramdani & Van Witteloostuijn, 2010). However, specification 
errors may occur if the assumptions of the OLS regression model are not met. Such errors 
include, amongst others, autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (Bradley, 2011). Care was 
taken to minimise these errors in the current study. 
The fixed effects and random effects regression techniques are commonly associated with 
panel data analysis (Hassett & Paavilainen-Mäntymäki, 2013: 45). For the purpose of this 
study, both the F-test for fixed effects and the Hausman test were considered to select the 
appropriate regression model. See Sections 5.10.2.55.10.2.8 for an in-depth discussion on 
these regression models as well as the relevant tests. Panel regression analyses were 
conducted on CGS and EPS, ROA, ROE and TSR respectively. 
In addition to TSR, which does not reflect risk, risk-adjusted abnormal returns (alphas) were 
estimated. For this purpose, both the CAPM and FamaFrench three-factor models were 
employed. Four corporate governance portfolios were constructed, based on the level of 
corporate governance compliance of the sample companies. The estimated alpha values of 
these four portfolios were compared over the period 20022010.  
Attention was furthermore given to whether the firms with the highest CGSs were able to 
weather the 20072009 financial storm better than the companies with the lowest CGSs. For 
this purpose, the dataset was sub-divided into two periods, namely before May 2008 and after 
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May 2008. The estimated alphas of the four corporate governance portfolios were then also 
compared for these two sub-periods. 
1.6 Prior academic research on the topic 
An extensive word search was done in 2010 when this study started. The key words 
‘corporate governance’, ‘financial performance’, ‘financial crisis’, ‘South Africa’ and ‘JSE’ 
were searched on the Sabinet database. Attention was given to current and completed research 
and the Union Catalogue of Theses and Dissertations. A similar search was conducted on 
Nexus for current and completed research projects. No studies were found that considered the 
relationship between corporate governance and the financial performance of JSE-listed firms 
that specifically included the 2007–2009 crisis period. 
See Section 1.2.2 for a discussion on previous South African researchers who also examined 
the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance. In this dissertation, 
specific reference is made to the differences between these studies and the current research. 
1.7 Contribution of the study 
After an extensive literature study, it was evident that inconclusive evidence existed in the 
emerging market context on the relationship between corporate governance and financial 
performance. A gap in the literature was hence addressed by considering this relationship in 
the South African context. Various stakeholders could benefit from this study’s findings, 
including directors and managers, private sector training providers and consultants, investors, 
ESG data providers, the media, researchers, educators and policymakers. 
In this study, the importance of sound corporate governance compliance will be highlighted. 
Hopefully, managers and directors would recognise and (more) efficiently perform their 
moral and legal responsibilities towards their firms’ shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Directors and managers could receive training with regard to firm-specific corporate 
governance compliance difficulties. Such training could be provided by private sector training 
providers, consultants and the IoDSA. 
In 2010, when this study commenced, there was no comprehensive corporate governance 
database available from which data could be sourced for academic research. As such, the 
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researcher refined an existing corporate governance research instrument. She then applied this 
instrument to compile a comprehensive database on the corporate governance compliance of a 
sample of JSE-listed firms over a nine-year period. Since investors need data to make 
informed investment decisions, more data providers could provide ESG data in future. 
The media could place more focus on the importance of corporate governance compliance. 
The results of this study can, for example, be published in business newspapers and financial 
magazines. Researchers could benefit from this study as a result of the contribution to the 
body of knowledge on corporate governance and financial performance. Educators could 
teach their students both financial and non-financial aspects, such as corporate governance. 
They can then apply this knowledge when working as corporates in South Africa and 
elsewhere. 
Policymakers should consider whether the voluntary approach of the King Reports is working 
in practice. If not, these voluntary principles might possibly be converted into legislation. 
More details are provided on this study’s contribution in Section 8.5. 
1.8 Limitations of the research 
Four limitations of this study have been identified. Firstly, the sample only included firms 
listed in six of the ten JSE industries. The reason for the exclusion of Basic Materials, Oil and 
Gas and Financials was that the nature of the financial reporting of the firms listed in these 
industries differs from that of the other industries. During the study period, no firms were 
listed in the Utilities industry. Firms listed in the excluded industries could possibly provide 
different results in terms of both financial performance and corporate governance compliance. 
Secondly, the limited timeframe excluded the possible effect of the King III Report on 
recommendations such as integrated reporting. Furthermore, the current study was conducted 
in an emerging market context, where limited ESG data were available. In future, South 
African academics might be able to examine the complete ESG spectrum and not only 
corporate governance compliance. However, at the time that this study was undertaken, 
sufficient comparative environmental and social data were not published by enough JSE-
listed companies to justify such a study. 
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Thirdly, annual reports were only sourced from McGregor BFA (2013). Some firms could 
have made (unaudited) separate sustainability reports and sustainability-related information 
available on their websites. For consistency sake, this information was not considered by the 
researcher. If such information existed and was taken into account, the scores that were 
allocated for the sustainability reporting category could have been different. 
Lastly, specific accounting-based and market-based performance measures were used in the 
current study. The selected measures were selected based on previous research. Numerous 
financial performance measures are discussed in literature. The usage of other performance 
measures could possibly have led to different results. 
1.9 Key concepts 
This study’s key concepts were: 
 Acceptability: an indication that the disclosed corporate governance information in a 
company’s annual report was in line with the recommendations of the King II Report 
and the PIC (2011). 
 Accounting-based performance measures: measures which reflect a firm’s past 
performance, with a general focus on profitability (Agarwal, 2013: 149). 
 Annual report: a formal account of the proceedings of a firm or group throughout the 
preceding year with the intention of giving information to stakeholders regarding the 
financial performance and non-financial activities of the firm (Collier, 2009a). 
 Compliance: a firm’s reported corporate governance initiatives were in line with the 
King II principles and recommendations by the PIC (2011). The notion of compliance 
was based on the “comply or explain” approach as discussed in the King II Report. 
Compliance in this study involved both disclosure and acceptability criteria. 
 Content analysis: a systematic way of quantifying and describing observed 
phenomena (Krippendorff, 2004). 
 Corporate governance: the system by which firms are directed and controlled 
(IoDSA, 1994).  
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 Corporate governance score: a score that reflects the compliance of a specific JSE-
listed firm with the guidelines of the King II Report and the recommendations of the 
PIC (2011) for a given year.  
 Disclosure: information on financial and non-financial considerations published in 
audited annual reports (PIC, 2011).  
 Financial crisis: a disruption to financial markets, which can affect the entire 
economic environment (Portes & Swoboda, 1987: 10).  
 Market-based performance measures: measures that give an indication of investors’ 
perceptions regarding the past performance and future prospects of the firm, typically 
based on the company’s share price (Bhat, 2008: 81). 
 Responsible investing: the integration of ESG considerations into investment 
management processes and ownership practices based on the belief that these factors 
have an impact on financial performance (UNEP FI & Mercer, 2007). 
 Risk-adjusted abnormal return: a market-based performance measure that considers 
share returns in excess of expected returns (Lee, Lee & Lee, 2009). Risk-adjusted 
abnormal returns were based on the CAPM and FamaFrench three-factor models in 
the case of this study. 
1.10 Structure of the dissertation 
This dissertation comprises eight chapters. 
Chapter 1: Introduction to the study 
This chapter reflects a broad overview of the study. A background sketch, the research 
problem, the research objectives and hypotheses, research methodology, prior academic 
research on the topic, the contribution and limitations of the current study, key concepts, as 
well as an overview of the contents of the chapters comprising the dissertation are provided. 
Chapter 2: Financial performance and financial crisis 
The focus of Chapter 2 is on two of the main constructs of this study, namely ‘financial 
performance’ and ‘financial crisis’. This chapter starts by defining financial performance, 
followed by a discussion of accounting-based and market-based performance measures. Non-
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traditional performance considerations are also mentioned. The causes of financial crisis 
periods are discussed. Specific reference is made to the 2007–2009 global financial crisis and 
the role that insufficient corporate governance compliance played in this crisis. 
Chapter 3: Responsible investing and corporate governance 
Corporate governance is the third main construct of this study. It is positioned in the field of 
RI. Corporate governance compliance is one of the non-financial aspects to which investors in 
general and responsible investors in particular give attention. This chapter begins with a 
discussion on the history of RI. Specific attention is given to the South African regulatory 
environment, followed by a detailed discussion on corporate governance globally and the 
development of the local King Reports over the past two decades. A summary of previous 
corporate governance studies conducted in developed and emerging countries is provided. 
Specific reference is made to previous South African studies. Research on the effect of 
previous crisis periods on corporate governance is also considered. 
Chapter 4: The corporate governance research instrument 
In Chapter 4, a detailed discussion is provided on the refinement and implementation of the 
research instrument that was used to compile annual CGSs for the sample firms.  
Chapter 5: Research design and methodology 
This chapter focuses on the research process that was followed. Nine steps are discussed, 
namely identifying and formulating the research problem and objectives, developing a 
research design, conducting secondary and primary research, determining the research frame, 
collecting data, processing data and finally, reporting the research findings. 
Chapter 6: Empirical results: descriptive statistics 
The findings of the descriptive statistics for both the independent and dependent variables are 
presented in this chapter. An overview is also provided of relevant economic data, with 
specific reference to the 2007–2009 global financial crisis. 
Chapter 7: Empirical results: inferential statistics 
Chapter 7 presents the results of the inferential statistics. The results of the mixed-model 
ANOVA design, which was used to determine the significance of the observed trends in the 
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CGSs, are discussed. The results of various panel regression analyses are also reported. Focus 
was placed on whether 2008, the mid-point of the 20072009 global financial crisis could be 
seen as a structural break in the financial dataset. In addition to the market-based TSR 
measure, risk-adjusted abnormal returns were estimated for four corporate governance 
portfolios by applying both the CAPM and the FamaFrench three-factor models.  
Chapter 8: Summary, conclusions and recommendations 
In Chapter 8, a summary of the study is provided. Conclusions are drawn and 
recommendations made, based on the research findings. Finally, suggestions for future 
research, based on the identified limitations of this study, are provided. 
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CHAPTER 2  
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE AND 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
2.1 Introduction 
As indicated in Chapter 1, the current study considered the relationship between corporate 
governance and financial performance within the South African context. One of the ultimate 
goals of corporate governance is to ensure that financiers receive a [sustainable] return on 
their investment (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The evaluation of financial performance is thus a 
central theme in corporate finance (Verweire & Van den Berghe, 2004: 8, 15).  
Measures to assess financial performance typically include return on investment ratios such as 
ROA and ROE (Schniederjans, Hamaker & Schniederjans, 2010: 60). The accountability of a 
firm’s managers to financial claimholders can be enhanced by having efficient corporate 
governance mechanisms in place (Jostarndt, 2007). According to the King III Report (IoDSA, 
2009), the 20072009 global financial crisis that started in the United States of America 
(USA) can be partly described as a corporate governance crisis. Corporate governance 
mechanisms were criticised for failing to safeguard firms against excessive risk-taking prior 
to this crisis (Kirkpatrick, 2009). On a positive note, sound internal corporate governance can 
mitigate the negative effects of a crisis (Chang, Park & Yoo, 1998; Moody-Stewart, 2009). 
Previous corporate governance researchers mostly considered the period before the 2007–
2009 global financial crisis. This crisis period was deliberately included in the current study, 
since the effect of the crisis on the financial performance of JSE-listed firms could not be 
ignored. There is no optimal set of performance measures that should be used to evaluate 
financial performance. In this study, the researcher concentrated on selected accounting-based 
and market-based financial performance measures that were used by previous corporate 
governance researchers. 
Financial performance is defined in Section 2.2, followed by a discussion on different 
accounting-based and market-based performance measures. Non-traditional performance 
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considerations are explained in Section 2.5. Thereafter, the causes and impact of financial 
crises are discussed in Section 2.6.  
2.2 Defining financial performance  
Financial performance can be defined as the results of the operations and policies of a firm in 
monetary terms (BusinessDictionary.com, 2013). The financial performance of companies 
may be influenced by internal managerial decisions (for example the financing of assets) and 
by external factors (such as a financial crisis). Although managers can exercise control over 
the internal corporate environment, they have very limited influence over changes in the 
external environment (Lussier, 2012: 56). 
Conventional financial management entails an integrated decision-making process (Baker & 
Powell, 2005). It concerns the acquisition and financing of assets as well as accomplishing the 
overall corporate objectives whilst operating in a complex economic environment (Epstein & 
Buhovac, 2014). Managers are supposed to regularly measure the performance of the firms 
for which they work. Performance measurement refers to the collection and reporting of 
mainly financial data, as well as the periodic analysis of this data by a company’s managers 
(Abramson & Kieffaber, 2003: 194). The measurement of performance provides the link 
between corporate decisions and the extent to which stated objectives have been reached 
(Epstein & Buhovac, 2014). 
2.2.1 Traditional financial performance objectives 
In this section, consideration is given to two traditional financial performance objectives, 
namely shareholders’ wealth maximisation and profit maximisation. 
2.2.1.1 Shareholders’ wealth maximisation 
Traditionally, the primary objective of a firm’s managers is considered to be the maximisation 
of the shareholders’ wealth. Financial authors (such as Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2009; 
Brigham & Houston, 2012) often indicate that shareholders’ wealth maximisation could be 
obtained by optimising the market price per share. This objective is based on the notion that 
shareholders are the owners of a firm. They buy shares with the aim of earning a return 
without undue risk exposure (Brigham & Ehrhardt, 2013: 9). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 23 
The shareholders of a firm then elect directors, who in turn hire managers to manage the daily 
operations of the firm. Actions driven by managers who are acting out of self-interest could 
increase the rate of return by keeping the share price artificially high. The share price of a 
firm can then be optimised, while shareholders’ wealth is simultaneously destroyed (Baijal, 
2012; Ehrbar, 1998: 6; Parboteeah & Cullen, 2013: 25). The decisions of a firm’s managers 
can thus have a significant effect on the wealth of investors as well as on their perceptions of 
future performance (Khan & Jain, 2007).  
Most proponents of the shareholders’ wealth maximisation perspective argue that this long-
term goal can also provide benefits to society (Martin, Petty & Wallace, 2009). They reason 
that competing companies will direct scarce resources to the most productive uses in order to 
create wealth. This wealth could then benefit the broader firm community. The effect could 
trickle down to benefit shareholders in the end (Keown, Martin, Petty & Scott, 2004: 4). 
Unfortunately, as explained in more detail in Section 2.6.3, the actions of managers are not 
always in line with the best interests of the firm’s shareholders.  
2.2.1.2 Profit maximisation 
The well-known American economist Milton Friedman (19122006) stated that the social 
responsibility of a firm is to increase its profits as long as it stays within “the rules of the 
game” (Friedman, 1970: 32). Friedman believed that the foundation of a free society is 
undermined when firms pursue any other responsibility (Horrigan, 2010; Ransome & 
Sampford, 2010: 35).  
From a microeconomic and accounting perspective, it is thus typically argued that profit 
maximisation should be the ultimate corporate goal. According to this viewpoint, profitability 
measures are critical tests of a firm’s performance, since profit is essential for the survival and 
long-term prosperity of a firm (Kumar & Sharma, 1998). A company should accordingly 
engage in activities that add to its profitability and eliminate activities that reduce profitability 
(Mittal, 2010: 349).  
When a microeconomic approach is used, the risks associated with investment projects and 
the timing of returns is typically ignored. However, investors normally require a higher return 
for taking on more risk. If the risk–return relationship is ignored, incorrect financial 
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management decisions may follow (Keown et al., 2004: 4–5). Furthermore, in a real-world 
scenario, the effect of possible future profits can also not be ignored. 
The profit maximisation perspective usually entails a theoretical, short-term goal. Accounting 
performance measures (as reflected in the annual reports of listed companies) are thus 
typically not focused on shareholders’ wealth creation (Keown et al., 2004: 124). The focus 
on short-term accounting-based performance measures, such as preliminary earnings results, 
can detract attention from the long-term objective of wealth creation. Managers should realise 
that decisions that could create long-term wealth, but strain short-term accounting results 
could (and should) be made. The rationale for such decisions should then be explained to 
shareholders by using the positive net present value (NPV) concept. Managers who consider 
this concept should invest in projects that will create value for the firm’s stakeholders over a 
longer period. The expected future benefits should exceed the cost of such investments (Floyd 
& Allen, 2002: 355; Madden, 2010; Moyer, McGuigan & Kretlow, 2009: 105).  
According to the two above-mentioned traditional perspectives, profitability and/or share 
returns are two important considerations for firms’ managers. As discussed, profit 
maximisation is often seen as a short-term objective, while wealth creation is typically a long-
term objective (Chapman, 2011). 
Traditional financial performance measures can be further classified according to three main 
dimensions, namely time-relatedness, value-relatedness and observation-relatedness (Lindow, 
2013: 114). The time-relatedness dimension categorises financial performance measures 
based on their focus on past or future performance. The second dimension (value-relatedness) 
places focus on the quantitative (financial) or non-financial nature of the measures. Lastly, 
according to observation-relatedness, financial performance measures can be divided into 
measures based on accounting data and/or market data (Lindow, 2013: 114).  
Over time, various financial performance measures have been designed to assess specific 
aspects of a company’s financial performance. These performance measures include, inter 
alia, accounting-based and market-based measures (Daily & Dalton, 1992: 379; Neely, 2002: 
8). In the following two sections, accounting-based and market-based performance measures 
are discussed. 
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2.3 Accounting-based performance measures 
As the name indicates, accounting-based performance measures rely on the financial 
information published in the annual reports of firms (Weber, 2012: 151). These measures 
typically reflect a firm’s past performance, with a focus on profitability (Agarwal, 2013: 149; 
Baker & Kiymaz, 2011; Faulkner, Teerikangas & Joseph, 2012: 120). Historically, 
accounting-based measures have been the most widely used by researchers across disciplines, 
including corporate governance, who investigated the relationship between an observed 
variable (such as a corporate governance score) and financial performance (Gomez-Meija, 
Berrone & Franco-Santos, 2010: 267).  
Profitability ratios can be used to assess the collective effects of liquidity, asset and debt 
management on amongst others the operating results of a company (Brigham & Houston, 
2012). Such ratios reflect on the ability of management to generate profit during a specific 
period. Profitability measures are often used to compare the performance of a firm with its 
competitors (Younger, 2013). The King II Report explicitly states that, without satisfactory 
profit levels, it is unlikely that stakeholders will have an enduring interest in a company.  
The ROA, ROE and EPS ratios are widely used accounting-based performance measures 
(Murray & Murray, 2012; Ramdani & Van Witteloostuijn, 2010). The relevance of these 
measures, as well as possible shortcomings are discussed in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. 
2.3.1 Return ratios 
Return ratios measure the efficiency of a firm to generate net income from its assets or capital 
(Gutmann, 2013). The ROA and ROE ratios are two commonly used return ratios. These 
measures give an indication of a firm’s financial health and are often used by investors to 
evaluate the efficiency of an investment (Basarab, 2011; Lesáková, 2007).  
The ROA ratio links a firm’s annual operating activities with its investment activities 
(Ingram, Albright & Baldwin, 2004). This ratio thus evaluates a firm’s effectiveness to 
generate profits from its available assets. The ROE ratio measures the return that a company 
has generated for ordinary shareholders. Consideration is given to the profit after tax for a 
specific year and capital provided by ordinary shareholders (Hatten, 2012: 199–200). Another 
approach to determine the ROE ratio is to multiply the ROA ratio with the firm’s financial 
leverage, defined as total assets divided by total equity. The ROE ratio thus provides a 
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summary of the firm’s success in terms of its operating, financing and investing activities 
(Hatten, 2012: 199–200; Ingram et al., 2004).  
The actions of managers and efficient corporate governance mechanisms (or the lack thereof) 
can play an important role in a firm’s investment, financing and operating decisions and the 
outcomes of such decisions (Cai, 2013). Efficient managers should not invest in ineffective 
assets or overinvest by choosing negative NPV projects. They should rather choose projects 
that create shareholder value. Regarding operating activities, if excess cash is available, 
positive NPV projects should be funded. Such projects are supposed to generate positive cash 
flows. However, when debt usage is high, profits are likely to decrease. The effect of leverage 
on the ROE ratio should thus be considered (Cai, 2013). In the case of positive financial 
leverage (the cost of money is less than the return on an investment) a firm’s ROE ratio is 
likely to increase if the company uses more debt capital to finance its assets. Such an increase 
does not necessarily indicate that the firm is well managed (Hatten, 2012: 199; Simkins & 
Simkins, 2013).  
2.3.1.1 Proponents of return ratios 
Some corporate governance researchers prefer accounting-based return ratios above market-
based share measures (Baker & Anderson, 2010: 108; Bhagat & Bolton, 2008). These 
researchers argue that accounting profitability is directly linked to a firm’s financial survival. 
Proponents of accounting-based measures reason that these measures are typically more 
stable and less subjective to speculation than market-based share measures (Hengartner, 2006; 
Joh, 2003: 297). Furthermore, when the share market is inefficient, share prices are not likely 
to reflect all available information (Joh, 2003: 297). This is of particular importance during 
crisis periods, such as the 2007–2009 global financial crisis. During a crisis, investors often 
act irrationally by not exercising their ability to reason logically (Mitchell & Wilmarth, 2010: 
98; Rand, 2004: 366).  
Ramdani and Van Witteloostuijn (2010) considered a large number of corporate governance 
studies that were conducted over the period 19852008. They found that ROA and ROE were 
favoured as financial performance measures in most of these studies. The main reason was 
that these return ratios provide a measure of how efficient a company’s managers are using 
the capital provided by investors to generate earnings (Rainey, 2008: 268). In Section 3.4, 
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further information is provided on previous corporate governance and financial performance 
studies where the ROA and ROE return ratios were used. 
2.3.1.2 Criticism against the ROA and ROE ratios 
Debt, equity or a combination of these financing sources can be used to fund positive NPV 
projects. However, excessive debt usage can be both risky and costly. For example, a firm’s 
financing costs will increase as more debt is used. If firms default on interest payments, they 
can experience financial distress and possibly file for bankruptcy (Brigham & Ehrhardt, 2013: 
600). Investors might view a company’s high ROE ratio as a positive sign, while the company 
is in fact struggling financially due to excessive debt usage. 
Evidence from the 2007–2009 global financial crisis revealed that, before the crisis period, 
some firms based their executive directors’ emoluments on their ROE ratios. Inflated debt 
levels were maintained to pay excessive bonuses to directors. When the crisis period ensued, 
those firms experienced severe financial difficulty. Some of these companies have not yet 
recovered from their financial losses and had to delist and/or file for bankruptcy (Simkins & 
Simkins, 2013).  
Another criticism is that the ROE ratio can be artificially manipulated by share buybacks, 
especially if debt capital is used to buy back shares (Taparia, 2003: 77). An increase in a 
firm’s debt usage results in higher financing costs and hence a decrease in net income. The 
ROE ratio might have increased (since the amount of ordinary shareholders’ equity probably 
decreased), although the firm’s profit did not improve (Taparia, 2003: 77). If a firm’s 
managers realise that they will be monitored regularly, inter alia, for illegal and misleading 
practices, they will be more likely to engage in sound business practices and comply with 
corporate governance guidelines (IoDSA, 2002).  
In addition to the ROA and ROE ratios, the EPS ratio was also used in the current study. 
Executives and market analysts tend to focus on the EPS performance measure when 
analysing financial performance (Ogilvie, 2009: 81). Previous corporate governance 
researchers (such as Alhaji, Yusoff & Alkali, 2012; Cheema & Din, 2013) also used the EPS 
ratio to measure financial performance. 
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2.3.2 The EPS ratio 
The EPS ratio reflects the net earnings available per share to a firm’s ordinary shareholders 
(Warren, Reeve & Duchac, 2012: 516). This ratio can be calculated based on historic earnings 
as well as projected future earnings (Tracy, 2002). Information can possibly be obtained about 
a company’s historical financial success (or the lack thereof) by analysing trends in the EPS 
ratio over time (Needles & Powers, 2009: 707; Nikolai, Bazley & Jones, 2010: 840).  
Different definitions for the EPS ratio are used in practice. JSE-listed companies are required 
to report their headline EPS (HEPS) (SAICA, 2009). Refer to Section 5.9.4.3 for a detailed 
discussion on the calculation of this ratio. In academic studies, reference is typically made to 
the use of EPS, with an explanatory section to discuss the specific EPS definition that was 
used. This approach was also followed in the current study. Share options and share 
repurchases can have a considerable influence on the EPS ratio, as explained in Section 
2.3.2.1. 
2.3.2.1 Share options, share repurchases and the EPS ratio 
The number of issued ordinary shares differ amongst firms. It might therefore be difficult to 
compare net income amongst small and large firms. The analysis of trends in the EPS ratio 
might also be challenging if large changes occur in the shareholders’ equity of a firm over 
time. Share buybacks, for example, result in a decrease in the number of ordinary shares 
issued. Consequently, the EPS ratio of a firm can improve, even if net profit does not improve 
(Christie, 2007). 
Managers are often obsessed with EPS growth over the short term (Young & Yang, 2011). 
This can be seen as an impediment to good corporate governance and the objective of creating 
value over the long term. The reason for this obsession is that managers’ emolument packages 
and incentives, such as share options, often depend on whether they have reached the EPS 
growth targets. However, short-term EPS growth does not necessarily create long-term value 
(Bogle, 2005: 113–114; Young & Yang, 2011). 
Since the 1980s, the popularity of share options schemes drastically increased in the USA 
(Winslow, 2003). Such schemes provide managers and directors with the possibility to obtain 
shares below the market price when they exercise their options. Executives and managers can 
hence influence share prices over the short term to benefit from share options. Inefficient 
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managers can cause large financial losses to their firms. However, once the share price 
recovers, these corporate role players can still gain from their share options. Option 
beneficiaries thus do not experience a personal financial loss due to their mismanagement. 
The personal wealth of firms’ insiders can hence be enhanced at the expense of the 
shareholders, something which is clearly in contradiction to the goal of shareholders’ wealth 
maximisation (Niskanen, 2005: 263; Wheeler, 2004: 10–11; Winslow, 2003: 48–50).  
Before the 2007–2009 financial crisis, the executives of the USA government-sponsored 
mortgage finance firm Fannie Mae, for instance, used share repurchases to reach their EPS 
growth target (Christie, 2007). EPS growth targets were regularly used by this firm to 
evaluate and compensate its executives. These growth targets were also used to allocate share 
options to the executives. In 2008, Fannie Mae made a financial loss that exceeded the net 
profit generated in the previous seventeen years (Arrowsmith & McNeil, 2008: 112; Cyert & 
DeGroot, 1987; Rosenberg, 2012: 219–120).  
Despite the financial loss and misstated earnings, Fannie Mae’s executives were not required 
to return their compensation (Hagerty, 2012: 251). However, the DoddFrank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (signed in July 2010) consequently mandated firms 
listed in the USA to recoup executive compensation in the event of material financial 
restatement (Oehmann, 2011). 
2.3.2.2 Other possible disadvantages of the EPS ratio 
In addition to the distorting effect of share repurchases, inflation can also have an adverse 
effect on the EPS ratio, since heterogeneous figures, such as numbers not expressed in the 
same monetary unit, are combined in this metric (Venanzi, 2012). Given that monetary 
figures are the general measurement unit used in accounting, comparisons over different time 
periods can be challenging (Whittington, 2007: 197). 
Another possible disadvantage is that firms can manipulate their reported profit, which can 
lead to false EPS figures (Haberberg & Rieple, 2008). Although such practices are clearly 
immoral and contradictory to sound corporate governance principles, they do unfortunately 
occur. An ethical corporate climate may reduce incidents of accounting manipulation 
(Abernethy, Bouwens & Van Lent, 2012). Therefore, the independence of financial 
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professionals, such as financial analysts and chartered accountants, should not be impaired 
(Chartered Financial Analyst Institute, 2010; SAICA, 2013).  
A firm’s auditors should use ratio analysis to identify abnormal values or deviations from the 
norm. Although absolute quantities can easily be manipulated, it is more difficult to 
manipulate all interrelated amounts (Gupta, 2005: 180). Consequently, if financial 
manipulation exists, the auditors are supposed to detect it by analysing trends and deviations 
in ratios before giving an unqualified audit opinion. Stakeholders could then use these audited 
reports to gather the necessary accounting-based information (Abernethy et al., 2012; Gupta, 
2005: 584). 
Financial statements reflect the effect that the decisions of managers had on a firm during the 
past year. Accounting-based measures reflect on historic performance, while share market 
measures reflect the market’s perception about the firm’s future prospects. Critics of 
accounting performance measures therefore often argue that share price performance 
measures should rather be considered, since it is an external measure that considers future 
performance (Madden, 2010; Venanzi, 2012).  
To address some of the shortcomings of accounting-based measures, market-based measures 
are often also included in studies that attempt to link corporate governance with financial 
performance (Mulsow, 2011; Wagner, 2003: 40). The market-based measures that were 
considered in this study are discussed in the following section. 
2.4 Market-based performance measures  
Share market data such as share prices are used as the primary source to evaluate market-
based performance (Eikelenboom, 2005: 116). Measures that are based on share prices are 
often used to assess long-term future performance (Gentry & Shen, 2010). These measures 
improve on accounting-based measures, since they can give management an indication of 
investors’ perceptions of the firm’s past performance and future prospects (Bhat, 2008: 81).  
Market-based measures are less subject to managerial manipulation in well-regulated markets 
than accounting-based measures (Mulsow, 2011: 34). In efficient markets, share prices should 
quickly adapt to new information. Market data are available on a daily basis, while 
accounting-based information is typically published less frequently (Gross, 2007). Market-
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based measures can also not be manipulated as easily as ratios that are based on financial 
statements (Bryson, 2012: 151).  
Another major advantage of market-based measures is that it can be adjusted for risk. 
Companies (and markets) with weak corporate governance practices can be less attractive to 
investors, especially due to possible heightened risks during a financial crisis period. 
Therefore, market-based measures are often included in corporate governance studies to 
consider whether firms that have high corporate governance compliance deliver better long-
term return rates compared to firms with low corporate governance compliance (Von 
Rekowsky, 2013). 
Unfortunately, market-based measures may be influenced by aspects that are not under the 
control of management, such as herding behaviour (Mitchell & Wilmarth, 2010: 98). 
2.4.1 Herding behaviour 
Theoretically, share prices that form the basis of market-based measures represent the 
discounted present value of future cash flows (Knecht, 2014: 223). However, instead of 
incorporating the potential future returns, share price movements can be induced by financial 
market volatility and herding behaviour (Bryson, 2012: 151; Knecht, 2014: 223). For 
example, before and during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis, many market participants 
engaged in herding behaviour (Mitchell & Wilmarth, 2010: 98).  
Herding behaviour refers to the tendency of individuals (and institutions) to act in similar 
ways, as if they were operating in a proverbial herd (Kremer & Nautz, 2013; Rizzi, 2008: 89). 
In the lead-up to the 20072009 global financial crisis, many investors and fund managers 
were influenced by each other’s decisions. They tended to follow one another into risky 
ventures (Bikhchandani & Sharma, 2000; Kolb, 2010: 279). When the financial difficulties 
started, investors also followed each other in withdrawing from certain investments and 
industries. Consequently, market liquidity became strained. Furthermore, investment 
managers probably did not want to jeopardise their jobs by investing when other market 
participants abandoned the market (Bikhchandani & Sharma, 2000).  
In financial markets, herds form more often on the sell-side of the market than on the buy-
side. Sell-side herding is also most evident for shares with low prior returns (Bikhchandani & 
Sharma, 2000). Herding behaviour exacerbated share market volatility before and during the 
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2007–2009 global financial crisis period (Kolb, 2010: 279).When observing a sample of 
German listed companies during the 2007–2009 crisis period, it was found that rising share 
volatility led to sell herding behaviour (Kremer & Nautz, 2013).  
Three popular market-based measures used to determine shareholders’ wealth increases, 
namely TSR, risk-adjusted abnormal return and Tobin’s Q (Gross, 2007: 23; Ntim et al., 
2012) will now be discussed. 
2.4.2 Share returns and risks 
An elementary consideration for existing and potential shareholders is the amount of money 
that they can earn on a specific investment. The TSR measure considers the dividend income 
and the change in the share price over the investment horizon (Megginson et al., 2008: 194). 
This market-based performance measure was included in previous studies that considered the 
relationship between corporate governance and financial performance (such as Ntim et al., 
2012; Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998).  
The main reasons for the inclusion of this measure in the current study are that previous 
corporate governance researchers considered TSR, the measure is simple to calculate and 
allows comparisons with other performance measures. The TSR measure is externally focused 
by reflecting the market’s perception of performance. The measure could hence be adversely 
impacted if the share price of a fundamentally strong firm “suffers” in the short term, for 
instance, during financial crisis periods. A disadvantage is that the measure does not take risk 
into account (QFINANCE, 2014a; Larrabee & Voss, 2013). 
Finance theory indicates that the expected return on an investment should be proportional to 
the level of risk that a rational investor takes (Arouri, Jawadi & Nguyen, 2010: 16; Groppelli 
& Nikbakht, 2006). Market efficiency (and thus rational expectations) implies that share 
prices should reflect all information that is available about a company and its prospects 
(Brigham & Ehrhardt, 2013). The intrinsic price per share should thus be approximately equal 
to the actual market price. However, share markets are not always efficient. Certain types of 
shares, with certain risk profiles, can thus occasionally outperform the market (Brigham & 
Ehrhardt, 2013; Stevenson, 2012). 
Risk cannot be ignored by financiers, especially in an emerging market context. South Africa 
offers considerable investment opportunities, but also presents a distinct set of challenges and 
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risks to investors (Van Dijk, Griek & Jansen, 2012). Possible risks are inter alia related to 
social challenges such as broad-based black economic empowerment (BBBEE), Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) as well 
as environmental problems such as water pollution, deforestation and over-fishing (Africa 
faces some serious environmental problems: Greenpeace, 2013; World Wildlife Fund, 2013).  
The relationship between risk and return should thus be carefully evaluated before deciding 
on a specific share investment (Swart, 2002: 159). There are three types of risks that should 
be considered, namely unsystematic, systematic and systemic risk (Adina & Cezar, 2012; 
Periasamy, 2009). An unsystematic risk, such as a strike or failed marketing campaign, is 
related to a specific company or industry (Strong, 2009: 168). Investors can diversify such 
risks by including securities from different firms in their portfolios (Moyer et al., 2009: 202). 
A risk inherent to the market is called a systematic risk, such as an unexpected interest rate 
change or recession (Strong, 2009: 168). Systematic risks cannot be eliminated through 
diversification. As unsystematic risk can be eliminated through diversification, the market 
consequently only rewards investors for bearing systematic risk (Moyer et al., 2009: 202). 
Systemic risk refers to the risk that an entire financial system or market can experience strain 
(Adina & Cezar, 2012: 371). Such a risk can occur due to interdependencies in market 
systems. The failure of an entity or entities can then cause cascading failure for an entire 
economy (Chen & Sebastian, 2012: 37). Systemic risk thus ultimately has a systematic nature 
(Scalcione, 2011: 92). For example, the 2007–2009 global financial crisis demonstrated the 
failure of global institutions to manage the underlying forces of systemic risk (Goldin & 
Vogel, 2010). 
One share is not necessary better than another if its TSR is higher, since systematic risk is not 
considered. Therefore, investors do not simply seek higher returns, but higher risk-adjusted 
abnormal returns (Martin et al., 2009: 30). Risk-adjusted abnormal returns can be estimated 
by considering the actual TSR less the expected return (Bartholdy & Peare, 2005; Catty, 
2010: 129). Two models are predominantly used in finance literature for such estimation 
purposes, namely the CAPM and the Fama–French three-factor model (Bartholdy & Peare, 
2005; Catty, 2010: 129). These models are discussed in more detail in Sections 2.4.3 and 
2.4.5. 
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2.4.3 The CAPM 
A firm’s expected share return is typically based on parameters from a market model, 
estimated over a number of returns prior to the sample period (Larrabee & Voss, 2013: 63). 
The well-known CAPM developed by Treynor (1961), Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and 
Mossin (1966) is often used by practitioners to estimate the expected return for individual 
shares or portfolios (Damodaran, 2008: 77; Kleuser, 2007).  
The CAPM is based on a number of assumptions, the most important being (Kürschner, 2008: 
5): 
 all investors consider a single period investment horizon; 
 the portfolio selection is based on the expected return and standard deviation over the 
considered period; 
 investors have homogenous expectations; and 
 taxes and transaction costs are ignored.  
According to the CAPM, the expected return of a share (E(Rit)) can be estimated by the risk-
free rate (Rft), beta (βi) and the expected return on the market (E(Rmt)) less the risk-free rate, 
also known as the market risk premium. The equation to estimate the expected return of a 
share by applying the CAPM is (Megginson, Smart & Graham, 2010: 208):  
E(Rit) = Rft + βi[E(Rmt) – Rft] (2.1) 
As indicted above, the CAPM equation starts with the risk-free rate. A good proxy for the 
risk-free rate is the yield on long-term government bonds. This yield closely reflects the 
default-free holding period returns that are available on long-term treasury securities (Baker 
& Powell, 2005: 352). Long-term government bonds, such as the R186 in South Africa, are 
regarded as having practically no default risk (Armitage, 2005: 278; Jones, 2010: 146).  
Logically, it is almost impossible to hold or observe the entire market portfolio with an 
enormous number of assets (Ho & Lee, 2004: 36). Consequently, an alternative estimate for 
the South African market portfolio should be used, such as the FTSE/JSE All Share Index 
(also known as the ALSI) (Kürschner, 2008: 7).  
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Beta is added to the CAPM as a measure of the share’s systematic risk (Ward & Muller, 2012: 
1). The beta measure indicates, based on past performance, the sensitivity of a firm’s historic 
return to the market portfolio’s historic return (Neely, 2007: 266–267; Ward & Muller, 2012: 
253). The relationship between the expected rate of return and the level of systematic risk is 
reflected by the security market line (SML) (Ross, Westerfield & Jordan, 2009) as indicated 
in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1: The security market line 
Source: Ross et al. (2009) 
As seen in Figure 2.1, the SML shows the trade-off between the expected return and 
systematic risk as a straight line that intersects the y-axis at the risk-free rate (Reilly & 
Brown, 2012: 218). The slope of the SML is equal to the market risk premium (Ross et al., 
2009). As the systematic risk of a security increases, so does its expected rate of return. If a 
security has the same return movement as the market, its beta is one. For a more responsive 
security, the beta is higher than one. The beta of a less responsive security is less than one 
(Kürschner, 2008: 4; Moyer et al., 2009). 
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The basis for modelling the relationship between risk and return was laid by the CAPM 
(Bodie et al., 2009). Practitioners tend to prefer this simple linear regression model above a 
multi-factor model, mainly due to the CAPM’s simplicity and the convenience to estimate 
expected return (Bartholdy & Peare, 2005; Shah, Abdullah, Khan & Khan, 2011). However, 
there is also critique against the CAPM. 
The CAPM is often criticised for relying on the theoretical market portfolio which includes all 
assets (Baker & Powell, 2005: 351; Bodie et al., 2009). Furthermore, in practice, most of the 
model’s assumptions do not hold (Kürschner, 2008: 5). Roll (1977) argued that the CAPM is 
inherently untestable, since in practice it is impossible to measure the return on the market 
portfolio (Rubinstein, 2006). The usage of historical data to predict the forward-looking 
CAPM estimates has also been criticised (Baker & Powell, 2005: 351; Bodie et al., 2009).  
In line with Roll’s (1977) critique, Fama and French (2004: 41) claimed that the CAPM has 
“never really been tested” and therefore cannot definitely be denied or proved. To evaluate 
the validity of a model, the positive economics approach suggested by Friedman (1966) could 
be used. According to this approach, what is relevant to the validity and usefulness of a model 
is its explanatory power. In the current study, the CAPM was hence considered for its 
explanatory ability rather than the validity of its assumptions (Levy, 2012: 187).  
Risk-adjusted abnormal share return can be estimated by comparing the actual TSR with the 
estimated expected return. The resultant excess return (also called the ‘abnormal return’) can 
be used to evaluate whether an investment, be it a single security or portfolio, under-
performed or over-performed relative to the market. Securities can also be directly compared 
on a risk-adjusted basis (Damodaran, 2012). In Section 2.4.4, attention is given to Jensen’s 
alpha, a measure of the actual return realised in excess of the expected return (Jensen, 1968). 
2.4.4 Jensen’s alpha 
Jensen (1968) proposed a regression-based view to measure a portfolio’s performance relative 
to the market. Jensen’s alpha is a measure of the actual return (TSR) realised in excess of a 
market model’s (such as CAPM) expected return. Jensen’s alpha refers to the intercept (called 
‘alpha’) in an estimation of the CAPM regression model of the return on a portfolio relative to 
the market (Bacon, 2013: 72; Mirabile, 2013).  
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A portfolio’s expected return should lie exactly on the SML (refer to Figure 2.1) if the CAPM 
is the correct model of equilibrium returns (Kim & McKenzie, 2007: 402). Jensen’s alpha 
should then be zero. If a portfolio yields a significant positive alpha, it indicates superior 
performance of a fund manager (Guerard, 2009: 585).  
Following criticism on the CAPM, Fama and French (1992) provided evidence that the 
differences in return amongst equity portfolios are primarily due to systematic risk and two 
other factors, as explained in Section 2.4.5. Jensen’s alpha can also be used in the Fama–
French context to measure the risk-adjusted abnormal return of a share or portfolio 
(Gregoriou, 2006: 89). 
2.4.5 The Fama–French three-factor model 
Based on ground-breaking research, Fama and French (1992; 1993) indicated that returns are 
not only based on market risk, but also on the spread in returns between small and large firms, 
as well as the spread in returns between value and growth shares (Jelicic, 2010; Pinto, Henry, 
Robinson & Stowe, 2010: 65). It can thus be argued that the CAPM is based on theory (with 
strong assumptions) while the Fama–French three-factor model is based on empirical 
evidence (Koller, Goedhart & Wessels, 2010: 256). 
The Fama–French three-factor model assumes a linear risk–return relationship similar to the 
CAPM. In addition to the CAPM market factor, Fama and French (1992) added a firm size 
factor and a value/growth factor to the CAPM equation. The Fama–French three-factor model 
is indicated by the following equation (Basiewicz & Auret, 2010): 
(R it –  Rft  )= α𝑖 + βi1(Rmt – 𝑅ft) + βi2SMB + βi3HML + ϵit (2.2) 
Fama and French (1992; 1993) argued that firm size, as measured by market capitalisation, 
could also have an effect on share returns. Therefore, they consider small market 
capitalisation firms versus large firms, denoted as small minus big (SMB) (Crane, 
McWilliams, Matten, Moon & Siegel, 2008; Kleuser, 2007). A firm’s market capitalisation is 
determined by multiplying its current share price with the number of ordinary shares issued 
(Verweire & Van den Berghe, 2004: 21). If the market capitalisation is higher than the book 
value of ordinary shareholders’ equity, management created value for shareholders.  
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The difference between value and growth firms, denoted as high minus low (HML) is 
determined by ranking the ratio of book value of ordinary shareholders’ equity to the market 
value of ordinary shares (BE/ME) (Crane et al., 2008; Fama & French, 1993; Kleuser, 2007). 
The BE/ME ratio thus combines financial statement data (book values) with market data. The 
ratio can be used as a proxy for future growth, bearing in mind that growth generates future 
value. Shares with high BE/ME ratios are referred to as ‘value shares’ whilst shares with low 
BE/ME ratios are called ‘growth shares’ (Peterson & Fabozzi, 2013). The larger this ratio, the 
lower the firm’s expected future growth prospective. Then again, a lower BE/ME ratio 
indicates that the firm’s assets are being managed effectively to generate future value, as 
reflected in a higher market price (Mayo, 2011; Peterson & Fabozzi, 2013: 177). 
A firm with a low BE/ME ratio is considered to be less risky than a firm with a high BE/ME 
ratio, and thus likely to generate lower returns (Fama & French, 1993). The prices of growth 
shares are typically bid up by investors who anticipate higher growth in earnings. The BE/ME 
ratio is then reduced by the higher share price. Such shares often tend to underperform the 
market (Mayo, 2011: 397; Peterson & Fabozzi, 2013: 177). For example, new firms in high-
technology industries generally fit this definition (Graham, Smart & Megginson, 2010: 216).  
Subsequent to the development of the three-factor model, some researchers (Carhart, 1997; 
Graham et al., 2010: 216) pointed out that other factors could also influence share returns. 
Momentum can, for example, be added as an additional factor to the Fama–French model.  
2.4.6 Momentum and arbitrage pricing theory 
Carhart (1997) extended the Fama–French three-factor model by adding momentum as a 
fourth factor. Momentum refers to the tendency of individual share prices to continue 
following an upward or downward trend (Ferri, 2011: 54–55; Kensinger, 2011: 54). Carhart 
(1997) argued that the momentum factor could improve the explanatory power of portfolio 
returns.  
While the size and BE/ME factors of the Fama–French three-factor model tend to adjust 
relatively slowly, the momentum factor tends to vary rapidly over time. Frequent portfolio 
rebalancing is therefore required when considering the Carhart four-factor model (Connor, 
Goldberg & Korajczyk, 2010: 132).  
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Ross (1976) argued that, in addition to a security’s beta coefficient, others factors could be 
required to specify the equilibrium risk-return relationship. These factors could extend beyond 
the size and BE/ME considerations of the FamaFrench three-factor model. The approach 
that Ross (1976) suggested is called arbitrage pricing theory. This approach can include any 
number of risk factors. Practical usage of the arbitrage pricing theory to date has been limited, 
due to the complex nature thereof (Brigham & Daves, 2013). 
In line with previous South African researchers (such as Basiewicz & Auret, 2010; Van 
Rensburg & Robertson, 2003) a decision was taken not to use a four-factor model including 
momentum, but rather to use the Fama–French three-factor model.  
2.4.7 Tobin’s Q 
The Tobin’s Q measure can be defined as a hybrid performance measure, since it evaluates 
both market-based and accounting-based data (Gross, 2007: 23). This ratio can be employed 
to demonstrate how a firm’s shares are valued relative to a firm’s property, plant (at market 
value), equipment and inventory (at replacement cost) (Chorafas, 2005: 178). Critics of the 
Tobin’s Q ratio argue that its value is typically over-exaggerated, since replacement cost is 
underestimated. Furthermore, there is a lack of evidence that this ratio can be used effectively 
over a short study period (Chorafas, 2005: 178). 
Dybvig and Warachka (2010) indicated that Tobin’s Q does not measure financial 
performance sufficiently. They reported that the relationship between Tobin’s Q and firm 
performance is confounded by endogeneity. This problem can, for example, arise as a result 
of omitted variables. In turn, this can result in an ambiguous effect of performance on the 
Tobin’s Q measure. Consequently, this measure was not included in the current study.  
2.4.8 Relevance of market-based models to corporate governance 
As discussed in Section 2.3.1, if a firm’s management is serious about creating value, they 
will invest in projects that have positive NPVs. The expectation is that such decisions would 
be recognised by the market, and share prices should consequently reflect the expected future 
benefits (Parrino & Kidwell, 2009). Investors are also interested in whether their investment 
will generate returns without violating their shareholders’ rights (IFC, 2009: 14).  
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Managers should track the different internal and external factors that could influence financial 
performance (Martin et al., 2009). One of the main considerations in the current study was 
whether corporate governance compliance was associated with financial performance, even in 
periods when external factors, such as a financial crisis, play a significant role. The focus was 
not simply on the TSRs of well- and poorly governed firms. Risk-adjusted abnormal returns 
were estimated for four portfolios, compiled based on the sample firms’ CGSs, by applying 
both the CAPM and the Fama–French three-factor model. 
Two traditional financial performance objectives were discussed in Section 2.2.1. However, 
as explained in Section 2.5, there are also other performance considerations, which did not 
traditionally form part of performance discussions (Martin et al., 2009).  
2.5 Non-traditional performance considerations  
Different theoretical perspectives exist on what the ultimate corporate objective should be. As 
indicated in Section 2.2.1.1, traditionally, shareholders’ wealth maximisation should be the 
primary goal of a firm’s managers (Blanpain, 2011). However, it is debatable whether the 
focus of financial managers in the 21
st
 century should be expanded from just making money 
for shareholders to include the interests of other relevant stakeholders (Martin et al., 2009). 
Freeman (1984: 246) identified stakeholders as “any group or individual who can affect or is 
affected by the achievement of the firm’s objectives”. This broadens the stakeholder category 
to include among others environmental groups and the community (Keay, 2011). Supporters 
of the stakeholder view argue that shareholders’ wealth maximisation can be better achieved 
with the co-operation of key stakeholders (Khan & Jain, 2007). However, stakeholders can 
have different, often contrasting interests (Crouch & Maclean, 2011: 40).  
Managers, for example, could investigate the construction of a new facility. If it is build close 
to a local community, the standard of living of employees from the community is likely to 
increase. The construction of the factory could, however, also affect the water resources in the 
area as chemicals used in the factory might contaminate a nearby stream. Measures to contain 
chemical leakages would require additional funding. Responsible investors would most likely 
expect that (costly) environmental conservation programmes should be in place.  
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The relevant internal and external stakeholders, to whom the firm is accountable, should 
hence be identified and their interests should be considered (Keay, 2011). This notion is 
supported in this dissertation, since if a firm’s board is expected to be accountable to 
everyone; it could result in being accountable to no one (IoDSA, 2002). 
Historically, a firm’s ESG responsibilities were typically ignored or excluded when financial 
decisions were made. However, some managers started to include both financial and non-
financial performance considerations (Crane et al., 2008: 269; Landier & Nair, 2009). If 
financial claimholders also critically consider the ESG considerations of investments, they 
could benefit over the long term in more than just monetary terms by encouraging corporate 
change (Landier & Nair, 2009). 
After the 2001 Enron scandal, increased focus was placed on value-based management. 
According to this enlightened value maximisation approach, the maximisation of the firm’s 
long-term value is seen as the criterion for making trade-offs amongst stakeholders (Jensen, 
2001; Martin et al., 2009). This approach was followed in the current research. Shareholders 
were not regarded as more important than other key stakeholders such as employees or 
suppliers. However, since it is not possible to maximise more than one aspect at a time (unless 
they are simple transformations of each other), attention is often given to shareholders’ wealth 
maximisation. A midpoint should be found on the continuum of shareholders’ best interests 
on the one side and stakeholders’ best interests on the other side. Corporate processes should 
be put in place to structure win-win agreements between the different stakeholders to share 
the created value (Jensen, 2001; Martin et al., 2009). In the researcher’s opinion, the ultimate 
corporate objective should hence not be the maximisation of shareholders’ wealth. Attention 
should rather be given the interests of the firm’s various relevant stakeholders. 
Stakeholders are negatively impacted by financial crises. Internationally and in South Africa, 
firms lost a great deal of value during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis. This happened 
mainly due to two reasons, namely the acceptance of lower NPV projects and limited access 
to external funding sources (Enikolopov, Petrova & Stepanov, 2012). In addition, in countries 
with poor investment protection, the ability of a firm to attract outside funding depends 
heavily on the quality of the firm’s corporate governance compliance (Erkens, Hung & 
Matos, 2012).  
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In the following section, a detailed discussion is provided on financial crises. Specific 
attention is given to the negative impact of the 20072009 crisis period on the financial 
performance of South African companies.  
2.6 Financial crises  
A large body of literature exists on financial crises and the causes thereof. However, there is 
no single definition of the construct or of the causes thereof that applies in all situations. 
Generally, a financial crisis refers to a disruption to financial markets, which can affect the 
entire economic environment (Chung & Eichengreen, 2004: 297; Portes & Swoboda, 1987: 
10). 
During an international financial crisis, the disruption spills over national borders and disrupts 
the entire market’s capacity to allocate capital internationally (Portes & Swoboda, 1987: 10). 
The classic explanation is that financial crises are mostly caused by monetary excesses. Such 
excesses lead to a prosperous period followed by an inevitable financial collapse 
(Kindleberger, 1978). A crisis period is typically associated with falling share prices, debtors’ 
insolvency, company failures and deflation. Exchange rates, interest rates and economic 
output growth are generally also negatively affected (Kamin, 1999; Portes & Swoboda, 1987). 
Asymmetric information problems between financial market buyers and sellers can create the 
right conditions for a financial crisis (Mishkin, 2009). Asymmetric information exists when 
two parties to a transaction have different information about each other’s intentions and the 
risks involved (Hendrickson, 2013: 37). Two common problems that arise from such 
asymmetries are moral hazard and adverse selection problems (Thomas, 2006: 70).  
According to adverse selection theory, loans can be made to investors who are unlikely to pay 
the loans back. After the transaction took place, the moral hazard problem may occur 
(Thomas, 2006: 70). According to this problem, an individual could have the tendency to act 
less carefully than he or she would if he or she had to bear the full consequences of his or her 
actions (Dowd, 2009: 143). A financial agent could thus have the incentive to take additional 
risk, since the costs that could occur would not be borne by him or her (Chaudhary, 2009; 
Hansanti, Islam & Sheehan, 2008). It has been shown that these problems could lead to 
financial instability and systemic risk in global markets (Mishkin, 1992). 
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Friedman and Schwartz (1963) indicate that financial crises are also associated with banking 
panics and consequent bank runs. In the case of a banking panic, investors withdraw their 
funds from both insolvent and solvent banks due to asymmetric information. When depositors 
hear that a crisis is imminent, they typically panic. Without knowing which banks are at risk, 
depositors can withdraw their money from all financial institutions. During the USA banking 
panics that took place in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries, depositors literally ran to their various 
banks in a withdrawal attempt, since they had lost trust in the solvency of all banks. If the 
banking system is unable to meet customers’ demands in cases like these, the complete 
system could become insolvent (Gorton, 2010; Smith, 2010: 93). 
During a banking panic, all banks must sell loans to meet their obligations to depositors 
(Gorton, 2010). However, in such panic situations, other institutions are not willing to take 
over these loans. Previously, the banking system was typically saved from destruction by 
refusal of the whole group of banks to give cash back to their depositors (Gorton, 2010). The 
development and maintenance of a sound banking system and banking stability provided a 
possible solution to this problem (Parker & Whaples, 2013; Smith, 2010: 93). 
Not all disruptions to financial markets necessarily constitute a financial crisis. In a well-
developed financial system, the financial intermediaries concentrate on the reduction of the 
asymmetric information problem through both screening and monitoring activities (Brakman, 
Garretsen, Van Marrewijk & Van Witteloostuijn, 2006: 243). Therefore, a share market crash 
will only cause a financial crisis if the financial market can no longer perform its main task of 
channelling funds to the most productive investment opportunities (Mishkin, 1992). 
As indicated in Section 2.6.1, the financial crisis that emerged in 2007 was based on 
unsustainable financial developments, insufficient corporate governance and a lack of proper 
monitoring of financial institutions that dated back for decades (SAICA, 2010; Smith, 2010). 
2.6.1 Causes of the 2007–2009 global financial crisis  
The 2007–2009 global financial crisis was preceded by existing problems in the USA debt 
market (Krishnamurthy, 2010). Although derivative instruments can provide means of 
hedging and speculation for many capital market role players, derivative activities at 
investment banks in the USA were not sufficiently monitored during the period preceding the 
crisis (FCIC, 2011). In 2003, Warren Buffett already stated that derivatives were “weapons of 
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mass destruction”. He also warned that the rapidly growing trade in these instruments posed a 
very large threat for the global economy (Buffett warns on investment ‘time-bomb’, 2003). In 
2007, with the start of the global financial crisis, his words proved to be true.  
The turmoil in the USA’s financial institutions led to a financial crisis which was described as 
“the most serious financial crisis since the Great Depression of 1929–1939” (Kirkpatrick, 
2009: 3). Financial losses during the 2007–2009 crisis period were amplified by the increased 
usage of certain derivatives, specifically synthetic securities (FCIC, 2011; Lartey, 2012). 
Synthetic structured products are securities of which the pay-offs do not primarily depend on 
the cash flows from a certain discrete pool of assets (Fuchita & Litan, 2007: 176). Rather, 
they depend on securities, assets or indices that are not held in any specific asset collection. 
Such products include credit default swaps and collateralised debt obligations (Fuchita & 
Litan, 2007: 177). 
Other reasons for the 2007–2009 global financial crisis include insufficient monitoring by the 
US Securities and Exchange Commission, inappropriate credit agency ratings and ineffective 
risk management (Lartey, 2012). The 2007 events that culminated in the global crisis entailed 
a modern version of the historic bank run problem discussed in Section 2.6. In 2007, non-
bank financial institutions ran on banks when the crisis became eminent. The largely 
unregulated shadow banking sector, which included hedge funds and unlisted derivatives, 
played an important role in the build-up to the credit crisis (Brooks & Dunn, 2012; Gorton, 
2010; Mullard, 2011: 54). 
Shadow banking refers to non-bank financial institutions that are engaged in maturity 
transformation (Kodres, 2013). This kind of transformation implies that non-bank institutions 
use short-term deposits to fund their longer-term loans. However, non-bank institutions in the 
USA were not subject to banking regulation prior to the crisis. Such institutions could also not 
borrow from the Federal Reserve Bank if necessary and did not have insurance-covered 
depositors’ funds. Although these financial institutions acted like banks, they were not 
supervised like banks (Brooks & Dunn, 2012; Kodres, 2013). These non-bank institutions 
were thus, figuratively speaking, operating in the “shadows” of the banking industry.  
Shadow banks played a prominent role in turning home mortgages into tradable securities 
(Kodres, 2013). Financial institutions and shadow banks gave sub-prime retail mortgages to 
house buyers who do not qualify for lower interest loans (IOSCO, 2008). Over time, the USA 
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sub-prime mortgage underwriting standards weakened. The weakening of credit terms was 
symptomatic of larger market erosion (Bhardwaj & Sengupta, 2008). 
Despite their high risk, asset-backed securities, sub-prime residential mortgage-backed 
securities and collateralised debt obligations were popular among USA institutional investors 
due to their high returns. The shadow banking system developed out of asset securitisation, 
such as collateralised debt obligations (Adrian & Shin, 2009; IOSCO, 2008). Before the 
crisis, investor losses on these products were minimal. Ironically enough, collateralised debt 
obligations and other financial instruments (also referred to as ‘conduits’) were designed to 
decrease investor risk through diversification, while these instruments actually resulted in 
increased risk concentration (Blundell-Wignall, 2007: 31; Friedman, 2011; IOSCO, 2008). 
As sub-prime interest rates in the USA decreased, the profit margins for sub-prime lenders 
also declined. Instead of tightening underwriting guidelines to compensate for the subsequent 
risk, some lenders lowered their lending standards even further. This was done in an attempt 
to increase their market share (IOSCO, 2008). In 2007, credit spreads, the premium that 
riskier borrowers pay compared to the least risky ones, started to increase in some of the main 
global financial markets. Although the degree of the increase was relatively small compared 
to historic levels, the effects were wide-ranging (Bitner, 2008; IOSCO, 2008: 2–3). 
By the last trimester of 2007, changes in the expected sub-prime mortgage rates created 
considerable uncertainty regarding the cash flow prospects of residential mortgage-backed 
securitiess and collateralised debt obligations. Credit markets tightened due to this uncertainty 
(IOSCO, 2008: 3). As sub-prime lending losses were realised, shadow banks (and banks) 
refused to lend more money. This action of the shadow banks was not “shadowy” per se. 
When many investors tried to withdraw their funds all at once, banks and non-bank 
institutions experienced financial difficulty. In some instances, they simply did not have the 
funds to reimburse investors (Brooks & Dunn, 2012: 545; Kodres, 2013). 
Between 2001 and 2007, the global economy grew faster than in any other six-year period 
during the previous 30 years and many countries shared in the benefits of this boom period 
(Van Niekerk, 2010; Wade, 2008: 23). The crisis that commenced in 2007 had consequences 
far beyond the USA sub-prime debt markets; it contributed to a worldwide financial crisis 
(IOSCO, 2008: 3; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008). This crisis also impacted severely on the state of 
the South African economy, as discussed in the next section. 
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2.6.2 The impact of the 20072009 global financial crisis on the South 
African economy 
The crisis in the USA sub-prime market had a significant effect on many countries globally. 
In South Africa, the crisis resulted in a recession during the first semester of 2009 (BER, 
2009; SARB, 2013). The expected outcomes of a global financial crisis are slower global 
expansion, a decrease in the volume of international trade and a drastic decrease in world 
economic growth (IMF, 2009; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization Institute for Statistics, 2009). Before the crisis, South Africa already had a 
relatively high unemployment rate. By 2010, as a result of the crisis, an additional 900 000 
workers lost their jobs (International Social Security Association, 2010). Furthermore, foreign 
investors became reluctant to invest in emerging markets and the demand for export products 
decreased (SAICA, 2010).  
By 2009, most developed countries were in a deep recession (McKibbin & Stoeckel, 2009). 
By the end of 2009, there was some financial respite in South Africa. However, during the 
second quarter of 2010, financial turmoil was again experienced. Europe had impending 
sovereign debt crises and share markets decreased globally (SAICA, 2010). 
According to Daniel Mminele, the deputy governor of the South African Reserve Bank 
(SARB) the magnitude of the financial shocks was experienced in 2007–2008 (SARB, 2012). 
The SARB (2013) indicated the downturn in economic activity in South Africa, including the 
technical recession in the first and second quarters of 2009, as from December 2007 to August 
2009. In the current study, reference is hence made to the global financial crisis of 2007–
2009. In Section 2.6.3, consideration is given to the link between corporate governance 
aspects and financial crises. 
2.6.3 Corporate governance failure during financial crises 
More than two centuries before the 2007–2009 global financial crisis, Adam Smith (1723–
1790) argued that it cannot be expected of a company’s executives to monitor invested money 
with the same attentiveness as partners in a private business (Dowd, 2009; Smith, 1776). 
Executives are likely to rather concentrate on their own wealth, than to focus on the wealth 
maximisation of their firms’ investors (Martin et al., 2009: 6). 
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This problem is called the agency problem and occurs when shareholders shift their control 
responsibility to management. The managers can then abuse their control function for their 
own benefit (Jensen & Meckling, 1976: 308). Due to more dispersed and changing ownership 
structures, this problem became more prominent during the 20
th
 century than in previous 
periods (Maher & Andersson, 1999: 5–6; Rossouw, Van der Watt & Malan 2002: 289). In 
South Africa, corporate governance principles have been introduced in the early 1990s 
(through the publication of the first King Report) to bridge the interests-gap between 
ownership and control (Ncube, 2006). 
Despite the implementation of corporate governance principles and codes, the responsiveness 
of boards (both globally and in South Africa) to prevent excessive risk-taking to protect the 
shareholders in the lead-up to the 20072009 global financial crisis was questioned (Ringe, 
2013). Before the financial crisis, the International Federation of Accountants (2007) 
conducted a survey on the extent to which corporate governance disclosure has improved over 
time. The survey involved 341 participants, representing investors, directors and regulators. 
The respondents indicated that firms seemed to implement those governance aspects that are 
relatively easy to comply with, but were slower to adopt the more substantial considerations. 
Furthermore, many directors regard corporate governance as a certification exercise that 
needs to be conducted according to a checklist, rather than a principles-orientated approach 
that focuses on improved corporate practices (UN, 2010). 
Awareness of eminent corporate governance issues existed before the 2007–2009 global 
financial crisis, but was ignored by most corporate role players (UN, 2010). The effects of this 
crisis could have been reduced, but proper attention was not given to early warning signals 
(FCIC, 2011). This crisis could, at least to a certain extent, be ascribed to the weaknesses and 
failures in global corporate governance mechanisms and the systematic breakdown in 
accountability and ethics (Kirkpatrick, 2009: 3–4). When considering corporate governance 
failure, weaknesses in four areas mainly contributed to the 20072009 global financial crisis, 
namely risk management, board practices, director emolument and the exercising of 
shareholder rights (International Corporate Governance Network, 2008).  
In many firms, risk management became separated from the implementation of their corporate 
strategy before the crisis. Boards were consequently ignorant of imminent risks (OECD, 
2010). In many cases, the monitoring role of board members was also impaired by a dominant 
chief executive officer (CEO). Furthermore, corporate governance guidelines recommend that 
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directors’ remuneration should be linked to their own as well as the firm’s performance. 
However, before the crisis, directors often received compensation that was not in line with 
shareholders’ best interests. In some instances, bonuses were even paid based on misstated 
financial performance (International Corporate Governance Network, 2008; OECD, 2010).  
Shareholder representation on boards provides important governance checks and balances, 
specifically with regard to board practices. Before the 20072009 crisis period, shareholders 
seldomly challenged boards in sufficient numbers to change inappropriate corporate actions 
(G30 Working Group, 2012: 11). The interests of managers and some shareholders were also 
found to be aligned during the pre-crisis period in that some shareholders preferred the same 
short-term incentives as the executives (OECD, 2010). Consequently, these shareholders did 
not necessarily held directors accountable for their actions (OECD, 2009). 
Shareholders should be encouraged to take a more active role in the corporate governance of 
their investee firms by exercising their shareholder rights (UN, 2010). Investors in general 
and responsible investors in particular can use their investments to direct changes within firms 
(Landier & Nair, 2009). As discussed in Section 3.2.3, the UN PRI (2013) also encourages 
shareholder activism as a driving force for corporate governance compliance (Chiu, 2010). In 
turn, managers should engage more with their firms’ shareholders (OECD, 2009). 
From the above, it is clear that the insufficient application of corporate governance guidelines 
was not the only contributing factor to the 2007–2009 crisis. Adams (2009) claims that the 
media over-exaggerated the governance failures that led to the crisis. Corporate governance 
principles per se did not fail; the principles were rather not properly applied (UN, 2010). 
2.7 Summary and conclusions 
Corporate governance mechanisms and their link to financial performance are debated in the 
economics and finance literature, both at a theoretical and empirical level (Ramdani & Van 
Witteloostuinj, 2010). Various performance measures have been used to assess the financial 
performance of listed companies. Historically, accounting-based performance measures were 
the most widely applied in research. After a consideration of measures used by previous 
corporate governance researchers, the ROA, ROE and EPS (specifically HEPS) ratios were 
selected for application in this study. 
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Market-based performance can be evaluated by means of share returns. In the current study, 
the non-risk-adjusted TSR measure was used. Jensen (1968) proposed a regression-based 
view to measure the risk-adjusted abnormal performance of a portfolio. Both the CAPM and 
Fama–French three-factor models were hence applied to estimate risk-adjusted abnormal 
returns for four corporate governance portfolios. The application of these models is discussed 
in more detail in Sections 5.9.5.2 and 5.9.5.3. 
The current study was conducted for the period 20022010, thus including the global 
financial crisis of 2007–2009. This crisis, which started in the USA sub-prime market, had a 
severe impact on the South African economy and hence on the financial performance of 
companies operating in the country (BER, 2009). The crisis was attributed to various factors, 
including corporate governance compliance failures. A detailed discussion on corporate 
governance is provided in Chapter 3.  
  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 50 
CHAPTER 3  
RESPONSIBLE INVESTING AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
3.1 Introduction 
“The problems we have today cannot be solved by thinking the way we 
thought when we created them.” 
This quote by Albert Einstein (1879–1955) (in Dettmer, 1998: 119) is particularly apt when 
considering the widespread consequences of irresponsible corporate actions. In recent years, 
many investors have come to realise that, by owning a security and earning a return on it, they 
implicitly approve the actions of the investee firm. Many investors have also come to 
recognise that approving an inappropriate action is immoral (Larmer, 1997). More investors 
are resorting to a new (more responsible) way of thinking when making investment decisions 
and exercising their shareholder rights (Micharikopoulos & Danalis, 2010). 
The market for RI products is growing internationally, as increasing numbers of investors are 
recognising the impact of ESG considerations on financial performance (UNEP FI & Mercer, 
2007). Corporate governance issues started to dominate ESG considerations by the early 21
st
 
century, due to global debacles such as Enron and excessive executive remuneration 
(Micharikopoulos & Danalis, 2010). The King Reports provide a well-developed corporate 
governance framework for firms operating in South Africa. The first King Report was based 
on the Cadbury Report published in the United Kingdom (UK). In this study, given data 
constraints in terms of environmental and social data, the focus was placed on the G-
component of ESG, namely corporate governance. 
To gain greater insight into the construct of corporate governance, the grounding thereof in 
the phenomenon of RI is firstly discussed. The importance of corporate governance globally 
and in South Africa is explained in section 3.3. Previous studies on the relationship between 
corporate governance and financial performance are discussed in Section 3.4.  
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3.2 Responsible investing: from the 18
th
 to the 21
st
 centuries  
As explained in Sections 3.2.13.2.5, RI developed considerably from its origin in the 18th 
century to the 2000s. 
3.2.1 The history of RI 
The history of RI dates back to the 18
th
 century when Quakers in the USA refused to profit 
from the slave trade, the sale of alcohol and weapon dealings (Hamm, 2003). The Quakers 
have a long-standing commitment to pacifism, social activism and the fair treatment of 
natives. At about the same time, John Wesley (1703–1791), the founder of the Methodist 
Church in England, preached that people should not engage in sinful trade or profit from the 
exploitation of other human beings (Hamm, 2003; Renneboog, Ter Horst & Zhang, 2008). 
In the 19
th
 century, the Industrial Revolution transformed the manufacturing of products 
(Blowfield & Murray, 2008: 44). There was a movement from hand-made production to 
machine manufacturing. The revolution brought about improvement in living standards, but at 
a social cost (OECD, 2008). Slaves from the African continent were often used to provide low 
cost labour. Child and female labourers were exploited to work long hours for very low 
salaries. Countries that adopted enlightened corporate conduct standards took many years to 
address these issues practically (Goloboy, 2008; OECD, 2008). 
In the 1920s, the UK Methodist Church avoided investments in firms involved in the 
production of alcohol, tobacco and gambling. The Methodist Church regarded these practices 
as sinful (Renneboog et al., 2008: 1725). The first modern RI mutual fund in the USA, the 
Pioneer Fund, was founded in 1928 by local Methodists as could be expected. This fund 
employed investment criteria based on religious convictions (Renneboog et al., 2008: 1725; 
Schwartz, 2003). Activism further developed in the USA after World War II (1939–1945), as 
investors lost their faith in the capitalist system (Boeckh, 2010: 269; Coerwinkel, 2007). 
A series of social campaigns made investors aware of the environmental and social 
consequences of their investments. These campaigns were fuelled by anti-war and civil rights 
movements (Zarbafi, 2011: 29). For example, the Pax World Fund, founded in 1971 in the 
USA, was created for investors opposed to the Vietnam War in particular and militarism in 
general (Zarbafi, 2011: 30).  
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In the 1980s, a great deal of shareholder activism took place against South African 
companies, multi-national firms and banks that had operations in South Africa. This occurred 
due to the system of Apartheid enforced in the country at that stage. RI investors in Europe, 
UK, North America, Japan and Australia exerted substantial pressure on firms doing business 
in South Africa to divert their operations to other countries (Renneboog et al., 2008: 1725). 
The trend to become responsible when investing had a substantial effect on the institutional 
investment community, pension fund trustees, managers of firms as well as the broader 
society (Solomon, 2007: 274). During 2007–2009, when the global economy experienced the 
first true recession since World War II, scepticism about the capitalist system once again 
reappeared, this time on a global scale (Sinn, 2010). 
3.2.2 Prominent RI strategies 
Different RI strategies developed over time with screening, shareholder activism and impact 
investing being the most prominent strategies (Harrington, 2005: 173; Schut, 2008: 175). 
Screening options for a RI portfolio can be divided into negative, positive and best-in-class 
screening strategies (Eurosif, 2010).  
Negative screening is exclusionary in nature, and represents the most basic form of evaluating 
investments. This screening strategy entails that investors refrain from investing in securities 
from firms that produce undesirable products and services, as well as companies that operate 
in undesirable industries and countries. Firms are thus omitted based on certain ethical and 
ESG criteria. Negative screening decisions usually entail yes/no decisions. Responsible 
investors who follow this strategy will thus typically avoid investments in firms that are 
associated with the production and sale of weapons, tobacco, alcohol and pornography. Faith-
based investors often apply this strategy (Eurosif, 2010). 
In contrast, positive screening is an inclusionary portfolio construction strategy. This strategy 
is based on actively choosing investments that meet a range of ethical and ESG criteria. 
Conscious investment decisions are made that can deviate from conventional choices (Fung, 
Law & Yau, 2010: 28). In South Africa, criteria dealing with labour issues and BBBEE are 
often employed as positive screens (Viviers et al., 2008: 39). South African investors also 
tend to use corporate governance as a screening criterion (Viviers, forthcoming a).  
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A combination of positive and negative screening strategies, referred to as best-in-class 
screening, may also be used. Such a combination often provides a practical way of integrating 
ESG issues in RI portfolios and increase financial returns (Fung et al. 2010: 28). Renneboog, 
Ter Horst and Zhang (2006: 1) indicate that RI mutual funds that employed a higher number 
of screens to model their investment universe received larger monetary inflows and performed 
better in the long run compared to narrowly focused funds.  
RI advocates argue that ESG screening could help investors to avoid risks which are not 
necessarily identified by traditional analysts. Furthermore, such screening can enable 
investors to recognise exceptional management, which can result in enhanced firm 
performance and a decrease in the cost of capital (Boatright, 2010: 399; Camejo, Aiyer, Case, 
Hale & Hawley, 2002). On the other hand, RI critics argue that, based on modern portfolio 
management theories, restrictions on the potential investment universe can increase risks and 
consequently reduce risk-adjusted returns (Boatright, 2010: 399; Camejo et al., 2002). 
Shareholder activism by institutional investors, the second major RI strategy, is regarded as a 
driving force for good corporate governance (Chiu, 2010). The concept entails that 
shareholders actively engage with managers and directors on a variety of ethical and ESG 
issues (Viviers et al., 2008: 39). It is a process of working with firms’ boards and managers to 
encourage them to change certain policies, products and practices. Shareholder activism is 
mostly cordial and done through private discussion and resolutions at annual general 
meetings. However, it can be confrontational, particularly when shareholders feel their 
concerns are not getting reasonable attention from corporate decision-makers (Little, 2008). 
The third major RI strategy is that of impact investing (Chen 2001: 6). This strategy entails 
that a specific worthy cause or activity is supported by financing it. The strategy is also called 
‘community investing’, since financial resources are often invested to support underprivileged 
communities (Basso & Funari, 2003: 522). Impact investors may seek market-related return 
or they may take a lower return in order to achieve a particular “social return” for society 
(Chen 2001). Corporate governance is an important consideration for all three discussed 
strategies. 
In Section 2.2.1.1, attention was given to the importance of shareholders’ wealth 
maximisation. It should be considered that RI does not necessarily have a negative effect on 
share returns (Landier & Nair, 2009). However, in 2006, Milton Moskowitz, a pioneer in 
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corporate social responsibility research, stated that many investors at that stage still regarded 
ESG considerations as relatively unimportant when making investment decisions (Crane et 
al., 2008: 267). Investors thus need to be educated regarding the relevance of ESG metrics 
and the application of RI strategies.  
As the RI phenomenon grew, the need arose for globally accepted, standardised principles to 
guide responsible investors when making investment and ownership decisions. The UN PRI 
was hence established.  
3.2.3 The UN PRI 
In 2005, Kofi Anan, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), invited a group 
of the world’s largest institutional investors to develop a set of principles for responsible 
investment. Twenty institutional investors from twelve countries agreed to participate in the 
investor group. This group was supported by a stakeholder group of experts (UN PRI, 2010). 
As a result of the discussions, the UN PRI emerged. In 2010 (the last observed year for the 
current study), there were more than 800 investment institutions from 45 countries (including 
South Africa) that became signatories (UN PRI, 2010). Table 3.1 indicates the six principles 
and possible actions that can be taken by institutional investors to support specific principles. 
Table 3.1: The six UN PRI principles and possible actions to support the principles  
Principles Possible actions 
1. Incorporate ESG issues into 
investment analysis and 
decision-making processes. 
 support the development of ESG-related metrics 
 access the capabilities of managers to incorporate ESG issues 
 encourage academic research on the theme 
2. Be active owners and 
incorporate ESG issues into 
ownership policies and 
practices. 
 exercise voting rights 
 engage with firms on ESG issues 
 ask management to report on ESG-related engagement 
3. Seek appropriate disclosure 
on ESG issues by the 
investee companies. 
 request integrated standardised reporting on ESG issues 
 support ESG disclosure initiatives 
4. Promote the acceptance and 
implementation of the 
principles within the 
investment industry. 
 communicate ESG expectations to investment service providers 
 support the development of ESG integration benchmarking tools 
 support enabling policy or regulatory developments 
5. Work together to enhance 
effectiveness in 
implementing the principles. 
 develop and support appropriate collaborative initiatives 
 collectively address relevant emerging issues 
 support ESG networks 
6. Report on activities and 
progress towards 
implementing the principles. 
 disclose how ESG issues are integrated within investment practices 
 reveal ownership activities 
 communicate with beneficiaries regarding the implementation of 
the principles 
Source: UN PRI (2010) 
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Institutional investors have a duty to act in the best long-term interest of their beneficiaries. 
Furthermore, ESG factors can affect the performance of investment portfolios to varying 
degrees over time. Therefore, such issues should be incorporated into investment analysis and 
ownership practices, as seen in Table 3.1. By applying the six UN PRI principles, investors’ 
ownership decisions and practices may be well aligned with the broader objectives of society 
(UN PRI, 2010). 
3.2.4 The RI market 
An increasing number of investors believe that ESG analysis could result in share market 
outperformance in the long run (Allianz, 2009). The 2010 Report on Socially Responsible 
Investing Trends in the United States shows that RI has continued to grow at a faster pace 
than the broader universe of conventional investment assets under professional management 
(US SIF, 2010). By 2010, the global RI market had reached approximately €6.9 trillion 
(Eurosif, 2010). 
In 2003, the International Finance Corporation (IFC, 2003) reported that South Africa shows 
potential for RI in emerging markets. However, in 2010, only approximately 1.04 per cent of 
all assets under management in South Africa were managed according to RI principles 
(Giamporcaro, 2010: 6). It thus seems as if growth in the South African RI market has lagged 
behind its international counterparts in the first decade of the 21
st
 century. 
As interest in the RI market increased globally, a large number of investment policies and 
codes were developed. Since the early 1990s, governments in certain developed countries, 
mainly the USA and the UK, promoted RI in general and corporate governance in particular 
by means of codes of practice, such as the Cadbury Report (Chandra & Aneja, 2004). In the 
2000s, an increase was also seen in the promulgation of legislation in the USA, such as the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 and the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008. This 
increase in legislation was driven by the series of corporate scandals and the 2007–2009 
global financial crisis (Agrawal & Chadha, 2005; Windsor, 2009: 308). In the next section, 
attention is given to the South African ESG regulatory environment. 
3.2.5 The ESG regulatory environment in South Africa 
In South Africa, an emerging country, emphasis was mainly placed on voluntary compliance 
with the King Reports on corporate governance (Mangena & Chamisa, 2008). However, as 
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interest in RI within the country is steadily growing, positive changes are starting to occur 
(Viviers et al., 2009: 3). For example, the FTSE/JSE Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) 
Index was launched in May 2004 in response to the debate around sustainability in South 
Africa. This index was a pioneering initiative amongst emerging markets and led to increased 
RI attention in these markets (Herringer, Firer & Viviers, 2009: 14; JSE, 2010).  
The FTSE/JSE SRI Index does not only consider large market capitalisation firms, but also 
includes small and medium capitalisation firms. Since the establishment of this index, the 
number of small and medium capitalisation constituents increased significantly. In 2011, the 
first year that JSE-listed firms had to provide integrated reports, 36 Top 40 firms, 31 middle 
capitalisation and seven small capitalisation firms formed part of the index (Le Roux, 2011). 
In an attempt to improve the stability of global economies, especially in the light of the 
20072009 global financial crisis, a greater need for financial market oversight through 
government regulation arose (Hebb, 2012). More stringent regulation and investor pressure 
are important drivers of RI in many countries, including South Africa (Eccles, De Jongh, 
Nicholls, Sinclair & Walker, 2007). In many Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries, pension fund regulation authorities have taken a relatively 
passive regulatory stance before the 20072009 global financial crisis (OECD, 2007).  
Since 2011, significant regulatory changes took place in South Africa. In March 2011, 
Regulation 28 of the Pensions Fund Act (Act No. 24 of 1956) was amended to include ESG 
considerations (Compliance Institute of South Africa, 2011). This regulation now provides a 
defined set of principles to promote RI across all asset classes in South Africa (Bertrand, 
2011). The amendment had important implications in terms of the RI criteria and strategies 
used by local asset managers and fund managers. Pension fund trustees are now required to 
develop an investment policy statement, which must describe the fund’s approach to ESG 
issues. The prudential limits set out in Regulation 28 ease prior restrictions on alternative 
investments, including hedge funds and unlisted equities (Cameron, 2011).  
An important driving force behind the growing awareness of RI in South Africa is the 
commitment shown by the largest local institutional investor, namely the Government 
Employees Pension Fund (GEPF). The GEPF was one of the founding members of the UN 
PRI (GEPF, 2010; Oliphant, 2010; World Federation of Exchanges, 2010). Most of the 
GEPF’s assets are managed by the PIC (2012), an asset management company that is wholly 
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owned by the South African government. The corporate governance research instrument that 
was used in this study was based on specific recommendations of the King II Report and the 
PIC (2011), as explained in Chapter 4. 
Furthermore, the first RI code, called the Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa 
(CRISA) was launched in July 2011 (IoDSA, 2011). The aim is to provide investors with the 
necessary guidance to give effect to the King III Report and the UN PRI initiative. The 
CRISA is not legislation and merely encourages service providers and institutional investors 
to practice its recommendations on an “apply or explain” basis (IoDSA, 2011). One of the 
main recommendations of this code is that institutional investors should incorporate 
sustainability considerations, including corporate governance, into investment activities 
(Association for Savings and Investment South Africa, 2012). 
Eccles et al. (2007) conducted a study on the materiality of ESG risks in South Africa. 
BBBEE and HIV and AIDS were added to the more conventional range of ESG risks, as 
indicated in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2: Perceptions on the materiality of ESG issues in South Africa  
Ranking Pension fund managers Asset managers 
Advisory service 
providers 
1 Corporate governance Infrastructure development 
Infrastructure 
development 
2 Sustainability Corporate governance 
BBBEE and gender 
empowerment 
3 Infrastructure development 
BBBEE and gender 
empowerment 
Employee relations 
4 HIV and AIDS Employee relations Corporate governance 
5 
BBBEE and gender 
empowerment 
Sustainability HIV and AIDS 
Source: Eccles et al. (2007: 15) 
As highlighted in Table 3.2, corporate governance issues are regarded as quite important by 
South African pension fund managers and asset managers (Eccles et al., 2007). This tendency 
could be due to the well-developed South African corporate governance framework that 
improved understanding of the concept. In the following section, the concept ‘corporate 
governance’ is discussed in more detail. 
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3.3 Corporate governance: globally and in South Africa  
The term ‘corporate governance’ started to capture the attention of economists in the late 
1980s and early 1990s (Grandori, 2004). It falls at the intersection of various disciplines, most 
notably economics, finance, management theory and law (Windsor, 2009: 310). In this 
section, corporate governance is firstly defined. Attention is then given to the development of 
global corporate governance codes and reports, followed by a discussion of corporate 
governance in South Africa. Details on previous corporate governance studies are also 
provided. 
3.3.1 Defining corporate governance 
Prominent researchers in the field are neither consistent nor unified in their standpoint 
regarding what corporate governance exactly entails (Windsor, 2009: 310). Furthermore, 
although corporate governance is relevant to all countries, regardless of the country’s level of 
development, there is no single, globally accepted definition for the concept (Mallin, 2007: 
248).  
3.3.1.1 The narrow and broad views of corporate governance 
The preferred corporate governance definition in a particular country generally depends on 
whether a narrow or broad view of corporate governance is considered (Windsor, 2009). The 
narrow view places focus on the relationship between a firm and its shareholders. In their 
seminal book called The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle and Means (1932) 
indicated concern about the separation of ownership and control. The book explores the 
agency theory and still serves as a foundational text in finance and economics (Windsor, 
2009: 307). 
As mentioned in Section 2.6.3, the agency problem could occur when the ownership and 
control of a firm become separated. The shareholders (called the ‘principals’) can shift their 
control responsibility to the managers (called the ‘agents’) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976: 308). 
However, the managers could use their control function for their own, and not necessarily the 
shareholders’ benefit (Rossouw et al., 2002: 289). 
Enron and WorldCom are examples of large North American companies where the abuse of 
agents’ power led to the downfall of these two firms. In the Enron case, directors were paid 
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above-average salaries (more than twice the average director compensation for the 200 largest 
USA corporations in 2001). WorldCom did not report that the CEO received a loan of more 
than $400 million at a below-market interest rate. The loan received no attention in the media 
until the firm was involved in an irrecoverable financial scandal in 2002 (Bebchuk & Fried, 
2003: 3, 10). 
Hart (1995: 678–679) indicates that, in the absence of agency problems as in the case of sole 
proprietorships, all individuals associated with the entity could be instructed to maximise 
profit. Theoretically, no governance structure would thus be required to solve disagreements, 
since no disagreements will occur. However, in reality, agency problems are present and a 
company’s governance structure does matter. Withering economic prospects often intensify 
agency problems (Johnson, Boone, Breach & Friedman, 2000). Corporate governance can 
then be used as a mechanism to bridge the separation between ownership and control (Ncube, 
2006). 
Ownership structure (referring to the identities of the firm’s equity holders) is hence often 
considered in corporate governance studies (Denis & McConnell, 2003; Fernando, 2009: 52; 
Jiang, 2004: 88). In June 2013, South Africa’s Central Securities Depository publicly argued 
that shareholder information should be withheld from data vendors (such as McGregor BFA), 
due to the terms of the new Financial Markets Act (Act No. 19 of 2012). In 2013, when the 
data collection for this study was completed, the case was still considered by the Financial 
Services Board (Pickworth, 2013). Since the outcome could have possibly limited the 
availability of shareholder data, the ownership structure of JSE-listed firms were not 
considered in the current study. 
The dominant theoretical perspective in corporate governance studies is that the concept of 
corporate governance was born out of the agency problem (Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003: 
371). To curb agency conflicts and limit agency costs, various governance mechanisms have 
been suggested in corporate governance literature (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). However, these 
control measures bring about certain costs. Firms complain that, while they are already 
struggling with increasing auditing expenses, such governance measures cost them additional 
time and money (Solomon & Bryan-Low, 2004: 1). 
The broad view of corporate governance can be expressed in the stakeholder theory. 
According to this view, the interests of all the relevant stakeholders, including amongst others 
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shareholders, employees, customers and creditors, should be considered (Blair, 1995: 225; 
Solomon, 2007: 12). The reasoning is that various stakeholders make contributions to the 
firm. Therefore, their interests should also be considered in the constitution and conduction of 
corporate governance. The directors have the duty to align and balance the potentially 
competing interests of the relevant stakeholders of a firm. This broad view is gradually 
attracting more attention globally (Boatright, 2006: 235; Collier & Roberts, 2001: 67; 
Fernando, 2009: 4). According to this inclusive corporate governance approach, a firm’s 
performance is judged by a wider constituency, interested in growth in trading relationships, 
market share and financial performance (Maher & Andersson, 1999: 6; Mayer, 1996: 11).  
3.3.1.2 The corporate governance definitions of the Cadbury Report and the 
OECD  
Mallin (2011) states that two different, though related, definitions of corporate governance 
have been advanced in the academic literature. These two definitions include the 1992 
Cadbury Report’s definition and the broader definition of the OECD.  
Corporate governance is defined in the Cadbury Report as “the system by which firms are 
directed and controlled” (Gertz, 2003: 115). The Cadbury Report’s definition hence implies 
that the main responsibility for the corporate governance of listed companies lies with their 
boards of directors. The South African King Reports also use this definition (Rossouw et al., 
2002: 289). Researchers generally consider the specific corporate governance definition that 
is used in the country in which they conduct their research (Solomon, 2007: 12). Therefore, in 
the current study, the King Reports’ definition of corporate governance was used. 
The OECD (2004: 11) defines corporate governance as “a set of relationships between the 
management, board, shareholders and other stakeholders of a company”. According to this 
definition, in contrast to the traditional finance paradigm of shareholders’ wealth 
maximisation, focus should be placed on the interests of a company’s relevant stakeholders 
and not just on the shareholders’ interests. The OECD definition is thus in line with the broad 
view of corporate governance discussed in the previous section. 
3.3.1.3 The protection of finance suppliers and investors 
Two other views on corporate governance centre on the protection of finance suppliers and 
adequate returns for investors. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define corporate governance as 
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“the manner in which the finance suppliers of firms assure themselves of getting a return on 
their investment”. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000: 4) define corporate 
governance as “a set of mechanisms through which outside investors protect themselves 
against expropriation by insiders”. According to this definition, countries with efficient 
governance systems could become preferred locations for firms to operate and invest in 
(Grandori, 2004: 318).  
3.3.1.4 Enterprise governance 
The International Federation of Accountants (2004: 4) uses the term ‘enterprise governance’ 
instead of merely referring to corporate governance. Enterprise governance constitutes the 
entire accountability framework by paying attention to the role of the board and the firm’s 
strategic direction. The term comprises two dimensions, namely conformance of corporate 
governance and performance of business governance (International Federation of 
Accountants, 2004).  
The conformance dimension mainly covers issues related to the board, such as 
CEO/chairperson role duality and independence. The recommendations of the King Reports 
are mainly used to address this dimension. The focus of the performance dimension is on 
strategic decision-making with the aim of creating (and maximising) value (International 
Federation of Accountants, 2004). Strategic scorecards can be used to aid directors in 
exercising oversight over the strategic process (Chartered Institute of Management 
Accountants, 2007; Collier, 2009b: 21–23).  
A positive outcome of the 20072009 global financial crisis is that corporate governance, 
sustainability and strategy became inseparable. The ultimate economic responsibility is still to 
ensure performance that result in value creation for shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Firms thus need to balance their conformance efforts with further performance improvements 
(UN, 2010). To assist firms with this responsibility, a number of corporate governance codes 
and reports were developed, as discussed in Section 3.3.2. 
3.3.2 The development of global corporate governance codes and reports 
A corporate governance code generally presents a comprehensive set of recommendations for 
corporate governance compliance within a specific country. The specific recommendations 
could thus vary amongst countries (Grandori, 2004). Most codes are based on two main 
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principles, namely acceptable disclosure and appropriate checks and balances. Such codes are 
generally not statutory, although listed firms tend to adopt at least some of the 
recommendations. The reason is that in several countries, the stock exchange’s listing 
requirements oblige firms to comply with the code’s recommendations or justify non-
compliance (Grandori, 2004: 320). 
3.3.2.1 Four main corporate governance systems 
Weimer and Pape (1999) identified four main corporate governance systems, namely the 
AngloSaxon, Germanic (also known as Continental European), Latin and Japanese systems. 
The AngloSaxon system, which is followed in the USA and UK, was of specific relevance 
to this study, since the King Reports were based on this system (Gstraunthaler, 2010).  
There are two broad approaches to corporate governance reports, namely common law in 
countries (including South Africa) that follow the AngloSaxon model, and civil law in 
countries that use the Continental European model. The common law approach is rules-based, 
while the civil law approach tends to follow principals. An advantage of the civil law 
approach is that while rules are more specific, general principals can be more broadly 
interpreted by regulators (Windsor, 2009: 310–311).  
The King III Report recommends an “apply or explain” corporate governance approach. JSE-
listed companies hence have to report on their application of the King guidelines and explain 
non-compliance (IoDSA, 2009). This approach could, however, lead to the perception that if 
managers and directors cannot adhere to the King guidelines, they can alter the interpretation 
thereof (Carte, 2009). This could obviously lead to non-compliance with the (original) King 
recommendations. 
3.3.2.2 Corporate governance codes in developed countries 
The USA Business Roundtable drafted the first guidelines to improve the corporate 
governance capacity of USA firms in 1978. These guidelines were called The Role and 
Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation (Grandori, 
2004: 322). The guidelines stated that the main duties of directors include overseeing 
management and reviewing performance.  
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Following on this publication, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange issued its first code of best 
practice in 1989. Two years later, the Irish Association of Investment Managers drafted what 
was called The Statement of Best Practice on the Role and Responsibility of Directors of 
Publicly Listed Companies (Grandori, 2004: 322). 
Due to public concern regarding firms’ management and possible power abuse, UK normative 
framework developers started discussions on corporate governance in the early 1990s. The 
Cadbury Report and accompanying code of best practice on corporate governance in the UK 
was compiled in 1992. This report emphasises the importance of corporate transparency and 
the need to focus on corporate responsibility towards all relevant stakeholders (Solomon, 
2007: 52–54). Hence, the broad view of corporate governance (see Section 3.3.1.1) was 
considered. 
Although the Cadbury Report was not legally binding, listed firms had to publish a statement 
of compliance with the report in their annual statements. Any non-compliance with the report 
had to be explained. This formed the basis of the “comply or explain” approach chosen for the 
UK corporate governance framework. The Cadbury Report had a substantial effect on the 
development of corporate governance codes and hence the governance of firms around the 
world (Solomon, 2007: 52–54). In 2002, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act was adopted, imposing 
corporate governance rules on all USA public firms (Agrawal & Chadha, 2005). 
Despite a slow start, the development of corporate governance codes grew rapidly (Grandori, 
2004: 322). In 2003, 35 countries (including countries in developed, developing and emerging 
countries) issued at least one such code (European Corporate Governance Institute, 2013). By 
the middle of 2013, more than 360 corporate governance codes (including reports, drafts, 
reforms, recommendations and codes for institutional investors) were published worldwide 
(European Corporate Governance Institute, 2013). 
3.3.2.3 Corporate governance codes in African countries 
In many developing countries, corporate governance mechanisms were practically non-
existent prior to the 1990s (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Although a number of African countries 
published corporate governance codes during the past decade (2002–2012), South Africa was 
the only African country that published a corporate governance code in the 1990s. The 
country was thus a corporate governance pioneer within the African continent, as well as 
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amongst other emerging countries (Grandori, 2004: 324). Table 3.3 indicates the number of 
corporate governance codes that were published by specific African countries during the 
period 19942011. 
Table 3.3: Number of corporate governance codes published in specific African 
countries (1994–2011) 
Country 
Number of corporate governance codes (including 
reports, drafts, reforms and recommendations)
 Year(s) issued 
Ghana 1 2010 
Kenya 2 2002 
Malawi 1 2010 
Nigeria 4 2003, 2006, 2008, 2011 
South Africa 4 1994, 2002, 2009, 2011 
Source: European Corporate Governance Institute (2013) 
When considering the African countries indicated in Table 3.3, it is evident that South Africa 
is a frontrunner in terms of the early publication dates (Vaughn & Ryan, 2006). Section 3.3.3 
provides a detailed discussion on corporate governance within South Africa.  
3.3.3 Corporate governance in South Africa 
South Africa has a turbulent history, experiencing social unrest and inequality, provoked by 
the Apartheid system of racial segregation. After democracy was restored in 1994, extensive 
legislation led to both social and political transformation. The country hence started to draw 
more foreign investor attraction. However, foreign institutional investors criticised the 
(inefficient) corporate structures and systems of JSE-listed companies (Abdo & Fisher, 2007; 
Malherbe & Segal, 2001; United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2007: 20). 
Attention therefore had to be given to the development of corporate governance guidelines for 
firms operating in South Africa. 
3.3.3.1 The first King Report 
In 1994, a corporate governance committee, chaired by judge Mervyn King, created the first 
King Report on corporate governance in South Africa (Malherbe & Segal, 2001; Mallin, 
2007: 248). The publication of this report evoked unprecedented interest in corporate 
governance in the country. However, corporate governance has already been at stake since the 
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inception of the first publicly owned firms in South Africa, which was more than 100 years 
ago (IoDSA, 1994; Rossouw et al., 2002: 289).  
The first King Report adopted an inclusive approach to corporate governance (Mallin, 2007: 
248). According to such an approach, a firm should consider the interests of various 
stakeholders when conducting its operations. Both financial and ethical dimensions were 
discussed in this report, based on the South African circumstances at the time of publication 
(Mallin, 2007: 248; Rossouw et al., 2002: 296).  
The board of directors was highlighted as the focal point of the South African corporate 
governance system (Mangena & Chamisa, 2008: 31). The report provided guidelines 
concerning, inter alia, the composition of the directorate, board meeting frequency and 
directors’ remuneration (IoDSA, 1994). Compliance with these guidelines was voluntary, 
based on the “comply or explain” approach, as discussed in Section 1.1 (Malherbe & Segal, 
2001). 
Between 1994 and 2002, there were extensive legislation changes in the country, including 
the promulgation of the Employment Equity Act (Act No. 55 of 1998). The first King Report 
needed to take account of these developments and was consequently revised in 2002 (Mallin, 
2007: 248). 
3.3.3.2 The King II Report 
According to Naidoo (2002: 3), Mallin (2007: 248) and Du Plessis, Hargovan and Bagaric 
(2011), the King II Report, that became active in 2002, was ground-breaking in terms of its 
recommendations and outlook. This report provides information concerning, among others, 
the composition of the board, risk management and sustainability.  
In the current study, the period 20022010 was considered. Specific attention was hence 
given to the King II guidelines. In Chapter 4, a detailed discussion is provided on the 
refinement of the corporate governance research instrument, based on selected 
recommendations by the King II Report and the PIC (2011). 
The King II Report identified seven characteristics that may be regarded as constituting the 
characteristics of good corporate governance, namely:  
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1. Discipline: commitment by the senior management of a firm to adhere to universally 
accepted behaviour;  
2. Transparency: the effortlessness with which a firm-outsider can make a meaningful 
analysis of the financial and non-financial considerations of a firm;  
3. Independence: the extent to which mechanisms have been introduced to minimise or 
avoid potential conflict of interest;  
4. Accountability: corporate individuals or groups should be held answerable for their 
actions; 
5. Responsibility: behaviour that allows for corrective action and penalisation for 
mismanagement;  
6. Fairness: the interests of all the relevant stakeholders of a firm should be taken into 
consideration; and 
7. Social responsibility: being aware of and responding to social issues as well as 
placing priority on ethical standards. 
The King II Report recommends that directors should comply with the above-mentioned 
characteristics. However, it is important to distinguish clearly between the accountability and 
responsibility of directors. In corporate governance terms, a director is accountable at 
common law and by statute to the firm and responsible to the firm’s relevant stakeholders. As 
explained in Section 2.5, the notion of accountability to all possible stakeholders must be 
rejected. The board should identify the relevant stakeholders and agree to policies in terms of 
managing the relationship with those stakeholders (IoDSA, 2002).  
It is important to note that the compliance of JSE-listed companies with the King II Report’s 
guidelines was voluntary (Mangena & Chamisa, 2008: 31). However, the JSE Listing 
Requirements (JSE, 2005) oblige listed firms to disclose the extent of their compliance with 
the King II Report’s recommendations in their annual reports. In the case of non-compliance, 
reasons should be provided (Mangena & Chamisa, 2008: 31). 
Corporate governance in South Africa is developing in a highly turbulent context. The 
unavoidable uncertainty caused by this context makes the revision of corporate governance an 
ongoing concern. In order for South African firms to participate in the global economy, they 
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have to meet international standards without neglecting their allegiance to the African 
continent (Rossouw et al., 2002: 301). The King III Report was hence developed in 2009. 
3.3.3.3 The King III Report 
The publication of the King III Report in 2009 became necessary due to promulgation of the 
new Companies Act (Act No. 71 of 2008) as well as changes in international corporate 
governance trends (IoDSA, 2009). Whereas the first two King Reports followed a “comply or 
explain” approach, the King III Report follows an “apply or explain” approach. The focus is 
thus on how the principles of the King III Report are applied in practice (Malan, 2010).  
One of the main differences between the King II and King III Reports is the enhanced focus 
on integrated reporting (PWC, 2009). The King II Report included a chapter on sustainability 
reporting. The concept of triple bottom line reporting (focusing on economic, social and 
environmental issues) was thus already explained to South African corporate agents in 2002. 
However, due to growing attention to sustainability issues, the King III Report now requires 
that the financial and non-financial information (ESG) should be published in a so-called 
‘integrated report’ (PWC, 2009). 
From 2011, it is mandatory for JSE-listed firms to include an ESG analysis in their annual 
integrated reports (Pretorius, 2011). Since the quality and availability of ESG information are 
important considerations for emerging market investors (Gifford, 2008), improved ESG 
disclosure is essential to enhance the development of RI in South Africa. Having gained 
insight in the construct corporate governance, previous corporate governance studies will now 
be discussed. 
3.4 Previous studies on corporate governance and financial 
performance 
This section focuses on previous studies that considered financial performance and corporate 
governance compliance. Miller (2004: 266) suggests that corporate governance researchers 
should concentrate on one country or world region. The rationale is to control for the effect of 
factors that could differ across countries. After a thorough consideration of the available 
corporate governance literature, it was evident that previous researchers did indeed focus on 
specific countries, such as Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) who focused on the UK. A few 
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international comparative studies were also conducted, such as those by Klapper and Love 
(2004) and Shah (2009).  
Studies conducted in developed countries are firstly considered. Thereafter, studies conducted 
in emerging and developing countries are discussed, with specific focus on African studies. 
Possible caveats of the interpretation of results are explained. Lastly, attention is given to 
corporate governance studies that were conducted during financial crisis periods. 
3.4.1 Corporate governance studies conducted in developed countries 
Previous researchers who conducted studies in developed countries used different corporate 
governance and financial performance measures. Inconclusive evidence was reported on the 
nature (positive or negative) of the relationship between corporate governance and financial 
performance, as discussed in Sections 3.4.1.13.4.1.3. 
3.4.1.1 Board characteristics and financial performance 
In the 2002 Global Investor Opinion Survey (McKinsey & Company, 2002) it was reported 
that investors were particularly interested in the structure, remuneration and practices of the 
boards of companies. Evidently, these give strong indicators to the corporate governance 
measures that should be implemented within firms and considered for corporate governance 
studies (Wilkes, 2004: 13). Some corporate governance authors did focus mainly on board-
related variables. This was possibly the case since the board is the focal point of corporate 
governance and board-specific compliance is relatively easy to measure. 
Daily and Dalton (1992) considered a sample of USA listed entrepreneurial firms and found 
modest performance advantages (in terms of ROA, ROE and the price-earnings ratio) when a 
board had more external than internal directors. Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) focused on the 
board structure of a sample of 250 UK listed companies. They used corporate governance 
data provided by the 1995 version of the Global Vantage database. The authors considered the 
market-to-book ratio, TSR and ROA as financial performance measures. They did not find a 
significant link between board structure and the considered performance measures. Kiel and 
Nicholson (2003) reported a positive relationship between the size of the board and market-
based performance (Tobin’s Q) for 348 listed Australian companies in 1996.  
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Florackis (2005) reported that executive emolument can help align the interests of 
shareholders and managers, and thus enhance firm value (as measured by Tobin’s Q). He 
considered 962 UK listed firms over the period 19992003. However, in another UK study, 
Abdullah and Page (2009) found no association between corporate governance (measured by 
board-specific variables and ownership structure) and improved performance (ROA, market-
to-book ratio and sales-to-total-assets ratio) of UK FTSE 350 firms between 1999 and 2004.  
3.4.1.2 Corporate governance ratings and financial performance 
Instead of focusing on board-specific considerations, some researchers that conducted 
corporate governance studies in developed markets designed their own corporate governance 
rating instrument. The study by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) is often cited by other 
corporate governance researchers. They created what was called a Governance Index for 
1 500 USA firms, based on 24 corporate governance rules. They considered the period 
19901999 and used data provided by the Investor Responsibility Research Center, the 
Center for Research in Security Prices and the Standard and Poor’s Compustat database to 
construct their Governance Index. These authors found a strong correlation between their 
index and share returns over the researched period. 
Bhagat and Bolton (2008) used Gompers et al.’s (2003) Governance Index. The authors 
examined 6 126 annual corporate governance observations for USA listed firms over the 
period 19902004. They found that higher corporate governance compliance was related with 
higher operating performance (as measured by ROA). However, contrary to Gompers et al.’s 
(2003) findings, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) found no correlation between share market 
performance and corporate governance. In line with Bhagat and Bolton’s (2008) finding, 
Brown and Gørgens (2009) stated that the Top 300 Australian listed firms that were more 
compliant with corporate governance guidelines had higher profitability (as measured by 
ROA) compared to less compliant firms over the period 20042006. 
For their study in the USA, Brown and Caylor (2004: 3) designed a measure called Gov-
Score, based on data provided by Compustat. The measure included 51 factors for eight 
corporate governance categories. The authors considered the corporate governance 
compliance of 2 327 USA listed firms for the year 2002. They reported that better governed 
firms were relatively more profitable (ROE and net profit margin was used), more valuable 
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(Tobin’s Q was considered) and paid out more cash to shareholders than their counterparts 
with lower corporate governance compliance.  
Considering profitability as a measure of financial performance, Bauer, Günster and Otten 
(2004) determined a negative relationship between corporate governance and profitability 
(measured by ROE and the net profit margin) for a sample of European firms. The authors 
used Deminor Corporate Governance Ratings. Their study was conducted over a relatively 
short period, namely 20002001. 
Nguyen and Aman (2006) constructed a corporate governance index for a sample of Japanese 
firms for the period 2000–2005. They reported a strong correlation between the corporate 
governance index and ROA as well as Tobin’s Q. Sami, Wang and Zhou (2011) used data 
from the China Listed Firms Corporate Governance Research database to conduct a corporate 
governance study on a sample of Chinese listed firms. They considered 1 236 corporate 
governance ratings over the period 2001–2003. They reported a positive relationship between 
accounting-based performance (ROA and ROE) and corporate governance disclosure. A 
positive relationship was also observed between the market-based Tobin’s Q measure and 
corporate governance disclosure.  
In addition to the Tobin’s Q and TSR market-based performance measures, previous 
corporate governance researchers also applied the CAPM and FamaFrench three-factor 
models to estimate risk-adjusted abnormal returns. 
3.4.1.3 The application of the CAPM and FamaFrench three-factor model  
When the Fama–French three-factor model was applied in previous corporate governance 
studies, portfolios were typically constructed based on a distinction between well-governed 
and poorly governed companies. Equally weighted (every firm in the portfolio has the same 
weight, irrespective of the size of the firm) or value-weighted portfolios (each share is 
weighted according to its percentage contribution to the total market value of the portfolio) 
were typically formed (Amenc & Le Sourd, 2003; Fabozzi, 1998: 99).  
With regard to the size of firms, previous emerging market researchers (such as Alves & 
Morey, 2009; Black, Jang & Kim, 2006) reported that larger firms were better governed than 
smaller firms. However, the effect of differences in size on corporate governance is 
ambiguous. Large firms may have greater agency problems than small firms and thus need 
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stricter corporate governance mechanisms. Small firms with good growth opportunities may 
need higher external financing and hence adopt sound corporate governance mechanisms 
(Klapper & Love, 2004: 708).  
Bauer et al. (2004) compiled portfolios consisting of well-governed firms (20 per cent of 
firms with the highest corporate governance ratings) and poorly governed firms (20 per cent 
of companies with the lowest corporate governance ratings). The authors considered the 
Deminor Corporate Governance Ratings for firms included in the FTSE Eurotop 300. They 
found large excess returns relative to a zero-investment corporate governance strategy. Such a 
strategy entails forming a long portfolio in one set of shares and a short portfolio in another 
(Alexander, 2000). With respect to the size and BE/ME factors, the portfolios did not differ 
substantially (Bauer et al., 2004). 
Drobetz, Schillhofer and Zimmermann (2004) constructed corporate governance ratings for a 
sample of German listed companies. Corporate governance commitment, the rights of 
shareholders, transparency, management and supervisory board matters and auditing were 
considered. They sourced monthly TSR data over the period January 1998 to February 2002. 
By applying the FamaFrench three-factor model, they reported that an investment strategy 
whereby investors bought companies with high corporate governance ratings and shorted 
firms with low corporate governance ratings earned positive abnormal annual returns. 
As indicated previously, Nguyen and Aman (2006) constructed a corporate governance index 
for a sample of Japanese companies for the period 2000–2005. They evaluated the 
performance of governance-sorted portfolios by applying the FamaFrench three-factor 
model. The authors indicated that the well-governed portfolio significantly underperformed 
the poorly governed portfolio. In line with market efficiency, share prices thus seemed to 
reflect the higher risk associated with poor corporate governance (Aman & Nguyen, 2008).  
Bauer, Frijns, Otten and Tourani-Rad (2008) used a dataset provided by Governance Metrics 
International to consider the relationship between corporate governance and the performance 
of Japanese non-financial firms. The August 2004 Governance Metrics International ratings 
for 356 firms were considered. The authors applied the Fama–French three-factor model and 
reported that poorly governed companies were significantly outperformed by well-governed 
firms. 
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Kleuser (2007: 4) investigated the relationship between a cross-section of firms’ share returns 
and their corresponding corporate governance ratings. He used a sample of USA listed firms 
for the period August 2003December 2006. The corporate governance data were provided 
by Governance Metrics International. One of the aims of his study was to determine bad 
governance risk by sorting the firms into good and bad corporate governance portfolios based 
on their governance ratings. He applied both the CAPM and the FamaFrench three-factor 
model. His findings revealed that the portfolio of firms with the worst corporate governance 
ratings outperformed the portfolio consisting of the best governed firms over the considered 
period. 
Gawer (2012) considered the corporate governance compliance of a sample of European firms 
over the period 19992009. The author conducted a long-term event study analysis, based on 
the FamaFrench three-factor model. He used corporate governance data from Vigeo, a 
European corporate social responsibility rating agency. Gawer reported that high corporate 
governance ratings were positively associated with significant abnormal returns.  
In addition to the above-mentioned studies that centred on corporate governance ratings, 
specific attention was also given to two performance-related studies that placed focus on RI. 
Bauer, Koedijk and Otten (2005) applied the Carhart four-factor model to study ethical 
mutual fund performance. They used an international database containing USA, UK and 
German ethical portfolios. The results indicated no significant differences in risk-adjusted 
abnormal returns between conventional and ethical funds for the observed period (1990–
2001) after controlling for investment style. A positive observation was that investors were 
not negatively affected by investing responsibly. This result could be a driver for more RI. 
After the 2007–2009 global financial crisis, the French EDHEC-Risk Institute evaluated the 
performance of RI investments by applying the Fama–French three-factor model (Amenc & 
Le Sourd, 2010). RI funds were defined as those made by selecting shares that meet specified 
ESG criteria. In most cases, statistically not significant negative alphas were reported, 
showing that, in itself, RI security selection does not lead to outperformance. 
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3.4.2 Corporate governance studies conducted in emerging and 
developing countries 
Since the current study was conducted in South Africa, previous research that focused on 
emerging and developing markets is highlighted. The International Monetary Fund (IMF, 
2013) uses a country classification system that considers the per capita income level, export 
diversification and degree of integration into the global financial system to differentiate 
between developing markets and emerging markets. South Africa is considered to be an 
emerging market. The country forms part of the BRICS group (an acronym for a group of 
major emerging markets, the others being Brazil, Russia, India and China) since 2010 
(Bloomberg, 2010).  
Table 3.4 provides a comparative summary of studies conducted in emerging and developing 
countries, based on an extensive literature review. A separate discussion is provided on 
African studies in Section 3.4.2.1.  
Table 3.4: A summary of previous corporate governance studies conducted in 
emerging and developing countries 
Researcher(s) 
and 
publication 
year 
Country 
considered 
Corporate 
governance measure 
Performance 
measure(s)/ 
Financial data 
Results 
Judge et al. 
(2003) 
Russia Board structure Respondents 
compared their 
perceptions of their 
firm’s performance 
relative to the 
performance of 
competitors on a 
five-point Likert-
type scale 
Effective corporate 
governance seemed to be 
essential to firm 
performance in Russia 
Klapper & 
Love (2004) 
14 emerging 
markets 
(including 
South Africa) 
Credit Lyonnais 
Securities Asia 
corporate governance 
questionnaire 
ROE; Tobin’s Q Wide variation in firm-level 
corporate governance; better 
corporate governance is 
correlated with better 
operating performance and 
market valuation 
Haniffa & 
Hudaib (2006) 
Malaysia Board-specific 
characteristics; 
shareholding 
ROA; Tobin’s Q Significantly positive 
relationships between 
specific corporate 
governance considerations 
and accounting as well as 
market-based performance 
Imam & Malik 
(2007) 
Bangladesh Ownership structure 
(alternative corporate 
governance measure) 
TSR; Tobin’s Q Significant positive 
relationships between 
ownership structure and 
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Researcher(s) 
and 
publication 
year 
Country 
considered 
Corporate 
governance measure 
Performance 
measure(s)/ 
Financial data 
Results 
market-based performance 
Omran et al. 
(2008) 
Arab countries 
(Egypt, 
Jordan, Oman 
and Tunisia) 
Ownership 
concentration 
ROA; ROE; Tobin’s 
Q 
Prospect improvements in 
corporate governance 
practices are better 
determined through the 
effect on accounting-based 
performance than market 
measures 
Shah (2009) Pakistan (and 
USA) 
Corporate governance 
scorecard 
ROE; ROA; Tobin’s 
Q; market-to-book 
value of equity; 
Fama–French three-
factor model; four-
factor model 
including momentum 
Positive relationships were 
observed between corporate 
governance and the 
performance measures for 
both countries 
Chi (2009) Taiwan Firm-level 
transparency and 
disclosure rankings 
Tobin’s Q Good corporate disclosure 
practices play a positive role 
in Taiwanese firms’ market-
based performance 
Morey, 
Gottesman, 
Baker and 
Godridge 
(2009) 
21 emerging 
market 
countries 
(including 
South Africa) 
Monthly 
AllianceBernstein 
corporate governance 
ratings  
Tobin’s Q; price-to-
book ratio 
Corporate governance 
improvements result in 
significant positive market 
valuations 
Ramdani & 
Van 
Witteloostuijn 
(2010) 
Indonesia, 
Malaysia, 
South Korea 
and Thailand 
Board independence 
and CEO/chairperson 
role duality 
ROA The quantile regression 
analysis used by the authors 
indicated that the 
relationship between 
corporate governance and 
firm performance variables 
was different across the 
conditional quantiles of the 
firm performance 
distribution 
Alhaji et al. 
(2012) 
Malaysia Board-specific 
characteristics 
EPS No significant relationship 
was reported between the 
board-specific 
characteristics and the 
accounting-based EPS 
measure 
Fallatah & 
Dickins (2012) 
Saudi Arabia Constructed a 
corporate governance 
index based on board 
characteristics and 
share ownership 
ROA; Tobin’s Q; 
market value of 
equity 
Corporate governance and 
ROA was unrelated, while 
corporate governance and 
Tobin’s Q was positively 
related 
Poramapojn 
(2013) 
Thailand Corporate governance 
score acquired from 
the Corporate 
Governance Report of 
Thai Listed 
Companies in 2010 
published by the Thai 
Institute of Directors 
ROA; Tobin’s Q Firms with high profitability 
are likely to have good 
corporate governance 
compliance; the relationship 
with Tobin’s Q was not 
significant 
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Researcher(s) 
and 
publication 
year 
Country 
considered 
Corporate 
governance measure 
Performance 
measure(s)/ 
Financial data 
Results 
Velnampy 
(2013) 
Sri Lanka Board and board 
committee 
characteristics 
ROA; ROE Corporate governance did 
not affect the profitability of 
the considered 
manufacturing firms 
Source: Researcher’s own construction based on the indicated studies 
It is evident that corporate governance compliance in studies conducted in emerging and 
developing markets is often measured in terms of board-specific variables, as reflected in 
Table 3.4. Furthermore, several of these researchers tended to use ROA and ROE as 
profitability measures, while Tobin’s Q was favoured as a market-based performance 
measure. Based on the divergent results indicated in Table 3.4, it is evident that inconclusive 
evidence exists on the nature of the relationship between corporate governance and financial 
performance in the developing and emerging market context. In the following section, focus 
is placed on selected African corporate governance studies. 
3.4.2.1 African corporate governance studies 
Nganga, Jain and Artivor (2003: 8–9, 18) evaluated corporate governance in Africa for a 
survey of publicly listed firms (South African firms were not included in their sample). They 
reported that the corporate governance standards of the considered African firms were mostly 
on a par with listed firms in other developing countries.  
A number of corporate governance researchers focused on Nigeria and reported varying 
results. Sanda et al. (2005: 3) considered the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms 
as a means of increasing the financial performance of 93 listed Nigerian firms between 
19961999. They used board-specific corporate governance measures and the price-earnings 
ratio, ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q performance measures. These authors found no evidence that 
boards with more outside directors performed better than other firms. However, they indicated 
that companies that were managed by foreign CEOs tended to achieve higher performance 
levels than those managed by Nigerian CEOs.  
In another Nigerian study, Kajola (2008: 20–21) observed the relationship between board-
specific corporate governance variables and the ROE ratio. The author considered a sample of 
20 listed Nigerian companies for the period 20002006. A statistically significantly positive 
relationship was found between profitability and board size as well as the status of the CEO. 
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Ehikioya (2009: 232) also examined the relationship between board-specific variables and the 
performance (ROA, ROE, price-earnings ratio and Tobin’s Q) of 107 Nigerian listed firms 
over the period 1998–2002. He reported no evidence to support the (positive) impact of board 
composition on performance. 
Babatunde and Olaniran (2009: 338) found no significant evidence that outside directors 
enhanced the financial performance of selected Nigerian firms. They examined the 
relationship between external and internal corporate governance mechanisms and the ROA 
and Tobin’s Q measures for a sample of 62 listed Nigerian firms between 20022006. Okpara 
(2011) indicated that Nigerian firms are challenged by a lack of board commitment, weak 
governance monitoring systems and insufficient corporate transparency and disclosure. 
Studies that were conducted in Egypt and Kenya also provided contradictory results. El-
Masry (2010) considered the Top 50 listed Egyptian firms for the period 20042006. Various 
board-specific characteristics were positively related to firm performance (measured by ROA, 
ROE and Tobin’s Q). In contrast, Barako, Hancock and Izan (2006: 11) examined the 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure practices of listed firms in Kenya. They considered 
ROE as a profitability control variable with no statistically significant results. A possible 
reason for this tendency was that ROE declined during the period under investigation (1992–
2001) as a result of the general decline in Kenya’s economic performance. Okiro (2010) also 
found no relationship between board size and performance (ROA and the dividend pay-out 
ratio were considered) of listed firms in Nairobi for the period 20062008. 
In line with the results of studies conducted in developed countries (see Table 3.4), 
inconclusive evidence was also reported on the nature of the relationship between corporate 
governance and the financial performance of firms operating in emerging and developing 
countries. 
3.4.2.2 South African corporate governance studies 
Abdo and Fisher (2007: 46) examined the effect of reported corporate governance disclosure 
practices on the financial performance of selected JSE-listed firms. They considered the 
period June 2003June 2006. The authors developed the G-Score research instrument. This 
instrument was based on 29 corporate governance disclosure factors. They reported that 
corporate governance had a positive correlation with share returns. Abdo and Fisher’s (2007) 
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G-Score was used by Opperman (2009) to consider the relationship between corporate 
governance compliance and the cost of capital of the 20 largest listed South African firms. 
Kyereboah-Coleman (2007: 208) considered the corporate governance data of 103 listed 
African firms. He included companies from Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa in his 
sample. The author indicated that the independence of corporate boards is particularly 
important for the performance (as measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q) of the considered 
companies. 
Moloi (2008) used content analysis based on the King II Report’s recommendations and the 
Corporate Laws Amendment Act (Act No. 24 of 2006) to assess the corporate governance 
reporting of the Top 40 JSE-listed firms in 2006. He found that these companies adhered to 
good corporate governance practices. A limitation of his study was that only the largest firms 
were included in the sample. The results were thus not unexpected.  
Mangena and Chamisa (2008: 29) examined the association between firms’ corporate 
governance structures and incidences of listing suspension from the JSE. They considered 81 
firms suspended between 1999 and 2005. These authors reported that the likelihood of 
suspension was higher for firms with weaker corporate governance compliance than for their 
counterparts with better corporate governance compliance. However, they indicated no 
association between ROA and the board-specific variables that were studied.  
In 2012, Ntim et al. (2012) considered the disclosure practices of 169 JSE-listed firms from 
20022007, based on 50 King II provisions. They reported that good corporate governance 
disclosure practices impacted positively on firm value (measured by TSR, among other 
measures). The authors only paid attention to disclosure practices, while both the disclosure 
and acceptability dimensions of corporate governance compliance were considered in the 
current study. 
Although South African researchers mentioned improvements in corporate governance 
compliance over time, the relationship between corporate governance and the selected 
financial performance measure(s) ranged from positive, negative to no association at all.  
Previous researchers identified three possible caveats that should be considered when 
interpreting results on the relationship between corporate governance compliance and 
financial performance. 
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3.4.3 Possible caveats of the interpretation of corporate governance and 
financial performance results 
Firstly, Klapper and Love (2004: 706) indicated that a possible caveat on results that show a 
positive relationship between corporate governance and financial performance is the likely 
endogeneity of corporate governance compliance practices. Growing companies with large 
external funding requirements have more motivation to adopt good corporate governance 
practices to lower the cost of capital than their more established counterparts. Furthermore, 
growth opportunities would be reflected in a firm’s market valuation, thus possibly inducing a 
positive relationship between a market-based measure such as Tobin’s Q and corporate 
governance compliance.  
Klapper and Love (2004) recommend that size should be considered as a control variable that 
could proxy for growth opportunities. Panel data techniques can also be used to address this 
problem. In the current study, both size and value/growth factors formed part of the 
FamaFrench three-factor analysis. See Section 5.9.5.3 for more details on the application of 
this model in the current study. In addition, panel regression models were used, as discussed 
in Sections 5.10.2.55.10.2.6. 
Secondly, if only large, financially successful firms adopt the specific recommendations of 
the observed corporate governance code, a positive relationship between corporate 
governance and financial performance is expected. It is then possible that a high corporate 
governance rating only indirectly affects performance (Bjuggren & Mueller 2009: 361–362). 
In the current study, both large and small market capitalisation firms were examined. In 
addition, the sample included both listed firms and firms that delisted from the stock 
exchange during the considered time period. Refer to Section 5.8.3 for more information on 
the compilation of this study’s sample. 
Thirdly, corporate governance researchers tend to expect a (causal) relationship between 
corporate governance compliance as the independent variable and financial performance as 
the dependent variable. However, the inverse of this relationship may also apply, namely that 
better financial performance leads to better corporate governance compliance. Companies 
with good operating performance may hence decide to adopt improved corporate governance 
practices, because they can afford it (Love, 2010: 2). Corporate governance could accordingly 
be the dependent or independent variable when considering the relationship between 
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corporate governance compliance and financial performance. As reported in Section 7.3, 
separate regression analyses were conducted in the current study on corporate governance as 
the dependent and independent variable respectively. 
Fourthly, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003: 96) warned that if a significant relationship is found 
between corporate governance and a financial performance measure, a researcher cannot 
merely accept a causal relationship. Other factors that were not considered within the specific 
study could have an influence on the reported association. The relationship between corporate 
governance compliance and financial performance is hence likely to be spurious rather than 
causal.  
The relationship between the corporate governance compliance and financial performance of 
a sample of JSE-listed firms was considered in the current study. The study period 
(20022010) included the 20072009 global financial crisis. The failing corporate 
governance structures of listed firms in the USA were one of the main causes of this crisis 
(Adams, 2009). The financial performance of JSE-listed firms was severely influenced during 
this crisis period. The influence of the 20072009 crisis period on the considered relationship 
could hence not be ignored. While none of the discussed South African corporate governance 
researchers (see Section 3.4.2.2) included the crisis period in their corporate governance 
studies, the 20072009 crisis formed part of the current study’s research period. 
With regard to previous financial crisis periods, a number of researchers conducted corporate 
governance studies during the Mexican financial crisis of 1994–1995, the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997–1998 and the 20072009 global financial crisis.  
3.4.4 Corporate governance studies that were conducted during financial 
crisis periods 
Previous corporate governance researchers either considered the periods before or after a 
financial crisis, or deliberately included a financial crisis period to consider the effect thereof 
on the outcomes of their studies. Joh (2003: 319) studied the effect of corporate governance 
on financial performance of Korean firms before rather than during the Asian crisis of 
19971998. He indicated that weak corporate governance led to the deteriorating of the 
considered firms’ performance over time, even before the 1997–1998 Asian crisis.  
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Mitton (2002: 239–240) reported a positive association between share price performance and 
disclosure quality for a sample of 398 listed firms from Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand during the 1997–1998 Asian crisis. In another Asian crisis study, 
Baek, Kang and Park (2004: 265) examined the effect of corporate governance compliance on 
the share price data of 644 Korean listed firms. These authors found that a change in the value 
of a firm during this crisis was a function of firm-level corporate governance differences. In 
addition, they reported that the considered firms with high corporate governance disclosure 
(and alternative external financing sources) “suffered less” in financial terms during the 
19971998 Asian crisis than firms with weak corporate governance disclosure.  
Leung and Horwitz (2010) considered the effect of corporate governance compliance on the 
share prices of 463 Hong Kong listed companies during the 1997–1998 Asian crisis. They 
indicated that companies with more concentrated director ownership and CEO/chairperson 
role duality experienced a smaller share price decline than their counterparts with less 
concentrated director ownership and separate CEO/chairperson roles. 
Regarding the 2007–2009 global financial crisis, Nogata, Uchida and Moriyasu (2009) 
examined the effect of corporate governance compliance on the share price performance of 
listed firms in Japan during the crisis. They found that corporate governance structures were 
important determinants of the considered firms’ share price performance. The share prices of 
firms that had share option plans were severely negatively affected during this crisis period. It 
thus seems as if managerial risk-taking incentives make share price performance (more) 
vulnerable during a financial crisis period (Nogata et al., 2009). 
Erkens et al. (2012) considered the effect of corporate governance on the performance of 
financial firms from 30 countries during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis. A surprising 
result was that firms with more independent boards and higher institutional ownership 
structures had significantly lower share returns than firms with less independent boards and 
lower institutional ownership. Manescu (2010a) warned that investors seem to have little 
concern with corporate governance when firms perform well; however, boards often come 
under pressure to change their corporate governance practices during underperformance 
periods (Abdullah & Page, 2009). In the current study, the risk-adjusted abnormal 
performance of the sample of JSE-listed companies before and during the recent crisis period 
was considered. See Section 7.5.3 for more details. 
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3.5 Summary and conclusions 
The history of RI dates back to the Quakers who refused to profit from investments related to 
alcohol and weapon dealings in the 18
th
 century (Hamm, 2003). The concept of RI developed 
over time, focusing the attention of investors on the importance of ESG considerations in the 
investment process. Since 2005, the UN PRI (2010) provides standardised, globally accepted 
principles that guide responsible investors. Corporate governance is generally the first level of 
ESG engagement for investors (World Federation of Exchanges, 2010: 2). 
Statistics revealed that the interest of institutional investors in RI considerably increased 
between 1999 and the early 2000s (International Labour Office, 2003: 71). Enhanced focus 
was hence placed on the development of RI initiatives, policies and codes. South Africa’s 
FTSE/JSE SRI index was a pioneering initiative amongst other emerging market countries 
(JSE, 2010). Furthermore, the amendments to Regulation 28 of the Pensions Fund Act (Act 
No. 24 of 1956) and the CRISA guide and encourage institutional investors to incorporate 
ESG considerations into investment activities (Bertrand, 2011). With regard to the ESG 
compliance of South African firms, focus is mainly placed on corporate governance. This 
tendency can be attributed to the country’s well-developed corporate governance framework 
provided by the King Reports. 
Previous researchers in developed and emerging countries reported inconclusive evidence on 
the nature of the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance. The 
current researcher aimed to contribute to the body of knowledge on this relationship by 
focusing on the South African context.  
However, while clearly defined financial performance measures are available, corporate 
governance is an abstract concept that is difficult to measure (Baber & Liang, 2008). Many 
previous corporate governance researchers hence tended to concentrate on board-specific 
variables. In contrast, in the current study, a comprehensive, well-defined corporate 
governance research instrument was refined and used to compile a CGS for each of the JSE-
listed firms in the sample. This instrument was based on the recommendations of the King II 
Report and the PIC (2011), as explained in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 4  
THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
RESEARCH INSTRUMENT 
Not indicated due to a confidentiality agreement between the researcher and the 
Centre for Corporate Governance in Africa at the University of Stellenbosch 
Business School. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Introduction 
“Research consists of seeing what everyone else has seen,  
but thinking what no one else has thought.” 
This quote by the 1937 Nobel Prize winner Albert Szent-Györgyi (1893–1986) indicates that 
a researcher should find a novel problem in the sphere of existing information on the 
considered research topic. The researcher should then cautiously select a research design and 
manage the entire research process actively (O’Leary, 2010).  
Systematic problem solving could lead to better research results (Kumar, 2011). A systematic 
research process normally entails a number of steps. Firstly, the researcher should decide 
what he or she wants to achieve, namely the study’s research problem, objectives, questions 
and hypotheses (Coldwell & Herbst, 2004: 2–3). As indicated in Section 1.3, this study’s 
research problem was to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and the 
financial performance of selected JSE industries for the period 20022010. South Africa 
presents an appropriate emerging market environment in which to conduct corporate 
governance research, due to the well-developed corporate governance framework provided by 
the King Reports. 
In the context of the research problem and objectives, the preceding literature chapters 
provided an in-depth discussion on financial performance, the 2007–2009 global financial 
crisis and corporate governance. In Chapter 4, a detailed discussion was provided on the 
refinement of the corporate governance research instrument. In the remainder of Chapter 5, 
the research process, consisting of nine steps, is discussed. 
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5.2 Defining business research 
Research is important for both academics and practitioners. Although the definition of 
research differs amongst users, there is a general consensus that research is systematic, entails 
a process of enquiry and investigation as well as increases knowledge (Wilson, 2010: 2–3). 
One of the research areas that are of particular concern to social scientists is that of business 
research. 
Business research can be defined as the objective, systematic process of collecting, recording, 
analysing and interpreting data to help solve managerial problems (Zikmund, Babin, Carr & 
Griffin, 2013: 4–5). In the context of the current study, responsible and mainstream investors 
need corporate governance and financial performance data for both short-term and long-term 
decision-making purposes. Corporate governance compliance is often costly and time-
consuming. Investors and other stakeholders are thus interested in understanding how the firm 
can benefit (in financial and non-financial terms) from efficient corporate governance 
compliance (Solomon & Bryan-Low, 2004).  
A general consensus amongst researchers is that research should increase knowledge. After 
the completion of the current study, new knowledge on the specific research area of concern 
(the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance) would have been 
created for use by other academics, business leaders and practitioners, amongst others. These 
interested parties could then possibly apply the research findings for future decision-making 
purposes, problem solving and research.  
The term ‘systematic’ in the definition of business research entails that the research should be 
well organised and planned (Wilson, 2010: 2). This could be accomplished by the nine steps 
of the research process illustrated in Figure 5.1. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 141 
 
Figure 5.1: The research process that was followed in the current study 
Source: Adapted from Cant et al. (2003: 39) 
The primary research objective of the current study was to investigate the relationship 
between corporate governance and the financial performance of selected JSE industries. Refer 
to Sections 5.10.2.4–5.10.2.6 for details on the regression models that were used to test for 
this relationship. 
The research questions formulated in this study included the following: 
 Are there differences between the corporate governance compliance of JSE-listed 
companies and that of delisted companies? (Refer to Section 5.10.2.10 for a discussion 
on the mixed-model ANOVA). 
 Was there an association between the corporate governance compliance of the top 
CGS firms in the sample and their risk-adjusted financial performance? (See Sections 
5.9.5.2–5.9.5.3 for detail on the estimation of abnormal share returns). 
Research 
process 
Step 1: Identify and formulate the research problem (refer to Section 1.3) 
Step 2: Determine the research objectives (see Sections 1.4.1, 1.4.2 and 5.2) 
After the research problem and research objectives have been defined, the 
appropriate research type(s) should be decided on (refer to Section 5.3) 
Step 3: Develop a research design (see Section 5.4) 
Step 4: Conduct secondary research (refer to Section 5.5) 
Step 5: Conduct primary research (see Section 5.6) 
Step 6: Determine the research frame 
Specific attention should be given to the studyʼs population (refer to Section 5.7) and 
sample (refer to section 5.8) 
Step 7: Collect data (refer to Section 5.9) 
Step 8: Process data (see Section 5.10) 
Step 9: Report the research findings (refer to Section 5.11; Chapters 6 and 7) 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 142 
 Does 2008, the midpoint of the 2007–2009 global financial crisis, represent a 
structural break in the financial dataset? (Refer to Section 5.10.2.12 for detail on the 
Chow test). 
In the following section, different types of research are explained. Specific reference is made 
to the research types that were used in this study. 
5.3 Types of research 
A study’s research problem affects the appropriate research type(s) that should be used (Bless, 
Higson-Smith & Kagee, 2006: 43). Collis and Hussey (2003: 10) state that the purpose, logic 
and process of research can be used to classify different types of research, as indicated in 
Table 5.1.  
Table 5.1: Classification of different research types 
Research type Basis of classification 
Descriptive, exploratory, causal, explanatory, predictive 
and evaluative research 
Purpose of the research 
Deductive and inductive research Logic of the research 
Quantitative and qualitative research Process of the research 
Source: Adapted from Collis & Hussey (2003: 10) 
5.3.1 Descriptive, exploratory, causal, explanatory, predictive and 
evaluative research 
Descriptive research aims to provide an accurate description of a specific phenomenon’s 
characteristics (Johnson & Christensen, 2012: 366). This strategy addresses the “who, what, 
where, when and how” aspects of the research. Descriptive research can be used to determine 
possible interactions between variables, but cannot be used to make cause-and-effect 
statements (Blumberg, Cooper & Schindler, 2008; Silver, Stevens, Wrenn & Loudon, 2013). 
Exploratory research attempts to generate new ideas and insight. If a study area is relatively 
novel, exploratory research often first needs to be conducted to develop a conceptual 
framework. This type of research can be used to clarify ambiguous situations (Burns & Burns, 
2008: 82; Zikmund & Babin, 2010: 50). Surveys are often used when conducting exploratory 
research. This type of research can lead to implementable suggestions or solutions for a 
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specific research problem (Blumberg et al., 2008; Silver et al., 2013). Shareholder activism in 
South Africa is, for example, a novel research field. 
The third type of research is that of causal research. This research type can be used to 
demonstrate that a change in one variable causes a (predictable) change in another variable. A 
“cause-and-effect” relationship is hence considered (Zikmund & Babin, 2010: 53). It can also 
provide the researcher with a better understanding of the outcome of one variable when 
varying the other (Silver et al., 2013). Causal research is based on the assumption that the 
dependent variable is causally related to one (or more) independent variables (Coldwell & 
Herbst, 2004: 11–12). There are three strict criteria for causality, namely temporal sequence 
(the cause must occur before the effect), concomitant variation (when a change occurs in the 
cause, a change should also be observed in the outcome) and non-spurious association (cause 
and effect observations are not due to another variable) (Zikmund & Babin, 2010: 53). 
Explanatory research is used to explain why a specific phenomenon occurred. This research 
type provides for the inclusion of reasons for a specific occurrence (Adler & Clark, 2011: 15). 
Explanatory research can be used to test a theory that describes a (positive or negative) cause-
and-effect relationship amongst variables, as well as the strength of the relationship. It can 
also be utilised to explain why variables are related (Salkind, 2010: 1254). Based on the 
interpretations suggested by explanatory research, predictive research can be used to forecast 
future phenomena or problems. Furthermore, when a researcher aims to assess whether a 
specific intervention or procedure can change the behaviour of observed objects, evaluative 
research can be used (Salkind, 2010: 1254; Vogt & Johnson, 2011: 300).  
In the current study, descriptive research was used to determine the nature and characteristics 
of the financial performance and corporate governance datasets. The interaction between the 
dependent and independent variables were also examined. As indicated in Table 5.1, the next 
basis of classification is the logic of the research. 
5.3.2 Deductive and inductive research 
The scientific norm of logical reasoning provides a hypothetical two-way bridge between the 
application of theory and conducting new research. In practice, scientific enquiry involves 
deduction, induction or a combination thereof (Babbie, 2013: 51-52). Deductive research is 
based on the application of a well-known theory, such as the agency theory. Hypotheses are 
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then deduced based on this theory. Thereafter, empirical observations are made to confirm or 
contradict the theory. In contrast, inductive reasoning typically starts with observation(s), 
where after tentative hypotheses are formulated. A general theory is then developed, based on 
these observations. The inductive approach can thus be seen as a theory-building process 
(Crowther & Lancaster, 2008; Trochim, 2006; Wilson, 2010: 7).  
By its very nature, inductive reasoning is exploratory (Wilson, 2008: 44). A deductive 
research approach is often used if the researcher wants to consider a relationship between 
certain variables (Collins, 2010: 42). In this study, the deductive research approach was 
followed. The researcher conducted a thorough literature review on corporate governance, 
financial performance and global financial crises. Thereafter, the hypotheses for the study 
were formulated. 
5.3.3 Quantitative and qualitative research 
The quantitative and qualitative research types each relates to a specific research paradigm. A 
study’s research paradigm is derived from its underlying research philosophy (Armstrong, 
2010b). The concept ‘research philosophy’ can be defined as the development and nature of 
the research background and knowledge (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2007). The relevant 
research paradigms and their underlying philosophies are firstly discussed (refer to Figure 
5.2), before quantitative and qualitative research types are explained. 
 
Figure 5.2: Philosophies, research paradigms and research types 
Source: Researcher’s own construction 
There are three main philosophical dimensions in research, namely ontology (focuses on a 
researcher’s perception of reality), epistemology (the nature of knowledge within a specific 
field) and axiology (concerned with the researcher’s values and ethics) (Collins, 2010: 36; 
Philosophies 
•Ontology 
•Epistemology 
•Axiology 
Research 
paradigms 
•Positivistic 
•Phenomenological 
Research types 
•Quantitative 
•Qualitative 
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Wahyuni, 2012: 69–70). Research paradigms are used to address the philosophical 
dimensions of a scientific discipline (Wahyuni, 2012: 69). Based on their research 
philosophy, researchers in the social sciences could adopt either a phenomenological or a 
positivistic research paradigm. In many cases, a blended approach is also suitable (Remenyi et 
al., 1998).  
Researchers who adopt a positivistic paradigm focus on explanations and the possibility of 
causality (Kasi, 2009: 95). This paradigm is associated with quantitative data collection and 
analysis (Blaxter, Hughes & Tight, 2006: 61). Existing theories are typically considered to 
formulate research questions and hypotheses through a deductive reasoning approach. 
Numerical data are then collected on which statistical analyses are conducted. Thereafter, the 
stated hypotheses are rejected (or not) based on the statistical results (Lodico, Spaulding & 
Voegtle, 2010).  
Researchers who follow a phenomenological paradigm typically consider feelings or 
experiences of participants in their study through words and descriptions (Taylor, 2005: 108). 
It is an interpretative research approach concerned with understanding the meanings which 
are attached to specific phenomena within the observed individuals’ social contexts. This 
research paradigm is typically associated with qualitative data collection and analysis (Ritchie 
& Lewis, 2003: 3; Taylor, 2005). Qualitative research allows the researcher to interpret 
specific phenomena without depending on numerical measurement. Specific data collection 
methods are used, such as interviews and focus groups, to gain new insights or determine 
inner meanings (Zikmund & Babin, 2010: 131). Qualitative research typically follows an 
inductive approach (Lodico et al., 2010).  
In this study, quantitative research was conducted. This research type offers a number of 
advantages over a qualitative approach. Since it is based on numerical measurement, it can be 
simpler to generalise than qualitative research. It is also easier to illustrate the results on 
graphs for explanatory purposes. However, quantitative data do not necessarily provide the 
researcher with the same level of depth as qualitative observations (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 
2003; Thomas, 2003: 2). Most previous studies (refer to Section 3.4) on the relationship 
between corporate governance and financial performance were also quantitative in nature. 
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At this stage, the study’s research questions have been formulated, the research objectives 
were derived and the appropriate research types were identified. The third step in the research 
process (refer to Figure 5.1) entails that a research design should be developed. 
5.4 Development of a research design 
The research design of a study indicates the necessary steps to provide answers to the research 
questions and to test the stated hypotheses (Gravetter & Forzano, 2009: 185; Silver et al., 
2013: 55). In the current study, time measurement was of specific concern to the selected 
research design. Observations can be evaluated in a single period or over a longer period. In 
this regard, two main research designs can be used, namely cross-sectional and longitudinal 
(Babbie, 2013: 106). 
A cross-sectional research design focuses on data collection from a section (i.e. the sample) of 
the population at a single point in time (Du Plooy, 2009: 91). The differences amongst the 
sample objects in this single period are typically considered. Such a design cannot be used to 
measure change(s) over an observed time period (Kumar, 2011: 107). Exploratory studies are 
typically cross-sectional in nature (Babbie, 2013: 105). Figure 5.3 illustrates how a cross-
sectional design was used in the current study.  
Year CGS firm 1 CGS firm 2 CGS firm 3 CGS firm n 
2010 40 69 34 50 
 
Figure 5.3: Example of a cross-sectional design in this study 
By using a cross-sectional research design, the researcher was able to compare the compiled 
CGSs amongst all the companies in the sample in a particular year, say 2010. However, the 
primary objective of this study was to observe the relationship between corporate governance 
and the financial performance of selected JSE industries over a nine-year study period 
(20022010). The consideration of only cross-sectional data was thus insufficient.  
In contrast to cross-sectional studies, longitudinal studies consider the same phenomenon over 
an extended period of time (Babbie, 2013: 106). Time-series and panel designs are typically 
used during longitudinal studies. Time-series designs evaluate a specific object (such as the 
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CGS of a specific firm) over a set time period (Blaikie, 2010: 202). The application of a time-
series design was used in the current study as illustrated in Figure 5.4. 
Year CGS firm 1  
2007 25 
2008 30 
2009 38 
2010 40 
Figure 5.4: Example of a time-series design in the current study 
As seen in Figure 5.4, a time-series design could provide the researcher with useful 
information regarding changes for a specific variable, such as a firm’s CGS over a four-year 
period. However, instead of considering only one firm over a number of years, the researcher 
collected corporate governance data for 230 JSE-listed firms over the period 20022010. As 
such, the usage of a panel research design had to be considered, since such a design includes 
changes in multiple sample objects over an observed period (Blaikie, 2010: 202; Jupp, 2006). 
Panel designs are widely used in the social sciences, where it is also known as ‘pooled cross-
sectional time-series designs’ (Frees, 2004: 4). If a balanced panel design is used, only firms 
which had data available for every year during a specific study period can be considered. This 
could create survivorship bias, since only companies that existed for the entire study period 
could be included in the sample (Baum, 2006: 47). Using an unbalanced panel could decrease 
this bias. For the purpose of the current study, firms that had fewer than nine annual 
observations were also included in the sample. The loss of sample size was consequently 
mitigated. Figure 5.5 provides an example of how an unbalanced panel design was used in the 
current study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Example of an unbalanced panel design used in the current study 
Year CGS firm 1 CGS firm 2 CGS firm 3 CGS firm 4  
2007 25 50 20  
2008 30 58 24 36 
2009 38 62  42 
2010 40   50 
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From Figure 5.5, it can be seen that the unbalanced panel design provided the researcher with 
the opportunity of observing firms during specific years during which they were listed 
(Arellano, 2003: 1–3). The use of this design enabled the researcher to combine the 
simultaneous measurement of time-series and cross-sectional data effects (De Jager, 2008: 
54–56; Yang, 2010).  
Three main advantages associated with the use of a panel design are that the sample size can 
be increased, individual heterogeneity (differences amongst individual objects) can be 
controlled for, and multicollinearity (correlation amongst the explanatory variables) can be 
reduced (Ajmani, 2009; Schils, 2005: 68). If n subjects (e.g. 100 firms) were observed over t 
time periods (e.g. 10 years), there would have been a total of 1 000 observations (n multiplied 
by t). In contrast, if cross-sectional data were used, there would only have been 100 data 
points. 
Possible unobserved individual effects, due to individual heterogeneity can be controlled for 
by using repeated observations on the same firms over time. Thirdly, multicollinearity can be 
reduced as a result of the variability between both time periods and individual objects. A 
detailed discussion of these problems can be found in Sections 5.10.2.3.35.10.2.3.4. A 
disadvantage of using panel data is that it can be very time-consuming to source the data 
(Ajmani, 2009; Schils, 2005: 68). 
Once the research design has been developed, the researcher should determine whether 
secondary and/or primary research should be conducted. Step 4 of the research process thus 
focuses on secondary research, while step 5 entails primary research.  
5.5 Secondary research  
Social science researchers typically start a new study by considering secondary data. This 
enables them to build the main argument of their study and to evaluate the results of previous 
researchers within the field (Hair, Celsi, Money, Samouel & Page, 2011: 155; Kumar, 2011: 
23; 58). Secondary data are already in existence, since it stems from sources previously 
compiled for other purposes than the current research project. The collection of secondary 
data normally does not require access to the original research subjects (Struwig & Stead, 
2013; Zikmund & Babin, 2010). 
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The main advantages of using secondary data include that it is readily available and relatively 
inexpensive to gather. It is also less time-consuming to collect secondary data than to gather 
primary data (Zikmund & Babin, 2010: 163). However, if the researcher needs to purchase 
data from a data provider, the cost of collecting data can increase substantially. A possible 
disadvantage is that secondary data were not specifically collected for the researcher’s needs. 
One study’s primary data can thus become another study’s secondary data. The researcher 
should therefore carefully evaluate the secondary data to determine the reliability and 
applicability of it in terms of his or her own research (Beri, 2010: 13; Boone & Kurtz, 2012).  
Secondary data can be quantitative or qualitative in nature. The necessary secondary data are 
often collected by using electronic sources, such as academic journals and databases 
(Zikmund & Babin, 2010: 163). For the purposes of the current study, several journal articles, 
books, press releases and websites were consulted to conduct a comprehensive literature 
review on corporate governance, financial crises and financial performance. 
Standardised financial data were gathered from the McGregor BFA (2013) database. This 
database provides financial data both as published in a company’s annual report (at financial 
year end) and in a standardised format. Standardised, annualised financial data were used for 
the current study, since it could be compared more easily (and accurately) amongst the sample 
firms. Data on the risk-free rate of return and the market proxy in South Africa (the FTSE/JSE 
All Share Index) were obtained from the BER (2013). This data were used for the estimation 
of alphas. 
Secondary data sources are often used in corporate governance and social responsibility 
studies. However, corporate governance data are not necessarily available in an immediately 
usable format (Hair et al., 2011: 112–113). The data should then be converted into the 
required format. ‘Data conversion’ refers to the process of changing the original form of data 
to a format that is more suitable to achieve the research objective(s) of a specific study 
(Zikmund & Babin, 2013).  
In the current study, the units of analysis, namely firms’ annual reports, were downloaded 
from the McGregor BFA (2013) database for the period 20022010. The term ‘annual report’ 
was used for the purpose of this study, since integrated reporting has only been expected from 
JSE-listed firms from 2011 onwards (Pretorius, 2011). The corporate governance data that 
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were contained in these annual reports had to be converted into an applicable CGS format for 
analysis purposes. Refer to Section 5.9.3 for details on this conversion process.  
5.6 Primary research 
If the research objectives cannot be addressed adequately by using secondary data sources, 
primary data should be collected (Hair et al., 2011: 186). Primary research is conducted if a 
researcher collects data for the first time for the purposes of a specific research project 
(Blaikie, 2010: 162). Primary data can, for example, be collected by means of interviews and 
questionnaires (Kumar, 2011: 26).  
This type of data is original and can be used to answer specific research questions (Blaikie, 
2010: 160). The analysis of primary data can provide more detailed information than merely 
evaluating secondary data. However, a disadvantage associated with primary research is that 
the data can take several months to collect (Boone & Kurtz, 2012). No primary data were 
used in the current study. 
In order to collect the necessary data, a researcher needs to determine which units of analysis 
will be part of the investigation. This is referred to as the ‘research frame of a study’. This 
frame normally includes sampling technique(s) to select representative units from a 
population (Pride & Ferrell, 2012: 178). Although only secondary data were used in this 
study, the afore-mentioned concepts were also relevant. 
5.7 Population  
A population is the group of all items, units or individuals of interest to a researcher. This 
group shares some common characteristics (Coldwell & Herbst, 2004: 73). For the current 
study, the population consisted of all JSE-listed firms for the period 2002–2010.  
During the observed period, two different systems were used by the JSE to classify listed 
firms in terms of economic groups and industries. The JSE used the FTSE Global 
Classification System from June 2002 to 31 December 2005 to group its Main Board firms 
into economic groups (JSE, 2008a; JSE, 2011b). Table 1 in Appendix 2 provides a breakdown 
of the FTSE Global Classification System. Due to investor pressure for a unified global 
classification system, the FTSE and the Dow Jones Indices announced the creation of a 
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combined industry classification system, called the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) 
(JSE, 2004).  
The ICB thus replaced the separate FTSE and Dow Jones classification systems in January 
2006 (JSE, 2006). An outline of the ICB system is provided in Table 2 in Appendix 2. The 
researcher classified all firms in the sample by considering the classification jargon of both 
systems that were used during the observed nine-year period (2002–2010). Considerable 
changes between the ICB and the FTSE Global Classification System are indicated in Table 3 
in Appendix 2. After the researcher had considered the changes between the two systems, the 
population of this study was clearly defined. 
5.8 Sampling frame and sample 
A sampling frame is a list of elements from which a sample is drawn (Coldwell & Herbst, 
2004: 73). It is a partial (or complete) list of the items that comprise the total population 
(Levine, Stephan, Krehbiel & Berenson, 2005). The researcher created a list of companies 
that were listed under each industry (as published in Die Burger, for the last trading day of 
2001 to 2010), as well as the number of years that every firm had been listed.  
A sample is defined as the subgroup of the population’s elements that is selected for 
observation (Malhotra, 2010: 371). Sample data are used as the basis for hypothesis testing in 
order to draw inferences about a population (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2011: 339). A researcher 
can also use a census to study every element in the population, but this is generally very 
costly (Zikmund & Babin, 2010: 412).  
There are various benefits associated with using a sample, including that it is more 
economical and timesaving than to study the whole population. A very large population can 
also be practically inaccessible for the researcher (Coldwell & Herbst, 2004: 73–74; Oliver, 
2008). Two main types of samples can be used, namely probability or non-probability 
samples.  
5.8.1 Probability sampling 
In probability sampling, every population unit has a known probability to be selected for the 
sample (Boslaugh, 2013: 57). A representative sampling frame is required to identify and 
sample members of the considered population. There are four types of probability samples, 
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namely simple random, systematic, stratified and cluster samples (Levine et al., 2005: 10; 
Rugimbana & Nwankwo, 2003). 
In a simple random sample, every individual or unit in the sampling frame has an equal, 
independent chance to be selected (Levine et al., 2005: 9). A systematic sample entails that a 
random starting point is selected. Thereafter, every i
th
 element (e.g. the 30
th
 element in the 
sampling frame) is chosen. The sampling interval (i) is determined by dividing the 
population’s elements by the sample size (Malhotra, 2010: 383).  
When a stratified sample is compiled, the population is divided into sub-groups (called 
stratums), based on specific characteristics. Equal numbers are then randomly selected from 
the stratums (Gravetter & Forzano, 2009: 143). In a cluster sample, the population is grouped 
into collective clusters (aggregates) based on their proximity to each other. Each cluster must 
be representative of the population. A sample is then drawn by randomly selecting 
representative cluster(s) and considering all elements in the selected cluster(s) (Jackson, 2011: 
119120). 
5.8.2 Non-probability sampling 
A non-probability sampling technique can be used if the likelihood of selecting a particular 
population member is not known (Zikmund & Babin, 2010: 423). It is useful when a sampling 
frame does not exist, because some of the population’s elements are difficult or impossible to 
locate (Monette, Sullivan, DeJong & Hilton, 2014: 242). This sampling technique typically 
relies on a researcher’s personal judgement (Malhotra, 2010: 376). The main types of non-
probability samples are a convenience, purposive (including judgement and quota samples) as 
well as chain sample (Coldwell & Herbst, 2004: 81). 
Convenience sampling entails that items are selected based on their inexpensiveness, 
convenience and accessibility. The more convenient population elements are thus chosen to 
form part of the sample (Gravetter & Forzano, 2009: 143; Jackson, 2011: 120). A judgement 
sample is drawn based on the judgement of the researcher. An assumption is made that the 
researcher is familiar with the population’s characteristics. The researcher thus deliberately 
selects elements to conform to specific criteria (Reddy & Acharyulu, 2008: 202).  
When a quota sample is constructed, the sample is divided into sub-groups according to 
certain relevant features. Judgement is then used to select units from each sub-group 
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(Gravetter & Forzano, 2009: 143). Lastly, a chain sample can be used to identify cases of 
interest from respondents who can indicate other possible sampling candidates (Reddy & 
Acharyulu, 2008: 203). 
The advantages of using a non-probability sampling technique include that it is more 
convenient and generally involves lower costs than probability sampling. However, a possible 
disadvantage is a lack of generalisability of the findings due to a non-representable sample 
(Levine et al., 2005:10). 
5.8.3 Sampling method used in this study 
In the current study, a combination of judgement and convenience sampling was used. 
Specific JSE-listed companies were considered, since the annual reports and financial data 
were conveniently available in a standardised format on the McGregor BFA (2013) database. 
A sample was drawn from six of the ten JSE industries, as classified according to the ICB 
system (JSE, 2009). The researcher used her judgement to include specific industries. 
Previous corporate governance researchers (Lamport, Latona, Seetanah & Sannassee, 2011; 
Saravanan, 2012; Uadiale, 2012) also used judgement sampling. 
Companies that were listed in the Oil and Gas, Basic Materials and Financials industries were 
excluded from the sample. Firms in these industries were not considered, because their annual 
statements differed from those of firms listed in the other industries. During the study period, 
no companies were listed in the Utilities industry. The six selected industries (Health Care, 
Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Industrials, Technology and Telecommunications) that 
were subsequently included in this dissertation are referred to as the considered industries.  
Firms were included in this study’s sample based on compliance with four criteria, namely:  
 the firm formed part of the considered industries (or relevant economic groups); 
 the firm’s annual reports were available on the McGregor BFA (2013) database; 
 the firm was listed for the entire calendar year (January to December) under 
consideration; and 
 firm-specific data were available for at least two consecutive years during the study 
period. This was done to ensure enough data points for statistical analysis purposes. 
To determine whether a firm was listed for a sufficient number of years, the JSE 
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listing information published in a local newspaper, Die Burger, for the last trading day 
of 2001 to 2010 were considered. The year 2001 was included to determine whether a 
specific firm was already listed at the end of 2001, since a firm should have been listed 
for two full calendar years to form part of this study’s sample. Firms’ listing status 
was checked by comparing the data available on McGregor BFA (2013), Die Burger’s 
trading information, as well as the firms’ listing status as published by the JSE 
(2011a). 
A complete list of firms was compiled, indicating their listing status and the number of years 
that they were part of the sample (see Appendix 3). A comment column was added to indicate 
reasons why certain firms were not considered, such as listing or delisting during a specific 
year, a lack of data on McGregor BFA, etc. If a firm changed its name during the period, both 
names were indicated. A total of 230 firms (1 439 annual observations) were included in the 
sample. Appendix 4 provides detail on 62 firms that formed part of the observed industries 
during the study period, but which were excluded from the sample. Reasons are provided for 
the exclusion of these firms, such as unavailability of annual reports on McGregor BFA. 
Possible sampling bias should be considered when drawing a sample from a population, as 
explained in Section 5.8.4. Attention should also be given to the generalisability of a 
judgement sample’s results, as discussed in Section 5.12. 
5.8.4 Sampling bias 
Sampling bias refers to the tendency of a sample to differ from the population in a specific, 
systematic manner due to various reasons, including the sample selection method and the 
manner in which data are processed (Peck, Olsen & Devore, 2009: 33; Zikmund & Babin, 
2010: 197). In the current study, specific attention was given to two potential sampling biases, 
namely sample selection criteria and survivorship bias.  
Sample selection bias can lead to the systematic exclusion of a part of the population (Peck et 
al., 2009: 33). After a large number of corporate governance studies and annual reports on 
corporate governance trends had been considered, it was evident that when firms were 
compared and ranked according to their CGSs, only the largest firms were generally 
considered. When considering ESG considerations, the selection criteria seem to be biased 
towards large, listed successful firms, often excluding small, less successful and/or delisted 
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firms (Ethical Investment Research and Information Service, 2011; Roy & Gitman, 2012). A 
firm’s size and listing status can, however, have an influence on corporate governance 
aspects, for example, on the size of the directorate (Huse, 2007: 109).  
Survivorship bias can occur when only currently listed firms are included in a study’s sample. 
Firms that delisted from the considered stock exchange during the period under review are 
accordingly excluded (Van Frederikslust, Ang & Sudarsanam, 2008: 229). Such exclusions 
can possibly influence the results of a study, since only firms that were successful enough to 
survive were considered (Pawley, 2006: 21). Survivorship bias in a dataset might lead to 
results that indicate the predictability of future performance based on past performance, even 
though this predictability is not true. “Winning” shares could have the appearance of 
predictability, just because they survived. If the share performances of delisted firms were 
ignored, the realised share returns might have appeared to be higher than what they actually 
were (Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson & Ross, 1992; Goetzmann & Ibbotson, 2006: 11). 
In this study, firms were hence not excluded based on their size or listing status. All listed and 
delisted firms that complied with the clearly defined selection criteria formed part of the 
sample. See Section 5.8.3 for a discussion of the criteria. After the population and sample had 
been defined, the necessary data had to be collected (step 7 in Figure 5.1).  
5.9 Data collection 
Data collection entails the systematic gathering of data for a specific purpose from various 
sources, such as interviews and published annual reports (Silber & Foshay, 2010: 96). 
According to the positivistic research paradigm that was considered in the current study, the 
researcher examined hypotheses and/or research questions that were deducted from theory. 
These hypotheses contained variables which had to be carefully defined.  
Part of the data collection process entails the identification of the relevant variables (Creswell, 
2003: 126). Some of this study’s variables were relatively easy to define and measure (such as 
ROA), while others were more difficult to define and measure (such as corporate governance 
compliance). Albert Einstein (1879–1955) claimed that “not everything that can be counted 
counts and not everything that counts can be counted” (Zikmund & Babin, 2013: 248). 
Researchers should thus determine which variables they are interested in (consequently which 
variables count) and which measurement scale should be used. The nature of the measurement 
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scale determines whether mathematical comparisons are allowed, in other words whether the 
variables can be counted or compared numerically (Zikmund & Babin, 2013: 248–249).  
In the following section, various measurement scales that can be used by researchers are 
presented, followed by a discussion on each of the dependent and independent variables. 
5.9.1 Measurement scales 
The selected measurement scale affects the data analyses that can be conducted (Hartas, 2010: 
311; Wiid & Diggines, 2009: 159). For statistical analysis purposes, data are generally 
classified as categorical or numerical (Anderson, Sweeney & Williams, 2011: 20). The terms 
‘qualitative’ and ‘quantitative’ data can be used interchangeably with ‘categorical’ and 
‘numerical’ data (Peck, 2014; Smith, 2012: 6). 
When considering categorical data, labels or names are typically used to assign attributes to 
the observed element(s). The focus is thus on written (or linguistic) expressions and not on 
numeric data (Albright, Winston & Zappe, 2011: 30). However, categorical variables can be 
coded numerically, for example, assigning the number one to listed firms and zero to delisted 
firms. Either a nominal or ordinal measurement scale can be used for categorical data 
(Anderson et al., 2011: 20). A nominal scale is the lowest level of measurement (Pagano, 
2013). Such a scale organises data into categories where no specific order or sequence is 
implied (Jackson, 2009: 59), as indicated in Figure 5.6. 
Categorical variable Categories 
Director’s gender Female (1); Male (2) 
Figure 5.6: Example of a nominal measurement scale in this study 
Source: Researcher’s own construction based on Levine et al. (2005) 
Directors can be categorised as female (coded 1) or male (coded 2). However, the numeric 
coding does not indicate that males are superior to females. The values are merely assigned 
for classification purposes (Anderson et al., 2011: 20). Such numeric values thus only serve as 
labels which do not indicate a quantitative relationship. It can also not account for differences 
within a specific category (Levine et al., 2005; Spatz, 2011: 10). 
An ordinal scale represents a higher measurement level than a nominal scale (Zikmund & 
Babin, 2010: 328). According to this scale, objects are categorised according to the relevant 
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amount of a certain concept that they possess (Pagano, 2013; Wiid & Diggines, 2009: 160). 
The various categories then form a rank order along a continuum. Ordering is implied 
between the lowest and highest rankings. However, the researcher cannot indicate by how 
much two rankings differ, since the ranking scores do not have equal unit sizes (Gravetter & 
Wallnau, 2011: 22; Jackson, 2009: 60). Figure 5.7 provides an example of how the ordinal 
measurement scale could be applied in the corporate governance context. 
Categorical variable Ordered categories 
Board leadership   Chair (2); Vice chair (1) 
Figure 5.7: Example of an ordinal measurement scale 
Source: Researcher’s own construction based on Levine et al. (2005)  
From Figure 5.7, it is evident that the chairperson is superior to the vice chair in board 
leadership terms. However, a ranking of 2 does not indicate that the chairperson’s ranking is 
twice as high (in order of importance) compared to the vice chair’s position. Categorical 
variables, which are measured on a nominal or ordinal scale, can be divided into constant, 
dichotomous and polytomous variables (Kumar, 2011: 72). A constant variable has only one 
category. For example, a dozen directors on a board are always 12. A dichotomous variable 
has two categories, such as yes/no. In contrast, a polytomous variable can be divided into 
more than two categories, e.g. favourable, uncertain, unfavourable (Kumar, 2011: 72).  
In the current study, the annual reports of the sample firms were used to gather the relevant 
data to compile a CGS for each firm. The dichotomous variables 0 and 1 were used to code 
the corporate governance data for content analysis purposes (refer to Section 5.9.3). The 
coding was done to provide comparable data in a numerical format for the independent 
corporate governance variable. 
In contrast to categorical variables, numerical variables typically yield mathematical 
responses (Srivastava & Rego, 2008). Quantitative data typically require interval or ratio 
measurement scales (Anderson et al., 2011: 20). Depending on the values assigned to the 
observed factors, two types of numerical measures can be considered. Discrete variables form 
one of a finite number of whole numbers. Most nominal and ordinal data are discrete. 
Continuous variables produce numerical responses arising from a measuring process allowing 
for fractional amounts (Levine et al., 2005: 15–16). Most interval and ratio data are 
continuous (Jackson, 2009: 62). 
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An interval scale can capture meaningful information regarding differences in quantities of an 
observed object or concept (Zikmund & Babin, 2010: 328). This scale’s units of measurement 
are equal in size, but the scale does not have an absolute zero point (Jackson, 2009: 60). The 
values cannot be multiplied or divided. Two responses with interval scale options 1 and 2 are 
as far apart as two responses with interval scale positions 2 and 3. However, if human 
respondents are used, it cannot be stated that a respondent with a score of 4 feel twice as 
strong about a specific phenomenon as a respondent with a score of 2 (Coldwell & Herbst, 
2004: 65). Figure 5.8 illustrates how an interval scale could be used. 
Numerical variable Level of measurement 
Temperature   Degrees of Celsius 
Figure 5.8: Example of an interval scale in this study 
Source: Researcher’s own construction based on Coldwell and Herbst (2004: 65) 
A ratio scale presents the highest measurement form. In addition to the characteristics of the 
interval scale, it has an absolute zero point (Zikmund & Babin, 2010: 329). An illustration of 
how the ratio scale was applied in this study is provided in Figure 5.9. 
Numerical variable Level of measurement 
ROE   −267.40% - +130.61% 
Figure 5.9: Example of a ratio scale in this study 
Source: Researcher’s own construction based on Levine et al. (2005) 
The ratio scale allows the researcher to compare differences in scores, as well as the 
magnitude in scores (Coldwell & Herbst, 2004: 66). The difference between a ROE ratio of 
5% and 10% was thus the same as the difference between a ratio of 30% and 35%. In 
addition, it can be stated that a ROE ratio of 40% was twice as much as a ratio of 20%.  
A discussion of each of the dependent and independent variables, as well as the calculation of 
these variables, follows in Section 5.9.2.  
5.9.2 Defining the dependent and independent variables in this study 
Part of the data collection process (step 7) was to define the study’s variables. A variable is 
anything that varies or changes from one instance to another, and which can be manipulated 
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or observed (Zikmund & Babin, 2010: 117). Researchers are often interested in the 
relationship(s) between the dependent and independent variables. Some previous corporate 
governance researchers (Al-Baidhani, 2013; Black et al., 2006; Mitton, 2004) considered 
corporate governance to be the independent variable. However, other scholars are still 
clarifying what the specific dependent variable should be in a corporate governance study 
(Judge, 2008). Instead of being included as an independent variable, corporate governance 
could be considered as the dependent variable (Bjuggren & Mueller, 2009: 373; Nottage, 
Wolff & Anderson, 2008: 47).  
5.9.3 Corporate governance score (CGS) 
A CGS was compiled for each of the sample firms for the years that they had been listed on 
the JSE during the period 20022010. This score consisted of a disclosure and an 
acceptability dimension (see Section 4.3). The focus of the disclosure dimension was on 
whether information regarding the factor under consideration was indicated in the annual 
report of a selected firm. Regarding acceptability, specific guidelines were set in line with 
selected recommendations of the King II Report and the PIC (2011). The maximum CGS that 
a firm could receive was 74. This value consisted of a maximum possible score of 39 for 
disclosure and 35 for acceptability. Note that acceptability criteria were not set for four 
specific factors, as no clear guidelines in terms of acceptability were available.  
The equation for the corporate governance score (CGS) was thus: 
CGS = ∑ Disclosuren+ ∑ Acceptabilityn
35
n=0
39
n=0   (5.1) 
The numerical CGSs of the firms were compiled by using content analysis. Content analysis 
is a systematic way of quantifying and describing observed phenomena (Krippendorff, 2004). 
It provides the researcher with an analytical method to determine the presence of certain key 
words and concepts within written text documents (Wright, 2008). Previous corporate 
governance researchers (Al-Moataz & Hussainey, 2012; Bhasin, 2012; Gupta, Nair & Gogula, 
2003; Murthy, 2008) also used content analysis to compile corporate governance indices or 
scores. 
The content analysis technique can be used in an inductive or deductive manner with either 
qualitative or quantitative data (Sullivan, 2009: 108). Researchers who focus on quantitative 
approaches sometimes use secondary data that are not in a numerical format, e.g. when 
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considering corporate governance data from the annual reports of JSE-listed firms. The 
reading of text documents is ultimately a qualitative endeavour. Specific text characteristics 
can, however, be converted into quantifiable data by determining the amount and/or 
frequency of certain observed concepts in textual data. A numeric summary can then be 
compiled by assigning codes to the considered concepts or categories (Bernard & Ryan, 2010: 
155; Krippendorff, 2004; Neuendorf, 2002).  
Conceptual content analysis was conducted for the purpose of this study. This technique 
consists of eight steps (Babbie & Mouton, 2003). The researcher should first decide on the 
level of analysis, such as specific key words, key phrases or a string of key words. The 
selected key words are usually based on existing literature. The second step is to decide on the 
number of concepts that should be coded. During the third step, the researcher should 
determine whether the existence of certain keys words or the frequency thereof (the number 
of times that the key words occurred in the text documents) should be coded. The fourth step 
entails that the researcher should decide how to distinguish amongst concepts. The researcher 
should also determine whether the exact key words should occur, or whether deviations from 
the key words will be allowed. During step five, rules and parameters should be developed for 
the coding of text documents. Step six entails that the researcher should decide how to deal 
with irrelevant information. Unrelated or irrelevant information (not related to the key words 
and key concepts) can be ignored. During step seven, the data should be coded. It might be 
necessary to read and re-read the text documents before assigning the applicable codes. The 
final step entails the analysis of the coded data (Babbie & Mouton, 2003). 
In the current study, specific key words were used to conduct word searches in the annual 
reports of the sample firms. As mentioned in Section 5.5, the considered annual reports were 
sourced from the McGregor BFA (2013) database. The key words were in line with the 
specified disclosure and acceptability criteria for each factor, as explained in Section 4.3. Due 
care was taken to abide by the indicated key words. Word sense disambiguation refers to the 
clarification that follows after (possible) ambiguity had been removed (Jahns, 2012: 90). To 
disambiguate the CGSs that were compiled by means of content analysis, the context within 
which the key words were used in the annual reports was interpreted, before a disclosure and 
acceptability score were allocated.  
As indicated in Section 5.9.1, a dichotomous categorical variable has only two response 
categories. The dichotomous variables 0 and 1 were used to code the observed corporate 
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governance data from the firms’ annual reports. If the disclosure criterion was met for the 
specific factor under consideration, it was coded 1. If no information could be found on the 
specific factor, it was coded 0. Only if a code of 1 was allocated for the disclosure criterion, 
attention was given to the acceptability criterion. If the acceptability criterion was also met, it 
was coded 1; if not, it was coded 0.  
The considered factors formed part of nine corporate governance categories (refer to Chapter 
4). In line with a recommendation of the PIC (2011), the CGSs and the categories’ scores 
were analysed (instead of focusing on the individual factors) in Chapter 6. 
An advantage of content analysis is that large volumes of data can be evaluated systematically 
(Krippendorff, 2004). The researcher considered 1 439 annual reports to compile CGSs for 
each sample firm for each year of being listed. The disadvantages associated with the use of 
content analysis include that it is very time-consuming and labour-intensive (Krippendorff, 
2004). For the purpose of this study, the CGSs were compiled over several months. It took 
approximately 60 to 90 minutes to complete one company’s CGS score sheet for one year.  
5.9.4 Accounting-based financial performance 
In line with previous corporate governance researchers (such as Alhaji et al., 2012; Klapper & 
Love, 2004; Ramdani & Van Witteloostuijn, 2010), ROA, ROE and EPS were selected as 
accounting-based performance measures. Ratio scale financial data were hence used in this 
study. The theory behind these measures was discussed in Section 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. 
5.9.4.1 Return on assets (ROA) 
For the purposes of this study, standardised ROA ratios were sourced on an annual basis from 
the McGregor BFA (2013) database.  
The equation for the standardised ROA ratio (McGregor BFA, 2013) is:  
ROA =
Profit before interest and tax − total profits of extraordinary nature − taxation
Total assets
 x 100 (5.2) 
5.9.4.2 Return on equity (ROE) 
The ROE ratio can be calculated on a before- or an after-tax basis (McLeary, 1999). In line 
with the ROA ratio, the ROE ratio was adapted to consider the profit after tax by using the 
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standardised statement of comprehensive income and statement of financial position data of 
the firms that were available on McGregor BFA (2013). 
The equation for the standardised ROE ratio (adapted from McGregor BFA, 2013) is:  
ROE= 
Profit after tax
Ordinary share capital + distributable reserves + non-distributable reserves + preference share capital + non-controlling interest
 x 100
 (5.3) 
5.9.4.3 Earnings per share (EPS) 
The equation for the basic EPS ratio (IFRS, 2012; SAICA, 2009) is:  
Basic EPS= 
Profit or loss attributable to ordinary shareholders of the parent firm
Weighted average number of ordinary shares issued
  (5.4) 
In practice, different definitions for the EPS ratio are used. JSE-listed firms are required to 
report the headline EPS (HEPS) (SAICA, 2009). Certain items can distort the EPS ratio. The 
HEPS measure is therefore determined by excluding separately identifiable re-measurements 
(net of related tax and non-controlling interest) from the EPS equation. A re-measurement is 
defined as an amount acknowledged in a profit (or loss) relating to any change in the book 
value of a liability or asset that arises after the initial recognition of the liability or asset 
(IFRS, 2012; SAICA, 2009). The standardised EPS ratios that were available on the 
McGregor BFA (2013) database were determined by using the HEPS equation.  
In addition to the selected accounting-based variables, market-based performance measures 
were also considered.  
5.9.5 Market-based performance measures 
In Section 2.4, TSR and risk-adjusted abnormal share returns (ratio data) were identified as 
market-based performance measures. The TSR measure reflects a firm’s actual share 
performance over a specific time period (Megginson et al., 2008: 194). 
5.9.5.1 Total share return (TSR) 
The TSR (also called the ‘holding period return’) is one of the simplest measures of 
investment performance. It refers to the return that a shareholder earns over a specific period. 
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The measure includes the capital gain (or loss) and dividends paid during the considered 
period (Monks & Lajoux, 2011: 270).  
The equation for the TSR measure (McGregor BFA, 2013) is (calculated on a monthly basis):  
TSR = 100 x [(
P𝑛 + (∑
D𝑡
𝐾 
 x P𝑡)
𝑛−1 
𝑡=0
P0
) − 1] (5.5) 
where: 
P𝑛 = the share price at month end 
P0 = the share price at the beginning of the month 
P𝑡 = the share price at time t 
𝑛 = the number of intervals in the period of calculations 
D𝑡 = the dividend yield at time t (the published final dividend per share was used) 
𝐾 = 12 (for monthly calculations) 
In line with previous South African researchers who considered monthly share return data 
(Auret & Sinclaire, 2006; Van Rensburg & Robertson, 2003), monthly TSR data were used in 
this study. The TSR data were sourced from McGregor BFA (2013). The TSR data were used 
to consider the actual share returns of each firm. Risk-adjusted abnormal returns were also 
estimated for four portfolios that were compiled based on the CGSs of the sample firms, as 
explained in Sections 5.9.5.2 and 5.9.5.3. 
5.9.5.2 Capital asset pricing model (CAPM) 
The equation to estimate the CAPM
 
expected return (Megginson et al., 2010: 208) is:  
E(Rit) = Rft  + βi [E(Rmt) – Rft] (5.6) 
where: 
E(Rit)  = share i’s expected return during month t 
Rft   = the realised risk-free rate of return for month t 
βi = sensitivity of the expected excess share returns to expected excess market returns 
E(Rmt)  = the expected return on the market for month t 
The traditional CAPM determines expected return based on historic data. A risk-adjusted 
market model that is based on the CAPM is often used by academics, since it considers the 
realised rate of return (Bodie et al., 2009; DeFusco, McLeavey, Pinto & Runkle, 2007: 320). 
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The equation for the risk-adjusted abnormal rate of return (ARit) (Reilly & Brown, 2012: 156) 
is:  
ARit= Rit - E(Rit)  (5.7) 
where: 
Rit = realised return on share i during month t 
E(Rit)  = the expected rate of return for share i during month t based on the CAPM 
To determine the abnormal return, the researcher should specify a statistical model for 
estimating the expected return of share i on date t. By applying the following regression 
model (some authors refer to it as the ‘market model’), the determined β𝑖 parameter can be 
used as a measure of the covariation between the returns on share i and the returns on the 
market, and α𝑖 as a measure of risk-adjusted abnormal return. 
The equation for the market model (Lee et al., 2009: 291) is:  
(R it  - Rft) = α𝑖 + β𝑖  (Rmt – Rft)+ 𝜖it   (5.8) 
where: 
(Rit  - Rft)   = the monthly return on share i less the monthly risk-free rate 
α𝑖 = the estimated intercept 
β𝑖 = the estimated slope coefficient of the regression 
(Rmt – Rft) = the monthly market risk premium 
𝜖it = random error term 
The expected return is thus risk-adjusted by taking into account the risk of share i relative to 
the overall market (Megginson et al., 2008). Since monthly share returns were considered in 
this study, appropriate monthly risk-free and market return rates were needed. There is a 
debate amongst researchers regarding the selection of an appropriate risk-free return rate. The 
bond yield on the R186 (a long-term South African bond) was used by previous South 
African researchers (Mlonzi, Kruger & Nthoesane, 2011; Raputsoane, 2009) to approximate 
the risk-free interest rate. The BER also recommended the usage of the R186 during a 
discussion of the current study. The R186 yield was consequently used for the purpose of this 
study. The necessary monthly risk-free rate data were provided by the BER (2013). 
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In previous South African studies (Demetriades, 2011; Strugnell, Gilbert & Kruger, 2011; 
Van Rensburg & Robertson, 2003), the FTSE/JSE All Share Index (ALSI; J203) was 
considered as an appropriate measure of the return on the market. In the current study, the 
return on the J203 was therefore also used as a proxy for the market return. The J203 is seen 
as a broad market index in that the included firms represent about 99 per cent of the JSE’s 
total market capitalisation (JSE, 2013; Ward & Muller, 2012). Until June 2002, the Actuaries 
Index was used. The recalculated monthly ALSI data were provided by the BER (2013).  
Since only a sample of the JSE-listed firms was considered in this study, it could be 
questioned whether the ALSI was really representative of the considered market. The average 
monthly calculated TSR (for all firms listed in that month) was hence also used as a market 
return index. For this purpose, equally-weighted portfolios were formed. The same portfolio 
percentage was hence used for every considered share, irrespective of share capitalisation. 
In the current study, the CAPM was applied as follows:  
1. The monthly risk-adjusted share returns were determined (Rit – Rft) for all the firms 
listed during that month.  
2. Thereafter, the monthly market risk premiums were determined (Rmt – Rft).  
3. Finally, the beta and alpha parameters were estimated by applying the market 
regression model (refer to equation 5.8). 
The traditional CAPM is widely used by academics and practitioners. However, the model is 
based on the efficient market hypothesis, which can be questioned (Catty, 2010: 139). The 
Fama–French three-factor model was also applied in the current study. 
5.9.5.3 Fama–French three-factor model 
Fama and French (1992; 1993) introduced a three-factor model as an extension of the CAPM. 
The Fama–French three-factor model assumes that the expected return of a share is a linear 
function of three factors, namely (Fama & French, 1992; Catty, 2010: 141–142): 
 the excess return of a market index over the risk-free rate (as considered by the 
CAPM);  
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 the difference between the expected returns on portfolios of small and large shares 
(SMB); and 
 the difference between the expected returns on portfolios of high and low BE/ME 
shares (HML).  
According to Fama and French, the equation for E(Rit) (Cochrane, 2014) is: 
E(Rit) = α𝑖 +  β𝑖𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝜖𝑖𝑡 (5.9) 
where: 
α𝑖 = the intercept 
β𝑖 = the beta coefficient 
𝐶𝑖𝑡  = vector of characteristics (including size and value/growth factors) (for period t) 
𝜖𝑖𝑡 = error term 
By applying the Fama–French three-factor model, risk-adjusted abnormal return can be 
estimated as (Fama & French, 1992): 
(R it –  Rft  )= α𝑖+ βi1(Rmt – Rft) + βi2SMB + βi3HML + ϵit (5.10) 
where: 
(Rit –  Rft  ) = the monthly return on portfolio i less the monthly risk-free rate of return 
α𝑖 = risk-adjusted abnormal return 
β
i1
 = sensitivity of portfolio i to the market factor 
β
i2
 = sensitivity of portfolio i to the size factor 
β
i3
 = sensitivity of portfolio i to the value/growth factor 
(Rmt – Rft) = the monthly market risk premium 
SMB = the size factor (expected return on small shares compared to large shares) 
HML = the value factor (also called ‘book-to-market risk premium’) 
ϵit = random error term 
For the purposes of the current study, BE and market capitalisation (ME) were determined as 
follows: 
BE = Ordinary share capital + non-distributable reserves + distributable reserves    (5.11) 
ME = market price per share x number of ordinary shares issued   (5.12) 
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The standardised, annualised data to calculate the BE/ME ratios were obtained from the 
McGregor BFA (2013) database. As the standardised book values were published without 
three zero’s, they were multiplied by a thousand before the BE/ME ratios could be calculated. 
The actual market capitalisation figures were reported by McGregor BFA (2013), therefore 
the market capitalisation values were not adapted by the researcher.  
The BE/ME ratios were calculated by using the book value of ordinary shares from the 
previous financial year end, divided by the market value of ordinary shareholders’ equity on 
calendar year end (December). This raises a question regarding the usage of calendar year end 
or fiscal year end data. Fama and French (1992) considered the usage of December market 
equity for companies that did not have December fiscal year ends. They concluded that the 
usage of fiscal year end market equity (also called ‘market capitalisation’) data instead of 
December market equity data had little impact on their return tests.  
In the current study, the Fama–French three-factor model was applied as follows (French, 
2013):  
1. The monthly risk-adjusted share returns were determined (R𝑖𝑡– R𝑓𝑡) for each of the 
sample firms. 
2. Thereafter, the monthly market risk premiums were calculated (R𝑚𝑡 –  R𝑓𝑡).  
3. The SMB size aspect was then determined. This was done by sorting the firms from 
large to small, based on their market capitalisation
*
. In line with Fama and French 
(1992), the firms with the lowest 25 per cent of market capitalisation (≤ 25%) were 
defined as small. The top 25 per cent of firms (> 75%) were defined as big.  
4. Thereafter, the monthly TSR was determined for each company in the small and big 
portfolios using equation 5.5. 
5. The average TSR for the big and small portfolios respectively was then calculated on 
a monthly basis. 
6. The average monthly TSR for the big firms was subtracted from the average monthly 
TSR for the small firms for each of the observed 108 months. These monthly 
differences were the SMB factor. 
7. Thereafter, the BE/ME ratios were calculated for the sample firms. 
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8. To determine the HML aspect, the firms were sorted based on their BE/ME ratios 
from high to low
*
. In line with Fama and French (1995), the 30 per cent of firms with 
the highest BE/ME ratio (> 70%) were included in the value portfolio (high), while 
the bottom 30 per cent firms (≤30%) was defined as the growth portfolio (low).  
9. Thereafter, the monthly TSR was calculated for each of the firms in the high and low 
portfolios, using equation 5.5.  
10. The average TSR for the high and low portfolios respectively was then calculated on 
a monthly basis. 
11. Then the average TSR of the low portfolio was subtracted from the average TSR for 
the high portfolio for each of the considered months. These monthly differences were 
the HML factor. 
12. Finally, a regression (refer to equation 5.10) was run based on the determined values 
and α𝑖, βi1, βi2and βi3were estimated. 
*
Percentiles were used to assess the spread of the data distribution. Percentiles divide a ranked 
dataset into 100 equal parts. The p
th
 percentile has p per cent of the data values (e.g. 25%) at 
or below it and 100 per cent less p per cent (e.g. 75%) of the data values above it (Sharma, 
2010: 98; Singh, 2007: 143).  
In this study, consideration was specifically given to whether a portfolio consisting of firms 
with the highest CGSs reported a positive alpha. For this purpose, corporate governance 
portfolios were constructed as follows: 
1. The entire dataset was considered on a monthly basis. All firms that provided a CGS 
were considered for inclusion in the monthly portfolio (the annual CGS was used for 
the relevant 12 months). The firms were then ranked according to their CGSs and the 
25
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles were calculated, in line with French (2013). 
2. All firms with a CGS within one of these two quartiles were included in portfolio 1 
(firms with the lowest CGSs) or portfolio 4 (firms with the highest CGSs) 
respectively. Portfolio CG 2 consisted of firms within quartile 2 and portfolio CG 3 of 
firms within quartile 3. 
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3. The abnormal return for each of these four portfolios was then estimated on a monthly 
basis. Both the CAPM and FamaFrench three-factor models were used for estimation 
purposes. 
5.9.5.4 Summary of the financial performance measures 
Table 5.2 provides a summary of the financial performance data that were sourced for the 
purpose of the current study. The equations or appropriate measures are indicated, as well as 
the relevant data sources. 
Table 5.2 Financial performance data 
Financial performance 
measure 
Equation / 
appropriate measure 
Source 
Accounting-based measures 
Annual ROA ratio 5.2 Sourced from McGregor BFA (2013) 
Annual ROE ratio 5.3 
Calculated by the researcher based on financial 
data obtained from McGregor BFA (2013) 
Annual headline EPS (HEPS) Adapted 5.4 Obtained from McGregor BFA (2013) 
Market-based measures  
Monthly TSR 5.5 Obtained from McGregor BFA (2013) 
Risk-adjusted abnormal return 5.7 
Estimated by the researcher based on regression 
analysis 
Estimation models 
CAPM (market model) 5.8 
Data provided by the McGregor BFA (2013) 
database and the BER (2013) 
Fama–French three-factor model 5.10 
Data provided by the McGregor BFA (2013) 
database and the BER (2013) 
Data required for estimation 
BE (financial year end; year t-1) 5.11 Sourced from McGregor BFA (2013) 
Size (calendar year end; year t-1) 5.12 Sourced from McGregor BFA (2013) 
Monthly risk-free rate 
Bond exchange yield 
on the long-term R186 
government bond 
Data provided by the BER (2013) 
Monthly return on the market 
FTSE/JSE All Share 
Index (J203); average 
calculated monthly 
TSR based on equally-
weighted portfolio 
construction 
Data provided by the BER (2013) 
Source: Researcher’s own construction 
Once the data for a study have been collected, the researcher can proceed to the 8
th
 step in the 
research process (as shown in Figure 5.1), namely the processing of the data. 
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5.10 Data processing 
Data processing (also called ‘data analysis’) entails the summation, computation and 
application of reasoning in order to understand the gathered data (Zikmund & Babin, 2010: 
66). The appropriate data analysis technique depends among other things on the selected 
research design, the population distribution and the nature of the dataset (Livingstone, 2009). 
Parametric statistics encompass numbers with continuous, known distributions. When the 
sample size is large and the data are on a ratio or interval scale, parametric statistics are 
typically used (Zikmund & Babin, 2010: 548). These statistics are based on the assumption 
that the data are drawn from a population that has a normal distribution (Black, 2012; Rubin, 
2010: 155). Statistics which do not assume a normal distribution are called non-parametric 
statistics (Morgan, Leech, Gloeckner & Barrett, 2011: 124). Generally, when data are nominal 
or ordinal, it is inappropriate to make the assumption that the population has a normal 
distribution (Rubin, 2010: 155). A main advantage of non-parametric statistical procedures is 
hence that no specific population distribution is assumed (Weiers, 2011: 506).  
Statistical procedures can be divided into two major categories, namely descriptive and 
inferential statistics (Dawson, 2013). The descriptive and inferential analyses of the corporate 
governance variable are illustrated in Figure 5.10. 
 
Figure 5.10: Statistical analysis of the corporate governance variable 
As shown in Figure 5.10, the sample firms’ CGSs were firstly analysed by means of 
descriptive statistics (refer to Section 5.10.1). The CGSs’ disclosure and acceptability 
Statistical 
analysis 
Descriptive 
statistics 
CGSs 
Disclosure dimension 
Acceptability dimension 
Corporate 
governance 
categories' scores 
Inferential 
statistics 
CGSs 
Panel regression analyses 
Compile portfolios to estimate 
risk-adjusted abnormal returns 
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dimensions, as well as the corporate governance categories’ scores were also analysed. 
Thereafter, the relationship between CGS and the EPS, ROA, ROE and TSR financial 
performance variables respectively were examined by means of panel regression analyses 
(refer to Sections 5.10.2.45.10.2.6 for a discussion of the relevant regression models). The 
sample firms’ CGSs were also used to compile four corporate governance portfolios, as 
discussed in Section 5.9.5.3. Both the CAPM and FamaFrench three-factor regression 
models were used to estimate risk-adjusted abnormal returns for these four portfolios. 
5.10.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics consist of procedures that are used to describe, characterise and 
summarise the collected data (Jain & Aggarwal, 2008: 5). Such statistics include measures of 
central tendency and variation (also called ‘dispersion’) (Coldwell & Herbst, 2004: 92). 
Central tendency refers to a central or typical value of a data distribution, whereas dispersion 
measures indicate the level of variety in the dataset (Healey, 2005: 114; Miller & Brewer, 
2003: 28). Some descriptive statistics (such as the mean and standard deviation) are not only 
valuable to describe the nature of the dataset, but also to form the basis for other analytical 
techniques (Healey, 2005). 
5.10.1.1 The mean 
The arithmetic mean (also called ‘average’) is the most widely used measure of central 
tendency (Levine et al., 2005: 105). This measure is calculated by adding the observed values 
of a specific variable and dividing it by the total number of observations (Jain & Aggarwal, 
2008: 91).  
The historic sample mean (?̅?) can be denoted as (Anderson et al., 2011: 87):  
?̅? = 
∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖= 1
𝑛
  (5.13) 
where: 
𝑥𝑖  = the observed values 
𝑛   = the number of observations in the sample 
Note that equation 5.13 is for historic data; the equation should be adapted if expected values 
are used. 
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The mean has various advantages, including that the measure is easily understood and unique, 
since every dataset has only one mean. However, the mean may be disproportionately 
affected by outlier values (Coldwell & Herbst, 2004: 103–104; Sharma, 2010). An outlier 
value is an extreme value that is much smaller or larger than most of the other considered 
values. It is also possible that the values of individual explanatory variables are not extreme, 
but the values fall outside the general pattern of the other observations. Such an outlier thus 
literally “lays outside” the overall pattern of a data distribution (Albright et al., 2011; 
Salomon, 2011: 599). 
When data are analysed, the impact of outlier values should be considered, since they can 
possibly distort the results due to their extraordinary nature (Fraser, 2012). A possible 
solution is to use trimmed means, by discarding a fixed percentage of outlier values, e.g. 
removing the largest and smallest 10 per cent of observations from the dataset (Howell, 2011: 
70). Winsorising can also be used to address outlier values. In this study, any value in excess 
of three standard deviations from the mean were classified as an outlier and replaced by a 
value equal to the mean ± three standard deviations. A small percentage of the total values 
(typically between one and five per cent per variable) are modified when using this technique 
(Vinzi, Chin, Henseler & Wang, 2010: 333). 
5.10.1.2 The median 
The median is the numeric middle value of a dataset after it has been arranged in ascending or 
descending order. If there are an odd number of data points, the median is the middle value. 
For an even number of observations, the median is the average of the two middle values 
(Anderson et al., 2011: 88).  
A main advantage of the median is that it is less affected by outlier values than the mean. 
When extreme values are present in a dataset, the median value could thus rather be 
considered instead of the mean value (Levine et al., 2005: 108). Furthermore, no assumptions 
need to be made about the shape of the dataset to determine the median value. This value can 
be used with nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio measurements (Howell, 2011; Singh, 2007: 
138). 
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5.10.1.3 Minimum and maximum values 
The minimum and maximum values are referred to as the first and last order statistics 
(Borowiak, 2003: 33). The range is the difference between the smallest and the largest value 
in the dataset (Zikmund & Babin, 2010: 445). A dataset can have unusually large or small 
outlier values. However, it is not definite that the minimum and maximum values should 
always be extreme (Anderson et al., 2011: 106).  
One of this study’s research questions was to determine the corporate governance compliance 
trend of the sample of JSE-listed companies over the research period. As explained in Section 
1.1, the term ‘compliance’ was used based on the “comply or explain” approach of the King II 
Report. Attention was inter alia given to average corporate governance compliance (the mean 
CGS), very low corporate governance compliance (the minimum CGS value) and very high 
corporate governance compliance (the maximum CGS value). 
5.10.1.4 Standard deviation 
Variance is a dispersion measure that can be used to determine how far numeric observations 
are spread out around the mean. However, variance reflects a measurement unit that has been 
squared. In the squaring process, observations that are farther from the mean get more weight 
than ones closer to the mean. The standard deviation is the square root of the variance 
(Struwig & Stead, 2013; Zikmund & Babin, 2010: 447).  
The historic sample standard deviation (SD) can be determined as (Anderson et al., 2011: 97): 
SD = √
∑ (𝑥𝑖−?̅?)
2𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛−1
 (5.14) 
 
where: 
𝑥𝑖  = the observed values 
?̅? = the historic sample mean 
𝑛   = the number of observations  
Note that equation 5.14 is for historic data; the equation should be adapted if expected values 
are used. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 174 
In addition to the discussed descriptive statistics, a number of inferential statistics were also 
employed, as explained in Section 5.10.2. 
5.10.2 Inferential statistics  
Inferential statistics (also called ‘inductive statistics’) comprise procedures that are used to 
make inferences, such as drawing conclusions or making predictions about a population’s 
characteristics, based on the sample information (Dodge, 2008: 263; Mendenhall, Beaver & 
Beaver, 2013: 4). Numerical characteristics of samples are thus used to estimate population 
characteristics (also known as ‘parameters’) (Sullivan, 2009: 225).  
Social science researchers typically attempt to find a difference between observed groups or a 
relationship between variables (Somekh & Lewin, 2005: 226; Sullivan, 2009: 354). 
Difference inferential statistics, such as ANOVA and t-tests are typically used to test for such 
differences, while an association between two or more variables is tested by using 
associational inferential statistics, such as correlation and regression analyses (Lee, Lee & 
Lee, 2013; Morgan et al., 2011: 97). These inferential statistics are generally built around the 
probability concept, by indicating the probability that any given result can be caused by 
chance (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2011; Rubin, 2010). The probability concept, as used during 
hypothesis testing, is explained in the subsequent section. 
5.10.2.1 Hypothesis testing 
Hypotheses are derived from the research objectives of a study, and are stated based on the 
theory regarding a specific population parameter (Zikmund & Babin, 2010: 538). The null 
hypothesis (𝐻0) indicates that there is no association between the variables or no difference 
between a sample statistic and a population parameter. The opposite of the null hypothesis, 
namely the alternative hypothesis (𝐻𝑎) represents a claim that the researcher wants to prove. 
The null hypothesis can only be rejected if there is sufficient statistical proof from the sample 
data to decide that it is unlikely to be true (Hatcher, 2003; LeBlanc, 2004; Levine et al., 
2005). Refer to Section 1.4.4 for the research hypotheses that were formulated for the purpose 
of this study. 
A test statistic can be computed, based on the sample data, to determine the plausibility of the 
null hypothesis. The sampling distribution of a test statistic can be divided into two regions, 
namely a rejection and a non-rejection region (Black, 2012). The rejection region consists of 
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the test statistic’s values that are unlikely to occur if the null hypothesis is true. The non-
rejection region refers to the values of the test statistic for which the researcher should not 
reject the null hypothesis (Levine et al., 2005). Figure 5.11 illustrates the non-rejection region 
with one critical value. 
 
Figure 5.11: Non-rejection region with one critical value 
Source: Healey (2010: 190) 
The critical value approach can be used to determine whether the value of the test statistic is 
small enough to reject the null hypothesis (Anderson et al., 2011: 360). The critical value(s) 
of the population mean (𝜇) are the values that lie on the boundaries of the rejection region in 
Figure 5.11. When the critical value approach is employed, alpha (the level of significance) is 
used to determine the critical value and the rejection rule. The value of the test statistic and 
the rejection rule are then used to decide whether the null hypothesis should be rejected or not 
(Zikmund & Babin, 2010: 542–543). If the test statistic falls into the non-rejection region, the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected. However, failure to reject the null hypothesis does not 
prove that the hypothesis is true. The researcher can then merely conclude that there is not 
sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2011: 202). 
The p-value (the observed level of significance) is the probability of obtaining a test statistic 
equal to or more extreme than the result obtained from the sample data, given that the null 
hypothesis is true. It thus provides a measure of the statistical evidence against the null 
hypothesis. The considered test statistic’s value is used to compute the p-value. The p-value 
approach will always lead to the same rejection decision as the critical value approach, 
namely if the p-value is less than or equal to α, the value of the test statistic will be less than 
or equal to the critical value (Anderson et al., 2011: 360–361; Levine & Stephan, 2010). 
Table 5.3 indicates the correct interpretations of the null hypothesis and two hypothesis 
testing errors (𝛼 and 𝛽) that can occur. 
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Table 5.3: Hypothesis testing and decision-making 
Statistical decision 
Actual situation 
H0 true H0 false 
Do not reject H0 Correct decision Type II error (β) 
Reject H0 Type I error (α) Correct decision 
Source: Healey (2010: 192) 
A type 1 error occurs if H0 is rejected when it is in fact true. Alpha denotes the probability of 
committing a type 1 error. The error rate of a type 1 error can be controlled by selecting a risk 
level for alpha that can be tolerated in rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true. The risk of 
committing a type 1 error is thus under the control of the researcher, since the level of 
significance is decided on before the hypothesis testing is conducted. If H0 is not rejected 
when it is actually false, a type II error occurs. Beta is used to denote the probability that a 
type II error can occur (Zikmund & Babin, 2010: 545). 
In the current study, levels of significance of one per cent and five per cent were considered. 
When statistical analysis is conducted, p-values are computed. These p-values are of 
considerable importance when interpreting the significance of regression analyses’ results 
(Wooldridge, 2013). For the purpose of this study, various regression analyses were used to 
analyse the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance.  
5.10.2.2 Simple linear regression 
When a simple linear regression (the most basic type of regression) is conducted, only one 
explanatory variable is used to explain the numerical dependent variable (Levine & Stephan, 
2010: 208). However, the simple linear regression concept can be adapted to the multiple 
regression setting to include several independent variables (Pardoe, 2012).  
The equation for the simple linear regression model (Anderson et al., 2011: 562) is: 
𝑦 =  β0 +  β1𝑥 +  𝜖 (5.15) 
where: 
𝑦 = dependent variable 
𝑥 = independent variable 
β0  = intercept 
β1 = slope 
𝜖 = error term 
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To test for a relationship between variables, regression parameters need to be estimated. The 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is a popular, simple method of estimating the 
unknown parameters of a linear regression model (Zikmund & Babin, 2010). 
5.10.2.3 OLS regression 
The OLS regression is a statistical technique that ensures that the resulting straight line from a 
regression will produce the least possible total error, by minimising the sum of squared errors 
(Heeringa, West & Berglund, 2010: 187–188). Equation 5.15 can be used to conduct an OLS 
regression (Anderson et al., 2011: 566). 
The OLS regression model contains a number of assumptions (Hayes & Cai, 2007: 709), 
including: 
 the dependent variables are generated according to the specified regression model; 
 the independent values are fixed (rather than random); and 
 the errors are uncorrelated, random variables with zero means and constant variance. 
The researcher should find the best means for fitting a straight line to the data. The OLS 
regression is a straightforward technique that guarantees that the resulting straight line will 
produce the least possible total error in using 𝑥 to predict 𝑦 (Zikmund & Babin, 2010: 601). 
However, there is a possibility of specification errors if the underlying assumptions of this 
regression model are incorrect (Bradley, 2011). A specification error can occur if a regression 
equation or one of the assumptions is incorrect in any way. Social scientists typically consider 
specification error to refer to mistakes in the manner that variables were incorporated in the 
regression model (Berry, 1993: 30). 
In the current study, four possible specification errors were considered, namely 
autocorrelation, normality of the errors, multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity. 
5.10.2.3.1 Autocorrelation 
An autocorrelation (also referred to as ‘serial correlation’) problem is commonly associated 
with time-series data. This problem occurs when the observation of the dependent variable at 
time t is related to the value of the dependent variable at previous time periods. This is 
specifically the case with financial data, since the products and activities of the sample firms 
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remain more or less the same from one year to the next (Anderson et al., 2011: 750; Fleming 
& Nellis, 2000: 321). 
Autocorrelation can affect the efficiency of the OLS regression model’s estimators. 
Consequently, the standard error of each estimated regression coefficient can be understated, 
leading to less precise confidence intervals. As a result, the null hypothesis can be rejected 
erroneously (Fleming & Nellis, 2000: 321). A possible solution for the autocorrelation 
problem is to lag the error term by one period (Webster, 2013: 370).  
If the value of the dependent variable in time period t is related to the value of the dependent 
variable in time period t - 1, first-order autocorrelation is present (Fleming & Nellis, 2000: 
321). The DurbinWatson test can be used to test for first-order autocorrelation. The null 
hypothesis of this test states that the regression errors are serially uncorrelated. However, if 
first-order autocorrelation is present, the assumption of independent error terms is violated 
(Anderson et al., 2011: 750). 
The DurbinWatson test statistic (d) can be computed as follows (Anderson et al., 2011: 751): 
d = 
∑ (𝜖𝑡− 𝜖𝑡−1
𝑛
𝑡=2 )
2
∑ ϵt
2n
t=1
  (5.16) 
 
where: 
𝑛  = number of cases 
𝜖𝑡  = error at time t 
𝜖𝑡−1 = error at time period 𝑡 − 1 
Based on: 
𝜖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖 - ?̅?𝑖 
𝑦𝑖; ?̅?𝑖 =observed and predicted values of the response variable for individual 𝑖 
The value of this test statistic is always between zero and four. A value of two indicates that 
there is no autocorrelation in the sample. Values that are substantially less than two indicate 
positive autocorrelation, while values closer to four indicates negative autocorrelation 
(Hoffinger, 2009). If autocorrelation is present, the AUTOREG SAS procedure can be used to 
correct the regression estimates for autocorrelation (SAS Institute, 2012). 
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5.10.2.3.2 Normality of the errors 
The assumption of normality of the errors entails that the error (disturbance) terms are 
approximately normally distributed. It does not entail that all the variables in the regression 
equation should have a normal distribution. The violation of this assumption can be the result 
of unobserved parameter variations and/or measurement errors (Allison, 1999: 130; 
Washington, Karlaftis & Mannering, 2011: 124). 
If a sample is small, the normality of the error term is important to ensure that the 
𝑝-values and confidence intervals will be accurate. However, if a sample is fairly large 
(contain more than 200 observations), the central limit theorem can be applied. This theorem 
explains that, even if the errors are not normally distributed, as the sample size becomes 
larger, the sample mean can be approximated as a normal distribution (Allison, 1999: 130; 
Anderson et al., 2011: 281). This study had a large sample, comprising 1 439 annual 
observations. 
The Kolmogorov–Smirnov goodness-of-fit test can be used to test the hypothesis of normally 
distributed disturbances (Washington et al., 2011: 124). A goodness-of-fit test considers the 
agreement between the distribution of a set of sample values and a theoretical distribution 
(Mahdavi, 2013). The null hypothesis of this test states that there is no difference between the 
observed distribution of survey scores and a normally distributed empirical sample. If the 
critical alpha is larger than the obtained 𝑝-value, the null-hypothesis should be rejected 
(Corder & Foreman, 2009: 32).  
The formula for the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test statistic (𝐷) (Lilliefors, 1967: 399) is: 
𝐷 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑥|𝐹
∗(𝑥) − 𝑆𝑛(𝑥)|  (5.17) 
where: 
𝑛  = number of (independent) observations in the sample 
𝑆𝑛(𝑥)  = cumulative distribution function of the sample 
𝐹∗(𝑥) = normal cumulative distribution function 
5.10.2.3.3 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity occurs when two (or more) independent variables are strongly related to one 
another. It can also occur when independent variables are correlated with omitted variables 
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that are related to the dependent variable (Washington et al., 2011: 110–111). Non-
experimental research methods (such as cross-sectional research) are typically subject to 
omitted variable bias. This bias refers to the possibility that unmeasured factors can affect the 
dependent and/or independent variables. The effect of one of the other variables can then be 
over- or underestimated (David & Sutton, 2004; Treiman, 2009: 364). In the current study, 
there were other factors (in addition to corporate governance) that could possibly have 
influenced the financial performance of the sample firms, for example the nature of the firm’s 
products and financial market conditions.  
Omitted variable bias can become a problem when the omitted variable is the explanator of 
the independent variable and/or correlated with an independent variable (Murray, 2006: 111). 
As a result, it can be difficult to separate the influence of one variable from that of another 
(Washington et al., 2011: 110–111). The inclusion of dummy variables (such as 0 for females 
and 1 for males) in a regression can also create multicollinearity (Watson & Teelucksingh, 
2002: 44). 
The forecasting power of the OLS regression will not be affected by multicollinearity. 
However, the parameter estimates can have large standard errors. The estimates of the 
regression coefficients might also not be precise and the signs of the coefficients can be 
incorrect (Hanssens, Parsons & Schultz, 2001: 218–219). In the current study, the possible 
effects of multicollinearity were moderated by the size of the sample and the overall fit of the 
selected regression models. Acceptable tolerance values (> 0.2–0.3) were determined for the 
predictors. 
5.10.2.3.4 Heteroskedasticity 
One of the assumptions of the OLS regression model is that the variance of the regression 
errors is constant (known as ‘homoskedastic’). Heteroskedasticity occurs when a regression’s 
standard error terms do not all have the same variance. The term literally means different 
(hetero) spread (skedasticity). The presence of heteroskedasticity can invalidate statistical 
significance tests, since the estimator of the regression parameter’s covariance matrix can 
then be inconsistent and biased (Hayes & Cai, 2007; Kacapyr, 2011).  
The BreuschPagan Lagrange multiplier can be used to test for heteroskedasticity in a 
regression model. The null hypothesis of this test entails that there is no conditional 
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heteroskedasticity. Individual-specific or time-specific error variance components are thus 
zero (DeFusco et al., 2007; Park, 2011).  
The equation for the BreuschPagan test statistic (LM) for one-way random effects (SAS 
Institute, 2012: 1400) is: 
LM= 
NT
2 (T - 1)
[
∑  𝑖=1
𝑁
( ∑  𝑡= 1
𝑇
𝜖𝑖𝑡)
2
∑  𝑖=1
𝑁 ∑  𝑡= 1
𝑇
𝜖𝑖𝑡
2 -1]
2
~ χ1
2  (5.18) 
where: 
N  = number of cross-sectional units 
T = number of time periods 
𝜖𝑖𝑡 = OLS residuals of the pooled model 
The distribution of the test statistic is the chi-square (𝜒2) with one degree of freedom.  
The chi-square distribution is one of the most widely used and basic probability distributions 
in inferential statistics. It is the distribution of a sum of squares of k independent standard, 
normal and random variables (Berger, 2001; Eyob, 2009). Note that equation 5.18 is for a 
one-way random effects model. The test can also be generalised to the case of a two-way 
random effects model if required. 
The pooled OLS regression model is an extension of the simple linear regression model and 
can be used to analyse time-series cross-sectional data (Menard, 2008: 234).  
5.10.2.4 Pooled OLS regression 
The pooled OLS regression coefficients are constant across time periods and units. Although 
this model acknowledges repeated observations on the same units, it does not per se model the 
repeated observations (Menard, 2008: 234). 
The equation for the pooled OLS regression model can be expressed as (Menard, 2008: 234): 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = β0 + β1𝑥𝑖𝑡 +  𝜖𝑖𝑡 (5.19) 
where: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡   = dependent variable 
β0 = intercept 
β1 = regression coefficient 
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𝑥𝑖𝑡 = independent variable 
𝜖𝑖𝑡 = error term 
The i and t subscripts indicate that there were pooled observations for i units over t time 
periods.  
In the current study, data observations for 227 firms were made over a nine-year period. Panel 
data were hence considered. Two regression techniques that are commonly used to analyse 
panel data are fixed effects and random effects (Hassett & Paavilainen-Mäntymäki, 2013: 45). 
These models are explained in the following two sections. The BreuschPagan test (refer to 
Section 5.10.2.3.4) can be applied to determine whether a pooled OLS regression can be used, 
or whether a random effects model should rather be considered over a pooled OLS (SAS 
Institute, 2012). 
5.10.2.5 Fixed effects regression 
The fixed effects regression model was designed to study the causes of changes within an 
observed entity (Kohler & Kreuter, 2005: 240). The assumption is that something within the 
entity might bias or affect the outcome(s) of the variables. There is thus a need to control for 
this possibility (Snorrason, 2012: 137). The fixed effects method controls for omitted 
variables in panel data that are constant over the period of time and vary across the cross-
sectional units (Gossy, 2008: 126). This model allows the unobserved effects to be arbitrarily 
correlated with the independent variable(s) in each time period (Wooldridge, 2013: 849).  
The fixed effects model can be equated as (Menard, 2008: 234):  
yit = β0i+ 𝛿𝑡+β1𝑥𝑖𝑡+ 𝜖it  (5.20) 
where: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡   = dependent variable for entity i at time t 
β0𝑖 = (i = 1…n) is the intercept for each entity (separate intercepts are indicated for each 
unit) 
𝛿𝑡 = dummy variable for each time period 
β1 = regression coefficient 
𝑥𝑖𝑡 = independent variable for entity i at time t 
𝜖𝑖𝑡 = error term 
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The i and t subscripts indicate that there were observations for i units over t time periods.  
The fixed effects model allows the intercept to differ cross-sectionally, but not over time. All 
the slope estimates are therefore fixed, both over time and cross-sectionally (Brooks, 2008: 
490). The coefficients of the model can thus not be biased due to omitted time-invariant 
characteristics. The model can also not be used to investigate time-invariant causes of the 
dependent variable(s) (Kohler & Kreuter, 2005: 240).  
5.10.2.6 Random effects regression 
The random effects regression model allows for the inclusion of time-invariant variables. In 
this model, variation across entities is assumed to be uncorrelated with the independent 
variable(s). Variation is thus allowed between and within considered units (Dwyer, Gill & 
Seetaram, 2012: 130–131; Torres-Ryna, 2013).  
The equation for the random effects model (Menard, 2008: 234) is: 
yit = β0 + β1𝑥it + μi + 𝜔𝑡+ 𝜖𝑖𝑡  (5.21) 
where: 
yit   = dependent variable for entity i at time t 
β0 = intercept 
β1 = regression coefficient 
𝑥it  = independent variable for entity i at time t 
μi and 𝜔𝑡 = separate error terms for entity i and time t 
𝜖𝑖𝑡 = within-entity error 
Note the removal of subscript i from the intercept in equation 5.21 compared to equation 5.20. 
The random effects model assumes that unobserved differences between time and units are 
random variables, compared to the assumption included in equation 5.20 that they are fixed.  
The main distinction between fixed and random effects is not whether these effects are 
stochastic or not. Stochastic refers to those variables whose values cannot be fully determined 
or controlled. Focus is rather placed on whether the unobserved individual effect embodies 
elements that are correlated with the model’s regressors (Greene, 2008: 138; Lewis-Beck, 
Bryman & Liao, 2004: 1084). The random effects model assumes that the error term of the 
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entity is not correlated with the predictors. This allows for time-invariant variables to play a 
role as explanatory variables (Snorrason, 2012: 137). 
5.10.2.7 The F-test for fixed effects 
Researchers who use panel data tend to include unit and time dummies, without considering 
whether they are truly needed. An F-test of the unit and/or time dummy variables could be 
used to determine whether unit and time heterogeneity should be controlled for (Menard, 
2008: 237). The null hypothesis of the F-test for fixed effects is that all betas are equal to 
zero. The alternative hypothesis is that one (or more) of the parameters are not equal to zero 
(Anderson et al., 2011: 659). If the F-test is significant, unit and time dummies should be 
included in the fixed effects model (Menard, 2008: 237).  
The equation for the F-test statistic for overall significance is (Anderson et al., 2011: 659): 
𝐹 = 
𝑀𝑆𝑅
𝑀𝑆𝐸
 (5.22) 
where: 
𝑀𝑆𝑅   = mean square due to regression = 
𝑆𝑆𝑅
𝑘
 
𝑆𝑆𝑅 = sum of squares due to regression 
𝑘 = corresponding degrees of freedom 
𝑀𝑆𝐸 = mean square due to error = 
𝑆𝑆𝐸
𝑛−𝑘−1
 
𝑆𝑆𝐸 = sum of squares due to error 
𝑛 − 𝑘 − 1  = corresponding degrees of freedom 
Both the 𝑝-value and the critical value approaches can be used to determine whether the F-
test’s null hypothesis should be rejected. The rejection rules are (Anderson et al., 2011: 589, 
659): 
 𝑝-value approach: reject the null hypothesis if the p-value ≤ α 
 critical value approach: reject the null hypothesis if 𝐹 ≥ 𝐹α 
o where 𝐹α is based on a F-distribution with 𝑝 degrees of freedom in the 
numerator and 𝑛 − 𝑝 − 1 degrees of freedom in the denominator  
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o if a simple linear regression is used instead of a multiple regression, 𝐹α is 
based on a F-distribution with 1 degree of freedom in the numerator and 𝑛 − 2 
degrees of freedom in the denominator 
Different types of F-tests exist. The type III 𝐹-test (also called the ‘partial F-test’) is typically 
used to test for fixed effects. This test determines the significance of each term conditionally 
on the fixed effects of all other terms in the model (West, Welch & Gałecki, 2007: 110). The 
partial F-test includes considerations for both a restricted and an unrestricted regression 
model. The unrestricted model has k independent variables. The unrestricted model can be 
restricted by adding certain exclusion restrictions. If there is (for example) q exclusion 
restrictions to test, the null hypothesis states that q of the variables have zero coefficients 
(Wooldridge, 2009: 145). 
The equation for the type III F-test (Wooldridge, 2009: 145) is: 
F = 
(𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑟− 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑢𝑟)/𝑞
𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑢𝑟/(𝑛−𝑘−1)
    (5.23) 
where: 
𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑟   = sum of squared residuals from the restricted model 
𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑢𝑟 = sum of squared residuals from the unrestricted model 
𝑞 = numerator degrees of freedom; the number of restrictions imposed in moving 
from the unrestricted to the restricted model 
𝑛 − 𝑘 − 1  = denominator degrees of freedom 
If the null hypothesis of this test is rejected, it can be stated that the independent variables are 
jointly significant at the appropriate level of significance. However, the test alone does not 
indicate which of the variables has a partial effect on the dependent variable. If the null 
hypothesis is not rejected, then the variables are jointly not significant. The non-rejection of 
the null hypothesis could justify the researcher to remove the variable(s) from the regression 
model (Wooldridge, 2009: 147). 
If unobservable factors are time-invariant, the usage of the fixed effects regression model is 
effective to control for or eliminate omitted variable bias (Eckbo, 2007: 56). The coefficients 
of the time-invariant regressors of the fixed model are absorbed into the individual-specific 
effect β0𝑖 and are thus not identified (Cameron & Trivedi, 2013: 365). The random effects 
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model allows coefficients to vary across individual cases (Morgan, 2013: 118). Hausman 
(1978) proposes an econometric test to choose the appropriate panel regression model. 
5.10.2.8 The Hausman test 
The Hausman test can be used to check the assumptions of the fixed effects regression model. 
This test can thus be used to choose between the fixed and random effects estimation (Pedace, 
2013: 302). The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is that the preferred model is random 
effects (Snorrason, 2012: 137). If the Hausman test has a significant result (𝑝 < 0.05), the 
fixed effects method can thus be used (Hassett & Paavilainen-Mäntymäki, 2013: 45).  
In a model with one independent variable, the Hausman test statistic (H) is defined as 
(Pedace, 2013: 303):  
H = 
(β̂1 (FE) -  β̂1 (RE))
σ
β̂1 (FE)
2 - σ
β̂1 (RE)
2
2
~ χ1
2  (5.24) 
where: 
β̂1      = estimated coefficient for the independent variable 
σβ̂1 
2  = estimated variance of the coefficient 
FE (fixed effects) = denotes values that were obtained by fixed effects estimation 
RE  (random effects) = denote values that were obtained by random effects estimation 
The distribution of the Hausman test statistic is the chi-square (χ2) with one degree of 
freedom. 
5.10.2.9 Summary of the considered regression models 
Table 5.4 provides a summary of the appropriate regression model (pooled OLS, fixed effects 
and/or random effects) that could be used for the inferential analysis. The appropriate model 
is selected based on the rejection (or not) of the stated hypothesis of the fixed and/or random 
effects regression models. 
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Table 5.4: Selecting the appropriate regression model 
Fixed effects 
(F-test) 
Random effects 
(Breusch-Pagan test) 
Appropriate regression model 
H0 is not rejected: no fixed 
effect 
H0 is not rejected: no 
random effects 
Data are poolable 
Use the pooled OLS regression model 
H0 is rejected: fixed effects 
H0 is not rejected: no 
random effects 
Use the fixed effects regression model 
H0 is not rejected: no fixed 
effects 
H0 is rejected: random 
effects 
Use the random effects regression model 
H0 is rejected: fixed effects 
H0 is rejected: random 
effects 
Recommendation: choose one of the fixed or 
random effects models depending on the result 
of the Hausman test 
Alternatively: fit a model with a fixed group 
effect and a random time effect (or vice versa) 
using a least squares dummy variable model and 
a random effects model 
Source: Park (2011) 
In addition to the discussed regression models, a mixed-model ANOVA was also used in this 
study. The model was employed to determine whether there was a significant trend in the 
observed CGSs over time, as well for listed and delisted firms. 
5.10.2.10 Mixed-model ANOVA  
The ANOVA model is a special case of the linear regression model (refer to equation 5.15) 
with three specific features, namely parameters are estimated by OLS, the F-test is used for 
hypothesis testing and betas (𝛽1, … , 𝛽𝑛) are assumed to be fixed parameters (Demidenko, 
2013: 4–5). 
A mixed-model ANOVA (also called ‘Model III ANOVA’) can be used to test for differences 
between two (or more) groups, as well as within groups (Urdan, 2005: 154). A combination of 
the fixed effects ANOVA model in which observations do not correlate and a random effects 
model variance component forms the mixed-model ANOVA. The fixed effects factor is a 
between-subjects variable and the random effects factor is a within-subjects variable (Reinard, 
2006; Rovai, Baker & Ponton, 2014: 499). 
The equation for the linear mixed-model ANOVA (Demidenko, 2013; XLSTAT, 2014) is: 
𝑦𝑖 =  𝑥𝑖β +  𝑧𝑖𝛾𝑖 +  𝜖𝑖  (5.25) 
where: 
𝑦𝑖   = dependent variable 
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β = vector of parameters associated with the fixed factors 
𝑥𝑖 = gathers all fixed effects 
𝑧𝑖 = matrix gathering all the random effects 
𝛾𝑖 = vector of parameters associated with the random effects 
𝜖𝑖 = error term 
The restricted maximum likelihood method is typically used to estimate variance components 
when using a mixed-model ANOVA. By defining the likelihood of residuals, the restricted 
maximum likelihood method aims to obtain unbiased estimates of variance as well as 
covariance parameters (Little, 2013: 368). 
5.10.2.11 Fisher’s least significant difference (LSD) test 
If an ANOVA is performed and the overall F-test indicates a significant difference, the null 
hypothesis of equal means can be rejected. In such a case, the Fisher’s LSD test can be used 
to make pair-wise comparisons amongst two sample means to determine where the 
differences occurred. This test requires the smallest difference between two means to state 
that a difference is significant (Ott & Longnecker, 2010: 463; Tavakoli, 2012: 231).  
The Fisher’s LSD test statistic (t) for comparing two sample means (Anderson et al., 2011: 
525) is: 
t =  
?̅?𝑖− ?̅?𝑗
√𝑀𝑆𝐸 (
1
𝑛𝑖
+ 
1
𝑛𝑗
)
 (5.26) 
where: 
?̅?𝑖 = historic mean of sample i 
?̅?𝑗 = historic mean of sample j 
𝑛𝑖 = sample size of group i 
𝑛𝑗 = sample size of group j 
𝑀𝑆𝐸 = mean square error obtained from the ANOVA test 
If the p-value is smaller than or equal to the level of significance, the null hypothesis should 
be rejected. When the critical value approach is used, the null hypothesis should be rejected if 
𝑡 ≤ −𝑡α 2⁄  𝑜𝑟 𝑡 ≥  𝑡α 2⁄ . The value of 𝑡α 2⁄  is based on a t-distribution with 𝑛𝑇 − 𝑘 degrees of 
freedom (Anderson et al., 2011: 525). 
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A Chow test was used to determine whether 2008, the midpoint of the 2007–2009 global 
financial crisis, represented a structural break in the financial dataset. 
5.10.2.12 Chow test 
A structural break can occur in time-series and cross-sectional data (Mukherjee, White & 
Wuyts, 1998: 236). Time-series analysts have developed structural break tests to estimate 
time-series regression models before and after a hypothesised break. The estimated 
parameters are then compared to determine if the difference is more than can be explained by 
chance (Gaughan, 2009; Gelman & Cortina, 2009: 218). 
The Chow test can be used to determine whether a multiple regression differs across two 
groups or time periods (Wooldridge, 2013). The researcher hence applied this test to 
determine whether a statistically significant change occurred in the financial dataset around a 
specific time period, namely 2008. The Chow test is a commonly used application of the F-
test. The F-test can be applied to determine whether there is more volatility in the score of one 
sample than in the score of another (Zikmund & Babin, 2010: 576).  
The Chow test statistic can be determined as follows (Brooks, 2008: 180):  
 Split the dataset into two sub-periods.  
 Estimate the regression over the whole period and then separately for the two sub-
periods to obtain the sum of squared residuals (SSRs) for all three regressions.  
The equation to determine the Chow test statistic (C) (Brooks, 2008: 180; Hayashi, 2000: 
175) is: 
C = 
[SSRR−(SSR1+ SSR2)]/K
(SSR1+ SSR2)/(n-2K)
 ~ 𝐹 (DF = 2) (5.27) 
where: 
SSRR = SSR for the entire sample under the constraint that parameter vectors β1
∗
= β2 
SSR1  = SSR from the first sample period (t = 1, 2…r) 
SSR2 = SSR from the second sample period (t = r +1, r + 2,…,n) 
𝑛 = number of observations 
*
Beta contains K elements (number of regressors in each regression) 
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The null hypothesis of the Chow test states that the parameters are stable over time. If the 
value of the test statistic is greater than the critical value from the F-distribution [F (K, n-2K)] 
the null hypothesis should be rejected (Brooks, 2008: 181).  
5.11 Reporting the research findings 
The final step in the research process as set out in Figure 5.1 is to report the research findings. 
The research findings of the current study are reported in Chapters 6 and 7. A study’s research 
process should also meet specific requirements regarding ethical considerations, reliability 
and validity, as explained in Section 5.12. 
5.12 Research ethics, reliability and validity  
Ethical considerations become important when research is conducted with human participants 
(Saunders et al., 2007). In the current study, firm-specific data were considered and no human 
respondents were used. The research proposal was nonetheless reviewed by a Departmental 
Ethics Screening Committee, a sub-committee of Stellenbosch University’s Research Ethics 
Committee. Given the nature of the study, the ethical risks associated with this research were 
deemed to be minimal. 
Attention should be given to both the reliability and validity considerations of a specific 
research project. If a researcher fails to timeously address the study’s reliability and validity, 
the findings thereof could be useless (Struwig & Stead, 2013). Reliability is the extent to 
which a study’s results are an accurate representation of the population and whether it is 
consistent over time (Reddy & Acharyulu, 2008: 203). The research instrument, and by 
extension the measurement scales, are considered to be reliable if the results of the study can 
be reproduced by using a similar methodology. Refer to Section 5.9.1 for a discussion on the 
measurement scales that were used in this study.  
Intra-rater reliability considers whether the data coder received the same results for attempts 
over different time periods. Reproducibility refers to whether the coding structure leads to the 
same text being coded in the same manner if different data coders were used (Reddy & 
Acharyulu, 2008: 203; Stemler, 2001). This study’s research instrument was applied over the 
complete study period by one coder. Over time, the researcher became more familiar with the 
research instrument and gathered additional knowledge regarding the implementation thereof. 
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Therefore, after the CGS data had been collected, the coding was double-checked. It was done 
in an attempt to ensure that the research instrument and succeeding coding were applied in the 
same manner for the complete corporate governance dataset (Du Plooy, 2009: 216–217). 
Validity denotes the accuracy of the selected measure or the extent to which a score truthfully 
represents a specific concept (Zikmund & Babin, 2010: 335). In quantitative studies, attention 
should be given to internal, external and construct validity. Internal validity refers to the 
interpretation of data. This type of validity considers whether a change in the independent 
variable relates to a change in the dependent variable (Bless et al., 2006: 93).  
Threats to internal validity include, amongst others, history, maturation and mortality. History 
refers to events that occurred between the beginning and end of a study period that could have 
affected the research situation. Maturation entails changes within respondents and mortality 
involves the drop-out of firms during the study period due to delistings (Coldwell & Herbst, 
2004: 40–41). The time dimension of a study’s research design can thus represent a threat to 
the validity of the study (Du Plooy, 2009). Controls to increase internal validity include 
holding as many factors as possible constant and that only one specific researcher should 
apply the research instrument over the duration of the study period (Newman & Benz, 1998).  
In this study, the researcher realised that external factors could possibly have influenced the 
data and consequently the observed results. Regarding the collection of corporate governance 
data, some of the typical threats to internal validity did not apply to this study. The researcher 
did not work with human respondents, but rather considered annual reports. In an attempt to 
increase the internal validity of the financial data, standardised financial statement data and 
ratios were sourced from McGregor BFA (2013). The reason was that the format of published 
financial data could differ slightly amongst firms, hence reducing the comparability.  
External validity determines whether or not an observed relationship and conclusion(s) could 
be generalised across similar situations (Bless et al., 2006: 93). A possible threat to external 
validity is that the researcher’s generalisations might not be accurate, since unusual objects 
were included at a peculiar time (Coldwell & Herbst, 2004: 42). A possible solution is to 
gather data across several strata to reflect the situation to which the results will be generalised 
more accurately (Newman & Benz, 1998). 
Regarding the external validity of this study, a detailed sample of JSE-listed firms from six 
Main Board industries (referred to as ‘the considered industries’) was analysed. See Section 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 192 
5.8.3 for an in-depth discussion of this study’s sample. The observations of the current study 
are thus not generalisable to all JSE-listed firms, since four industries were excluded from the 
study. Generalisations could, however, be made to firms in similar industries. 
Construct validity denotes the degree to which the considered constructs are accurately 
represented and measured by the selected instrument (Sullivan, 2009: 533). A construct refers 
to concepts which are measured with multiple variables. The ability of the measure to 
correlate with other (standard) measures and/or established criteria should be considered 
(Zikmund & Babin, 2010: 325; 336–337). Strong measurement validity can reduce the threats 
to internal validity (Newman & Benz, 1998).  
In line with the recommendations for efficient construct validity, the PIC Corporate 
Governance Rating Matrix was refined for the purpose of this study. The refined research 
instrument incorporated recommendations of the King II Report and the PIC (2011). Based on 
the King III Report, JSE-listed firms should publish integrated annual reports from 2011 
onwards. Future corporate governance researchers should thus take note of the King III 
Report when conducting similar studies and/or applying this study’s research instrument. 
5.13 Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter the research process that was adopted was explained in detail. The selected 
research process was adapted from that prescribed by Cant et al. (2003). This process met the 
necessary ethical, reliability and validity considerations associated with good research. A 
quantitative research approach, based on numerical measurements, was used. Quantitative 
data are related with the deductive research approach. According to this approach, hypotheses 
are deduced based on existing literature. A descriptive research type was used to provide a 
description of the considered constructs’ characteristics. 
Secondary research was conducted in this study. A large number of journals, books and 
websites were included in the literature review. Furthermore, corporate governance and 
financial data were collected within the South African context. Content analysis was used to 
construct CGSs for the sample firms. The CGSs were based on specific disclosure and 
acceptability criteria as discussed in Chapter 4. 
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The financial performance of the firms was measured by using various accounting-based and 
market-based measures. Standardised ROA, ROE and EPS data were sourced from the 
McGregor BFA (2013) database. In addition, the CAPM and Fama–French three-factor 
models were employed to estimate risk-adjusted abnormal returns for four corporate 
governance-sorted portfolios. The required TSR, market capitalisation and book value data 
were sourced from McGregor BFA (2013) and the BER (2013). 
The population consisted of all JSE-listed firms for the period 20022010. A combination of 
convenience and judgement sampling techniques was applied to draw a sample of 230 firms 
from six JSE industries. After the necessary panel data had been collected, descriptive 
statistics were conducted to describe and summarise the dataset. 
Pooled OLS regression, fixed effects and random effects regression models were used in this 
study. The selection of the appropriate regression model depends on the outcomes of the 
specified tests that can be applied to measure fixed and/or random effects. In addition, a 
mixed-model ANOVA was applied to determine whether there was a significant difference in 
the CGSs over time, as well as between the CGSs of listed and delisted firms. A Chow test 
was employed to determine whether 2008, the midpoint of the 2007–2009 global financial 
crisis, could be seen as a structural break in the financial dataset.  
In the following two chapters, the results of the descriptive and inferential analyses are 
presented. 
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CHAPTER 6  
EMPIRICAL RESULTS:  
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
6.1 Introduction 
An outlay of this study’s research process was provided in Section 5.2. The final step in this 
process is to report on the descriptive and inferential statistics. More specifically, the results 
of the descriptive statistics that were used to determine the nature of the corporate governance 
and financial datasets are reported in this chapter. 
The researcher used a corporate governance research instrument to compile 1 439 annual 
CGSs for 230 JSE-listed firms. These scores reflected the level of corporate governance 
compliance (or the lack thereof) of the firms over the period 2002–2010. The accounting-
based ROA, ROE and EPS (specifically HEPS) ratios were examined to assess financial 
performance. In addition, the TSRs of the firms were evaluated to consider their market-based 
financial performance. 
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 6.2 provides a discussion of the CGS descriptive 
statistics, followed by the descriptive statistics of the financial performance variables. Section 
6.4 provides an overview of relevant South African economic data, with specific reference to 
the 2007–2009 global financial crisis.  
6.2 Corporate governance 
The annual CGS data were processed using Excel and Statistica. The complete sample 
included both JSE-listed and delisted companies. As mentioned in Section 5.8.4, firms that 
delisted from the JSE during the study period were included in the sample to reduce possible 
survivorship bias. Descriptive statistics were hence conducted for the complete sample, as 
well as for two data sub-sets consisting of listed firms and companies that delisted from the 
JSE over the study period. 
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6.2.1 The complete sample 
The CGS descriptive statistics for the complete sample are provided in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1: CGS
a)
 values for the complete sample  
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2002 191 39 39 9 67 12 
2003 192 45 47 10 69 12 
2004 166 49 51 9 72 12 
2005 161 51 53 13 71 12 
2006 146 52 54 16 71 12 
2007 141 52 56 16 70 12 
2008 150 55 57 14 72 11 
2009 151 57 59 21 72 10 
2010 141 59 62 27 74 10 
Overall period 1 439 50 53 9 74 13 
a) The lowest potential overall CGS was 0 and the highest potential overall CGS was 74. 
As seen in Table 6.1, the annual mean and median CGSs exhibited a similar, consistently 
increasing trend over the research period. A possible explanation for this positive 
development is that, over time, directors became more aware of the King recommendations 
and the importance of efficient corporate governance compliance. In addition, based on the 
content analysis, it was evident that companies gradually introduced one or more internal 
compliance functions. For example, a compliance officer was appointed and/or a compliance 
department was introduced. Such functions could help boards and managers to establish 
(more efficient) corporate governance compliance practices. These observations highlight 
promising opportunities for investors who consider the corporate governance compliance of 
JSE-listed firms when evaluating potential investments. 
The corporate governance sample had an overall mean of 50 out of a potential 74. On 
average, the sample firms hence complied with two thirds (67.568%) of the corporate 
governance disclosure and acceptability criteria that were discussed in Chapter 4. The annual 
mean CGSs increased. This trend was expected, as boards and directors became (more) 
accustomed to the guidelines of the King II Report over time.  
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Despite the overall increasing compliance trend, the sample firms only complied with 
approximately 68 per cent of the corporate governance criteria for the overall study period 
(20022010). By 2010, the sample firms complied with approximately 80 per cent of the 
corporate governance criteria. Some firms, however, did not pay enough attention to 
corporate governance compliance. The directors and managers of such firms probably need 
more training to properly understand the King guidelines and to incorporate these effectively 
into their companies’ activities. The observed lack of corporate governance compliance 
provides opportunities for consultants to train directors on various governance-related aspects. 
If a firm uses a consultant, it has the advantage that the service can be tailor-made to meet the 
needs of the directors and managers. 
To classify the sample firms’ level of corporate governance compliance, their CGSs were 
expressed as a percentage of the maximum potential CGS as indicated in Figure 6.1. 
 
Very low Low to average Moderate High 
  0            19                             37   56                           74 
Figure 6.1: Classification of the sample firms’ CGSs 
As shown in Figure 6.1, the maximum score of 74 was sub-divided into four classifications, 
namely equal to or below 25 per cent (CGS less than or equal to 19), above 25 per cent and 
below or equal to 50 per cent (CGS more than 19 but less than or equal to 37), above 50 per 
cent and below or equal to 75 per cent (CGS more than 37 but less than or equal to 56) and 
above 75 per cent (CGS higher than 56). Classification 1 reflects ‘very low’, classification 2 
‘low to average’, classification 3 ‘moderate’ and classification 4 ‘high’ corporate governance 
compliance. Firms within classifications 1 and 2 would benefit most from the services of a 
corporate governance consultant and/or the appointment of an internal compliance officer to 
assist with their corporate governance compliance practices. 
The minimum CGS moved from very low (CGS of 9) in 2002 to the low to average 
classification (CGS of 27) in 2010. The two companies that obtained a CGS of 9 (in 2002 and 
2004) subsequently delisted. In line with this result, Frost, Racca and Stanford (2012) 
indicated that weak corporate governance compliance could be symptomatic of larger 
corporate feasibility problems.  
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Not all firms that had very low corporate governance compliance necessarily delisted from 
the JSE. Some of the firms with very low CGSs improved their corporate governance 
compliance over time. The minimum CGS tripled from 2002 to 2010. The CGSs of the 
companies at the top end of the compliance classification also improved over time, albeit with 
a smaller increase (from 67 to 74) than the firms with very low compliance. Based on the 
content analysis, the researcher observed that companies that considerably improved their 
corporate governance compliance often stated that it takes time to create an efficient corporate 
governance structure and mechanisms. 
The annual standard deviations in Table 6.1 ranged between 10 and 12, indicating some 
variation in the dataset. Given the fact that the sample contained firms that formed part of the 
FTSE/JSE Top 40 Index as well as firms that had delisted within a few years from their listing 
date, the results were not surprising. Firms which formed part of the FTSE/JSE Top 40 Index 
would be expected to consistently deliver good corporate governance compliance results, 
because they are more “in the public eye” and thus subject to greater stakeholder scrutiny. 
The delisted firms were anticipated to have poor(er) corporate governance compliance. Such 
firms possibly lacked intent and skills to comply with corporate governance guidelines. Some 
firms that delisted could also have a lack of resources to fund (costly) corporate governance 
initiatives. 
6.2.2 Listed versus delisted firms 
The results of some previous international corporate governance studies (e.g. Chiraz & Anis, 
2013: 125; Serve, Martinez & Djama, 2012) suggest that the corporate governance structures 
of delisted companies are weaker than those of listed companies. In the current study, 
consideration was hence given to whether the CGSs of the sample firms also differed based 
on their listing status. The complete sample was accordingly divided into two data sub-sets, 
namely listed and delisted firms. 
Of the total 1 439 annual CGS observations, 71 delisted firms contributed 260 annual 
observations. Figure 6.2 presents the mean and median CGSs for the listed and delisted 
companies over the nine-year study period. 
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Figure 6.2: Mean and median CGSs for the listed and delisted firms 
It can be seen in Figure 6.2 that the mean and median CGSs for listed firms were higher than 
the corresponding CGSs for delisted firms for the largest part of the study period. While the 
mean and median values of listed firms consistently increased over time, the mean and 
median values of delisted companies fluctuated somewhat during the observed period. These 
findings were in line with the findings of previous corporate governance researchers (such as 
Chiraz & Anis, 2013; Serve et al., 2012). 
As indicated previously, not all firms that delisted from the JSE necessarily experienced 
corporate governance compliance difficulties. In 2009, three delisted firms, namely 
Dimension Data, Set Point Group and Spescom had high corporate governance compliance 
(falling in classification 4). Dimension Data delisted, following a takeover by the Japanese 
telecommunications firm Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (Wessels, 2010). 
Before the takeover, the firm was listed in the Technology industry for 23 years (Convergence 
Partners, 2010). The board of the Set Point Group indicated that the market sentiment towards 
small JSE-listed firms in the aftermath of the financial crisis was not favourable. They had 
consequently decided that there were no material benefits to remain listed (I-Net Bridge, 
2010). Spescom had been listed in the Technology industry since 1987 before it merged with 
Jasco (Prinsloo, 2011). 
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Firms with high corporate governance compliance can be attractive targets to acquire or 
merge with, as in the case of Spescom and Dimension Data. Corporate governance initiatives 
could also be regarded as unnecessary red tape that slow down decision-making processes 
(Solomon, 2007). Companies with high corporate governance compliance can hence decide to 
delist to avoid time-consuming compliance activities. No delisted firms formed part of the 
sample for the year 2010, either because the firms were not listed for the complete 2010 year 
or their annual reports were not made available on the McGregor BFA (2013) database. 
6.2.3 Disclosure and acceptability dimensions 
The CGS consists of two dimensions, namely disclosure and acceptability. To ease 
comparison, the mean disclosure and acceptability scores were converted into percentages by 
dividing each by the total CGS of 74. In Table 6.2, the annual mean disclosure and 
acceptability dimensions are indicated. The annual mean CGSs (the sum of the mean 
disclosure and acceptability dimensions) are also provided. 
Table 6.2: Mean disclosure and acceptability dimensions as a percentage of the total 
CGS of 74 
Firms Years 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
All 
Disclosure (%) 32.291 36.177 38.741 39.869 40.827 41.001 42.198 43.556 44.566 
+ Acceptability (%) 19.803 24.008 27.222 28.513 29.554 29.835 31.541 33.632 34.963 
= Mean CGS
a)
 (%) 52.094 60.185 65.963 68.382 70.381 70.836 73.739 77.188 79.529 
           
 
Listed 
 
Disclosure (%) 33.616 37.395 39.486 40.905 41.098 41.470 42.324 43.481 44.566 
+ Acceptability (%) 21.108 25.366 28.126 29.773 29.987 30.585 31.719 33.546 34.963 
= Mean CGS
a)
 (%) 54.724 62.761 67.612 70.678 71.085 72.055 74.043 77.027 79.529 
           
Delisted 
Disclosure (%) 30.000 34.054 36.612 36.139 39.122 36.383 39.189 47.297 
n/a + Acceptability (%) 17.548 21.641 24.639 23.977 26.824 22.453 27.252 37.838 
= Mean CGS
a)
 (%) 47.548 55.695 61.251 60.116 65.946 58.836 66.441 85.135 
a) The mean CGSs in Table 6.1 were rounded to the closest integer, while the original (unrounded) mean CGSs 
were used to determine the percentages presented in this table.  
Figure 6.3 provides a visual representation of the two dimensions for the complete sample and 
for listed and delisted firms. 
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Figure 6.3: Disclosure and acceptability dimensions for the complete sample, as well 
as for the sub-sets of listed and delisted firms 
Perusal of Table 6.2 and Figure 6.3 reveals that in 2002, the mean CGS for all firms was 
52.094 per cent. Disclosure contributed 32.291 per cent and acceptability 19.803 per cent to 
this score. At that stage (2002), the sample firms seemed to have below average (less than 
50%) compliance with the acceptability guidelines. Over the study period, the listed and 
delisted firms gradually improved their compliance with both the disclosure and acceptability 
dimensions.  
In 2010, the mean CGSs of all firms were 79.529 per cent. This score hence increased 
substantially (with 27.435%) over the research period. Furthermore, the acceptability 
dimension contributed 34.963 per cent to the mean CGS for the complete sample in 2010, an 
increase of 15.160 per cent since 2002. This is a promising result for investors, since the 
sample firms not only improved their disclosure of corporate governance considerations, but 
also revealed more acceptable compliance practices over time. 
As discussed in Section 4.3, acceptability guidelines were not set for gender and race 
diversity, full disclosure of individual executive director remuneration and the disclosure of 
shareholding. A firm could receive a maximum score of 39 for disclosure and 35 for 
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acceptability. The two dimensions thus did not contribute equally to the total CGS of 74. The 
contributions of both dimensions were calculated as a percentage of the annual mean CGSs 
for the complete sample, as shown in Table 6.3. For example, a disclosure score of 32.291 per 
cent out of a mean CGS of 52.094 per cent in 2002 indicates that the disclosure component 
contributed 61.986 per cent to the CGS. 
Table 6.3: Contributions of the mean disclosure and acceptability dimensions (%) to 
the annual mean CGSs of all firms 
Years 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Contribution of the 
disclosure dimension to 
the mean CGS (%) 
61.986 60.110 58.731 58.303 58.009 57.882 57.226 56.428 56.037 
Contribution of the 
acceptability dimension 
to the mean CGS (%) 
38.014 39.890 41.269 41.697 41.991 42.118 42.774 43.572 43.963 
Table 6.3 shows that in 2002, the acceptability score contributed less than 40 per cent to the 
mean CGS.  It hence appears that the sample firms struggled to correctly apply the corporate 
governance guidelines. If was evident from the content analysis of the 2002 annual reports 
that firms tended to explain their non-compliance with some of the King guidelines. Such 
firms hence complied with the “comply or explain” guideline, but their compliance per se was 
not necessarily acceptable with regard to the stated acceptability criteria. By 2010, the 
contribution of the acceptability dimension to the mean CGS improved. The mean CGS was 
more equally spread between the disclosure and acceptability dimensions than in 2002.  
The annual mean disclosure and acceptability scores of the complete sample were also 
considered as a percentage out of 39 and 35 respectively, as reported in Table 6.4. 
Table 6.4: Annual mean disclosure and acceptability scores (%) 
Years 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Mean disclosure 
score
a) 23.895 26.771 28.669 29.503 30.212 30.340 31.227 32.232 32.979 
Percentage  
(out of 39) 
61.270 68.643 73.509 75.649 77.468 77.796 80.068 82.646 84.561 
          
Mean acceptability 
score
a) 14.654 17.766 20.145 21.099 21.870 22.078 23.340 24.887 25.872 
Percentage  
(out of 35) 
41.870 50.759 57.556 60.284 62.485 63.080 66.686 71.107 73.921 
a) Original (unrounded) mean scores were used for calculations. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 202 
The disclosure and acceptability scores of all firms increased rapidly over the study period. In 
Table 6.4, improvements of 23.291 per cent and 32.051 per cent can be seen for disclosure 
and acceptability respectively over the study period. This is a positive development, since the 
firms not only improved their corporate governance disclosure, but also had more acceptable 
corporate governance compliance practices at the end of the research period. 
Disclosure and acceptability criteria were set for 39 corporate governance factors. In line with 
a recommendation of the PIC (2011) to group corporate governance factors into categories, 
these factors formed part of nine corporate governance categories. Instead of focusing on 
single factors, these categories were examined. 
6.2.4 CGS categories 
Some categories made a larger contribution to the total CGS than others, as indicated in Table 
6.5. 
Table 6.5: Contribution of the corporate governance categories to the total CGS 
Not indicated due to a confidentiality agreement between the researcher and the 
Centre for Corporate Governance in Africa at the University of Stellenbosch 
Business School. 
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Table 6.5 indicates that board-related categories and corporate culture and behaviour 
contributed most to the total CGS. The categories related to the board contributed 35.135 per 
cent in total (board composition contributed 18.919%, while board committees and individual 
directors each contributed 8.108%). Since the board is the focal point of corporate governance 
compliance (IoDSA, 2002), this high contribution is justified. Aspects related to corporate 
culture and behaviour (Category 8) made the second largest contribution (27.027%) to the 
total CGS. This high contribution is also reasonable considering that the current study was 
conducted in South Africa, which is characterised by many social considerations such as 
BBBEE and HIV and AIDS, as well as unethical behaviour such as bribery. 
The annual mean category values were converted into percentages by dividing them by 74. 
The results are depicted in Table 6.6 and Figure 6.4. 
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Table 6.6: Mean CGS categories as a percentage of the maximum CGS of 74 
All 
firms 
Year C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 
2002 9.374 3.149 3.984 6.530 1.931 6.919 5.016 13.223 1.966 
2003 11.311 3.780 5.272 6.792 2.808 7.024 5.208 15.372 2.619 
2004 12.480 4.208 5.959 7.204 2.891 7.131 5.308 17.405 3.378 
2005 13.027 4.457 6.245 7.436 2.988 7.303 5.304 17.777 3.845 
2006 13.236 4.822 6.470 7.507 3.027 7.341 5.369 18.539 4.073 
2007 13.523 4.850 6.478 7.628 3.124 7.322 5.368 18.315 4.227 
2008 14.415 5.027 6.766 7.865 3.207 7.405 5.405 19.081 4.568 
2009 15.330 5.423 7.034 8.170 3.311 7.634 5.405 19.993 4.886 
2010 15.785 5.770 7.150 8.281 3.258 7.754 5.405 20.539 5.588 
 
 
Listed firms 
Year C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 
2002 9.895 3.328 4.143 6.958 1.876 7.114 5.249 13.961 2.200 
2003 11.608 3.965 5.495 7.134 2.814 7.255 5.350 16.182 2.958 
2004 12.689 4.384 6.119 7.470 2.923 7.196 5.361 17.820 3.647 
2005 13.449 4.601 6.446 7.754 3.014 7.378 5.362 18.554 4.119 
2006 13.299 4.847 6.500 7.626 3.014 7.389 5.362 18.823 4.226 
2007 13.777 4.930 6.566 7.770 3.072 7.422 5.364 18.803 4.350 
2008 14.443 5.039 6.766 7.920 3.191 7.404 5.405 19.247 4.627 
2009 15.285 5.424 7.022 8.145 3.296 7.634 5.405 19.942 4.876 
2010 15.785 5.770 7.150 8.281 3.258 7.754 5.405 20.539 5.588 
 
Delisted 
firms 
Year C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 
2002 8.474 2.838 3.707 5.792 2.027 6.582 4.614 11.950 1.564 
2003 10.792 3.455 4.884 6.197 2.799 6.622 4.961 13.958 2.027 
2004 11.880 3.708 5.500 6.442 2.797 6.946 5.154 16.216 2.608 
2005 11.505 3.938 5.522 6.293 2.896 7.027 5.096 14.981 2.857 
2006 12.838 4.662 6.284 6.757 3.108 7.027 5.405 16.757 3.108 
2007 11.019 4.054 5.614 6.236 3.638 6.341 5.405 13.514 3.015 
2008 13.739 4.730 6.757 6.531 3.604 7.432 5.405 15.091 3.153 
2009 17.568 5.405 7.658 9.459 4.054 7.658 5.405 22.523 5.405 
2010 n/a 
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Figure 6.4: Mean CGS categories (%) for the complete sample as well as for the sub-
sets of listed and delisted firms 
As revealed in Figure 6.4, the mean category scores gradually increased over time for the 
complete sample and for the sub-set of listed firms. However, the mean category values of the 
delisted firms fluctuated over time. In comparison to the delisted firms, larger categorical 
increases can be observed for listed firms during 2002–2008. 
As indicated in Table 6.5, the nine corporate governance categories did not contribute equally 
to the total CGS. If two firms each had a CGS of 40, it does not per se indicate that they 
scored equally on all categories. To determine the drivers of improvements in corporate 
governance compliance, the annual mean category scores for the complete sample were 
expressed as a percentage of the maximum total score per category. These percentages are 
shown in Table 6.7. 
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Table 6.7: Annual mean category scores as a percentage of the maximum total score 
per category for the complete sample 
Category 
(maximum 
score) 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
C1 (% out of 14) 49.550 59.786 65.964 68.857 69.964 71.479 76.193 81.029 83.436 
C2 (% out of 6) 38.833 46.617 51.900 54.967 59.467 59.817 62.000 66.883 71.167 
C3 (% out of 6) 49.133 65.017 73.500 77.017 79.800 79.900 83.450 86.750 88.183 
C4 (% out of 7) 69.029 71.800 76.157 78.614 79.357 80.643 83.143 86.371 87.543 
C5 (% out of 3) 47.633 69.267 71.300 73.700 74.667 77.067 79.100 81.667 80.367 
C6 (% out of 6) 85.333 86.633 87.950 90.067 90.533 90.300 91.333 94.150 95.633 
C7 (% out of 4) 92.800 96.350 98.200 98.125 99.325 99.300 100.000 100.000 100.000 
C8 (% out of 20) 48.925 56.875 64.400 65.775 68.595 67.765 70.600 73.975 75.995 
C9 (% out of 8) 18.188 24.225 31.250 35.563 37.675 39.100 42.250 45.200 51.688 
It is evident from Table 6.7 that the firms already complied with almost 50 per cent of the 
stated criteria relating to the board composition (Category 1) in 2002. In addition, 
considerable improvements were observed for the three board-related categories (Categories 
1, 2 and 3) over time. This was not surprising, since the first King Report already discussed 
the role and composition of the board at length. The directors of the sample firms thus had 
more time to comply with board-specific guidelines than “new” considerations, such as 
sustainability, that was introduced in the King II Report. 
Many previous corporate governance researchers (such as Kiel & Nicholson, 2003; Vafeas & 
Theodorou, 1998) focused on board composition and reported improvements in board-related 
compliance over time (refer to Section 3.4 for details on these studies). As seen in Figure 6.5, 
the sample firms, as well as the data sub-sets of listed and delisted companies also 
considerably improved their compliance with the board composition criteria (out of 14) over 
time. By 2009, the delisted firms had higher board compliance than the listed firms. These 
firms’ directors were probably sought-after. The three delisted firms were probably attractive 
take-over targets. 
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Figure 6.5: Board composition (Category 1) for all firms as well as the sub-sets of 
listed and delisted firms 
It is disconcerting that so many previous corporate governance researchers tended to focus 
only on board-specific aspects to measure a firm’s corporate governance compliance. The 
board consists of humans who make important decisions. These decisions can determine a 
firm’s strategic direction and have an influence on its success (or failure). However, a number 
of other aspects also influence a firm’s corporate governance compliance. Therefore, in this 
study, various other corporate governance categories were also examined to give a 
comprehensive overview of corporate governance compliance in South Africa. 
With regard to the not board-related categories, it is evident from Table 6.7 that compliance 
with director remuneration (Category 4), accounting and auditing (Category 6) and risk 
disclosure and reporting (Category 7) criteria was already reasonably high in 2002 and further 
increased over the study period. The high compliance trend for Category 4 can possibly be 
(partly) ascribed to the role of active shareholders and the media. These role players often 
highlight remuneration-related issues, such as a lack of performance-related payment and 
excessive executive bonuses (Gardee, 2014). Enhanced shareholder activism can be a driver 
for future remuneration-related improvements. Revised statutory reporting requirements (such 
as IFRS) and the JSE Listing Requirements possibly steered firms towards high compliance 
with Category 6. All the firms reported on their relevant risks and the management thereof 
(Category 7) since 2008, the midst of the 20072009 global financial crisis period. 
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An interesting observation was that although shareholders are traditionally regarded as the 
most important stakeholder group, the sample firms had below average (less than 50%) 
compliance with Category 5 (shareholding) in 2002. Below average attention was also given 
to Category 8 (corporate culture and behaviour) in the same year. Both of these categories, 
however, showed substantial improvement over time.  
Compliance with the sustainability reporting category was very low (below 20%) in 2002. By 
2010, the sample firms only complied with approximately half (51.688%) of the 
sustainability-related criteria. Directors and managers should consider this category in more 
detail, especially in the light of the compulsory publishing of integrated reports since 2011. 
The King III Report includes a comprehensive discussion on integrated reporting. 
Since the researcher attempted to provide in-depth analysis of corporate governance 
compliance, additional criteria were considered for three factors. Two of these factors formed 
part of Category 1, namely Factor 7 (board development programme) and Factor 8 (board 
performance evaluation). Factor 35 (anti-corruption programme) formed part of Category 8. 
6.2.4.1 Additional scores for board development programme, board 
performance evaluation and anti-corruption programme  
The King II Report emphasises the importance of board development and the evaluation of 
the board’s performance. The amount of detail (no detail, only mentioned, some detail or an 
extensive discussion) provided on the board development programme, board performance 
evaluation and anti-corruption programme was examined. The allocation of additional scores 
based on the provided detail did not increase the firms’ total CGSs. The percentage of 
companies within each scoring category is presented per annum in Table 6.8. 
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Table 6.8: Additional scores for Factors 7, 8 and 35 
Factor 
Percentage of annual firm-specific observations that obtained a score of 0, 1, 3 or 5 for 
Factors 7, 8 and 35 
n
a) 
191 192 166 161 146 141 150 151 141 
Years 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Board 
development 
programme  
(Factor 7) S
co
re
b
)  
0 74.345 59.896 52.409 49.689 45.206 43.262 34.000 27.152 25.532 
1 19.372 25.000 22.892 26.087 25.342 29.078 33.333 33.775 29.078 
3 6.283 14.583 23.494 18.634 21.918 19.149 22.000 26.490 29.787 
5 0.000 0.521 1.205 5.590 7.534 8.511 10.667 12.583 15.603 
Board 
performance 
evaluation  
(Factor 8) S
co
re
b
)  
0 82.722 64.583 53.012 50.311 45.891 42.553 35.333 28.477 22.695 
1 12.042 23.438 31.325 29.193 28.767 27.660 32.000 33.775 31.206 
3 5.236 11.458 14.458 18.012 17.808 19.858 20.000 19.205 21.986 
5 0.000 0.521 1.205 2.484 7.534 9.929 12.667 18.543 24.113 
Anti-corruption 
programme  
(Factor 35) 
 S
co
re
b
)  
0 67.539 63.541 54.217 46.584 45.890 43.262 40.667 33.113 28.369 
1 23.560 22.917 25.904 26.708 23.973 25.532 23.333 24.503 26.950 
3 8.377 11.979 16.867 19.876 21.233 19.858 22.000 24.503 24.823 
5 0.524 1.563 3.012 6.832 8.904 11.348 14.000 17.881 19.858 
a) The number of annual reports considered per year 
b) 0: The disclosure criterion was not met and/or the factor was not mentioned in the annual report. 
    1: The factor was only mentioned in the annual report. 
    3: Some detail was provided in the annual report regarding the factor. 
    5: The factor was extensively discussed in the annual report. 
By looking at Table 6.8, it is evident that the majority of the companies did not mention the 
implementation of the three factors initially (2002). Those firms that considered the factors 
mostly mentioned them (and obtained a score of 1) in 2002. Over time, more detail was 
provided on the three factors. By 2010, only 15.603 per cent of the firms provided extensive 
detail on their board development programme, 24.113 per cent on their board performance 
evaluation, and 19.858 per cent on anti-corruption programmes. Although the amount of 
detail increased over time, it is disconcerting that approximately a quarter of the sample firms 
did not even mention these factors in their annual reports by 2010. 
6.2.4.2 Researcher’s category-specific observations based on the content 
analysis 
While the corporate governance considerations from the annual reports were quantified, the 
researcher also made category-specific observations, as shown in Table 6.9. 
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Table 6.9: Researcher’s category-specific corporate governance observations 
Categories Researcher’s observations based on content analysis 
C1: 
Board 
composition 
 Over the observed research period, the status and roles of directors changed to include 
more NEDs. 
 Despite the King II Report’s recommendation that more than 50 per cent of the NEDs 
should be independent, a lack of independent NEDs was observed over the research 
period.  
C2: 
Board 
committees 
 The majority of the firms (more than 50%) had an audit committee and a remuneration 
committee. 
 The nominations committee was often combined with the remuneration committee. 
 General areas of non-compliance with the King II guidelines were the role of the 
committee’s chairperson (not an independent NED) and the number of committee 
members (fewer than three members). 
C3: 
Individual 
directors 
 
 It seems to be common practice for directors to serve on a number of boards (which 
could lead to over-boardedness). 
 During the first four years of the research period, committee meeting attendance for 
individual members was often not disclosed. 
C4: 
Remuneration 
 Shareholders’ approval of NEDs’ remuneration was often not mentioned. 
 Despite the view expressed in international markets that NEDs should preferably not 
receive share options, share options were regularly given to NEDs, generally without 
shareholder approval. 
 During 2008–2010, the majority of firms (more than 50%) published detailed 
remuneration reports. 
C5: 
Shareholding 
 Most firms complied with the one shareone vote principle. 
 The disclosure of shareholding information varied considerably between firms, from a 
detailed analysis to merely mentioning the five largest shareholders. 
C6: 
Accounting and 
auditing 
 Even though a firm’s internal auditor and the audit committee functions were both 
mentioned, clear indication of communication or oversight between the two parties 
could often not be found. 
C7: 
Risk disclosure 
and reporting 
 From 2008 (the midst of the 20072009 global financial crisis), all firms reported on 
risk management, with varying degrees of detail. 
C8: 
Corporate 
culture and 
behaviour 
 Most firms had a code of ethics. 
 The terms ‘whistle-blowing’ and ’whistle-blower’ were rarely used, perhaps due to the 
social stigma that is often associated with being a whistle-blower (Uys, 2011). 
 The majority of firms (more than 50%) clearly mentioned their relationships with and 
responsibilities to their various stakeholders; although a small number of firms (fewer 
than 10) did not even mention the term ‘stakeholder’. 
 Reporting on BBBEE and HIV and AIDS-related aspects in the observed annual 
reports increased over time. 
C9: 
Sustainability 
reporting 
 Initially, sustainability considerations were often only mentioned by a few firms 
(approximately 20%). The number of firms that reported comprehensively on such 
considerations increased over time. 
 Scores for this category were based on sustainability reporting in annual reports (and 
when available sustainability reports) and not on separate sustainability reports that 
were not available on McGregor BFA (2013) 
Source: Researcher’s own construction based on the content analysis 
The annual mean CGSs and the individual category scores increased considerably for the 
complete sample. In addition, the disclosure of corporate governance data in the annual 
reports also developed over time. Investors can use such transparent corporate governance 
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data to make more informed investment decisions. Despite these positive observations, the 
researcher also has a number of compliance-related concerns. 
6.4.2.3 Corporate governance compliance concerns 
Based on the content analysis, two main corporate governance concerns were evident, namely 
high compliance costs and over-boardedness. 
The insufficient corporate governance compliance of some of the sample firms could be 
ascribed to high compliance costs. Such costs can become disproportional to the incremental 
benefits, especially for small firms (Rezaee, 2007: 513). While conducting content analysis on 
the sample companies’ annual reports, it was observed that, specifically in the period 2005–
2010, non-compliance with specific corporate governance requirements was acknowledged, 
but no suggestions were provided to improve within the next year(s). Such firms thus adhered 
to the King II Report’s “comply or explain” principle, but did not (necessarily) plan to 
improve their corporate governance practices. 
Another corporate governance concern is that of over-boardedness, as discussed in Section 
4.3.3.1. An over-boarded director serves on several boards (Harris & Shimizu, 2004: 776). 
Such a director could consequently struggle to give proper attention to the issues of the 
various firms on which boards he or she serves. Although no guideline was set for an 
acceptable number of board memberships for the purpose of this study, the researcher 
observed some “very busy” board members. Furthermore, the reporting on corporate 
governance considerations of some sample companies seemed very positive at first glance. 
However, when the researcher reflected on the corporate governance data, it seemed as if their 
excellent compliance was over-exaggerated. Creating false favourable impressions with 
investors who favour sound corporate governance is morally wrong. 
According to Stürmer (2013), many JSE-listed firms’ managers and directorates still only talk 
about sound corporate governance without truly practicing it. Although the mean CGSs of the 
sample firms improved over time, some firms still had a serious lack of corporate governance 
compliance in 2010. The researcher hence tends to agree with Stürmer (2013). 
The type of industry in which a company operates and the regulation of its operations could 
possibly influence the extent of its corporate governance compliance (Huse, 2007: 107; Miles, 
2005). The mean CGSs are hence discussed per industry in Section 6.2.5. 
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6.2.5 The considered industries 
When the number of companies indicated in this section is summed, the number of firms 
(244) differs from the total number of firms in the sample (230). The reason is that some firms 
moved between industries. For example, a specific firm formed part of the Consumer Goods 
industry for two years and then moved to Industrials. Such firms were included in the number 
of firms that were considered per industry, but were not double counted for the sample. 
Figures 6.6–6.11 contain the descriptive statistics for the six considered industries by means 
of box-and-whisker plots. The box extends from the 25
th
 to the 75
th
 percentile. The mean, 
median and range (denoted as min-max) are also provided. 
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Figure 6.6: CGS values of the Health Care industry 
In total, nine Health Care firms (42 annual CGS observations) were considered. From Figure 
6.6, it is clear that the mean and median CGSs of the Health Care firms reflected moderate to 
high corporate governance compliance for all the considered years (the annual mean and 
median CGSs were above 37). South Africans are challenged by various health care concerns, 
including the high prevalence of HIV and AIDS. Consequently, companies in the Health Care 
industry have an important role in providing pharmaceutical and biotechnological services to 
the public and private sector. Such firms have to comply with strict regulations 
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(SouthAfrica.info, 2012). The high corporate governance compliance of the Health Care firms 
could probably be partly ascribed to the strict regulations with which they have to comply. 
Competition for capital can be fiercer if there are only a small number of competitors 
(Jeurissen, 2007: 101). Health Care firms that produce better annual reports could possibly be 
in a better position to attract capital from both mainstream and responsible investors than their 
counterparts. The two firms that obtained the lowest CGSs in 2002 and 2003 subsequently 
delisted. After these two firms delisted, the annual mean and median values improved 
considerably. 
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Figure 6.7: CGS values of the Consumer Goods industry 
Companies that produce automobiles, vehicle parts, foods, beverages, personal and household 
products form part of the Consumer Goods industry (JSE, 2009). During the study period, 45 
Consumer Goods firms (269 annual CGSs) were evaluated. As indicated in Figure 6.7, the 
mean and median CGSs almost doubled over time. Consumer Goods firms seem to become 
more aware of the ‘economics of reputation’ (Sparkes, 2003). If consumers boycott 
companies that they regard as having inappropriate (or insufficient) ESG practices, the firms’ 
sales could decrease (Macey, 2013). The same applies to investors who are becoming more 
discerning in terms of where they are investing their hard earned money.  
There was a large difference between the maximum and minimum annual CGSs of the 
Consumer Goods firms. The minimum values remained below 30, while the maximum values 
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were above or equal to 65 for all years. Seven of the eight firms that had very low compliance 
(CGSs below 19) delisted. In addition, one of the firms that had very low compliance used the 
same structure to report on corporate governance for the entire study period. For six years 
(2002–2007), corporate governance considerations were merely mentioned on a single page. 
From 2008 onwards, it was stated in its annual report that the firm complied with rule 3.84(a) 
of the JSE (2008b). This rule entails that a firm’s board should have a formalised policy that 
sets out the procedures for new board appointments. It appeared as if the board members of 
this specific firm regarded board-specific requirements of utmost importance. Most of the 
other King II recommendations were ignored. 
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Figure 6.8: CGS values of the Consumer Services industry 
The Consumer Services industry consists of amongst others retailers, media, travel and leisure 
providers (JSE, 2009). The sample included 64 firms (373 annual CGS observations) from 
this industry. When comparing Figures 6.7 and 6.8, it is evident that the results for these two 
industries revealed similar trends. The mean and median CGSs of the Consumer Services 
industry also increased over time, although the improved reporting in this industry were 
slightly less extensive on an annual basis than for the considered Consumer Goods 
companies.  
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Figure 6.9: CGS values of the Industrials industry 
The Industrials industry contributed the largest number of considered firms (92 firms; 553 
annual CGS observations) and consists of construction, industrial goods and service providers 
(JSE, 2009). The mean and median CGSs gradually increased over the study period. The 
range was 56 in 2002 and decreased to 45 in 2010. The minimum value tripled between 2002 
and 2010. These observations could be regarded as positive compliance developments.  
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Figure 6.10: CGS values of the Technology industry 
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The Technology industry contributed 177 annual CGS observations originating from 29 
sample firms. This industry consists of companies that provide software, computer services, 
hardware and equipment (JSE, 2009). The descriptive statistics showed an increasing 
corporate governance compliance trend for technology firms over the observed nine years. 
The range also decreased over the study period. 
An efficient and transparent corporate governance structure is of specific importance to firms 
in this industry due to the nature of their activities. Technology companies typically rely 
heavily on initial public offerings and venture capital funds as financing sources (Ash & 
Greene, 2007). The boards of Technology firms probably have to adopt best practices to 
attract capital from institutional and foreign investors.  
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Figure 6.11: CGS values of the Telecommunications industry  
The Telecommunications industry provides both fixed and mobile telecommunications to 
South Africans (JSE, 2009). During the study period, five telecommunications companies, 
that contributed 25 annual CGS observations, were considered. When comparing Figure 6.11 
with the figures for the other five industries, it is evident that the Telecommunications 
industry had the overall highest mean, median, minimum and maximum CGSs. The top 
scoring Telecommunications firm had 100 per cent compliance with the disclosure and 
acceptability criteria in 2010. 
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In South Africa, electricity provision and telecommunications are mainly dominated by state-
owned enterprises (Chabane, 2010; DPE, 2002). Telkom, for example, is a semi-privatised 
company that is 39 per cent state-owned (Independent Communications Authority of South 
Africa, 2014). A possible reason for the high CGSs of Telecommunications firms is that since 
1999, corporate governance is one of the cornerstones of the South African government’s 
strategic vision for the restructuring of state-owned enterprises (DPE, 2002).  
Companies in the Telecommunications industry also regularly engage with the government 
and parastatals for tender processes (Blue Label Telecoms, 2010; Stevensen & Waite, 2011). 
A parastatal is an organisation that serves the state indirectly (Oxford Dictionaries, 2014). 
Compliance with regulation and corporate governance codes is thus typically undertaken 
diligently by Telecommunications firms. Since there are only a few (large) companies in this 
industry, competition to comply with corporate governance guidelines could possibly be 
fiercer than in other industries. 
The Consumer Goods industry showed the largest improvement in corporate governance 
compliance over the study period. Industrials and Consumer Goods, however, still had low to 
average minimum CGSs in 2010.The Telecommunications and Health Care industries had the 
best overall corporate governance compliance. Firms operating in these industries could 
provide promising investment opportunities for responsible investors.  
Research by the risk solutions firm Inoxico (Stürmer, 2013) on the external directorships of 
selected JSE-listed companies, however, indicated that firms in the Telecommunications, 
Technology and Health Care Industries had high governance risk at the board level due to 
over-boardedness. The pool of eligible directors in South Africa is relatively small; hence 
directors tend to serve on (too) many boards. It is questionable whether over-boarded 
directors can really add to value creation if their attention is spread too widely. 
The researcher has two concluding corporate governance-related remarks. Firstly, sound 
corporate governance compliance is about more than mere compliance on paper, i.e. reporting 
on the “comply or explain” principle in a firm’s annual report. The directorates of some of the 
sample firms should learn to balance their conformance (such as compliance with legislation 
and corporate governance guidelines) and performance (such as strategy formulation) 
activities, as discussed in Section 3.3.1.4. If a company follows a “tick-box” approach to 
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merely comply with the (basic) King guidelines, the benefits of effective corporate 
governance compliance will not necessarily be obtained. 
Secondly, sound corporate governance compliance is about “practicing what you preach”. 
The corporate governance initiatives that are discussed in a firm’s annual report should be 
implemented; if not, it is almost worthless. Window-dressing of corporate activities might 
seem like a viable option to impress stakeholders over the short term. However, over the 
longer term, active shareholders are likely to start questioning practices which seem “too good 
to be true”. 
6.3 Financial performance variables 
In this section, the descriptive statistics of the financial performance variables (EPS, ROA, 
ROE and TSR) are discussed. 
6.3.1 Accounting-based performance variables 
A preliminary round of descriptive analysis was done and a few extreme data values were 
identified. Such extreme accounting performance values could be due to abnormal profits or 
losses during a specific year and/or human input error(s) in the database. These values 
distorted the financial dataset and were thus removed. The number of extreme values that 
were removed are indicated in footnotes for Tables 6.106.12. 
6.3.1.1 EPS ratio 
In Table 6.10, the descriptive statistics of the EPS ratio for the complete sample are indicated. 
As discussed in Section 5.9.4.3, the standardised EPS ratios that were sourced from the 
McGregor BFA (2013) database were determined by using the HEPS equation. 
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Table 6.10: EPS values for the complete sample (cents per share) 
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2002 191 92.921 34.400 -759.000 1 539.000 197.537 
2003 192 103.326 34.200 -870.400 2 297.000 252.726 
2004 166 167.568 61.200 -179.400 2 704.000 363.082 
2005 161 216.634 65.200 -114.300 2 849.000 439.201 
2006 146 255.264 89.950 -816.568 3 317.000 498.813 
2007 141 244.494 106.100 -297.900 2 195.000 388.705 
2008 149 232.013 96.800 -362.600 1 692.800 351.891 
2009 151 216.945 78.200 -316.800 1 835.669 330.009 
2010 141 237.299 105.900 -220.700 1 782.394 338.246 
Overall 1 438
a)
 189.715 67.050 -870.400 3 317.000 359.103 
a) One extreme value was removed 
Nominal values were considered 
Perusal of Table 6.10 shows that the mean EPS values were substantially higher than the 
median values for all considered years. The mean EPS ratio increased from 20022006. 
Investors are typically interested in firms with steadily increasing EPS values, since it could 
be due to an improved financial position (Hall, 2012). Since the remuneration of executive 
directors is often linked to EPS targets, they could also benefit from high EPS ratios (Gup, 
2007). It should, however, be noted that improvements in a firm’s EPS ratio are not 
necessarily the result of good performance. Inflation can also have an impact on this ratio. 
A firm’s EPS ratio can increase if either its profit increases and/or its number of ordinary 
shares decrease. On the one hand, if an increase in EPS is due to an improvement in profit, 
then the firm is actually growing. On the other hand, if a firm buys back shares during a 
specific year, this ratio can seem better, even though the firm might not have performed better 
(it could even have performed worse). Investors’ confidence can be lost if share buybacks are 
used to artificially improve a firm’s EPS ratio (Hall, 2012). Value can be created for 
shareholders if shares are bought back “cheaply”. However, if management over-pays for the 
shares or use expensive financing to fund it, value can be destroyed (Katsenelson, 2007). 
South African companies have only been allowed to buy back their own shares since 1 July 
1999. Share repurchases started slowly, but increased between 1999 and the late 2000s 
(Bester, Wesson & Hamman, 2010). Bester (2008: 94) found that over the period July 
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1999June 2007, 121 JSE-listed firms made 312 repurchase announcements to the value of 
approximately R50 billion. The increasing trend in share buybacks should be kept in mind 
when analysing EPS ratios in South Africa. 
During 20072009, the mean EPS values decreased. This trend could be ascribed to external 
factors, such as the global financial crisis and resulting recession in South Africa, and not 
necessarily to firm-specific actions. The standard deviations suggest that there was some 
variation in the EPS dataset. The negative minimum EPS values in all considered years 
revealed that certain firms operated at a loss. However, a negative EPS ratio should not 
necessarily be interpreted as a “bad sign” by investors. Start-up companies may show an 
initial loss, followed by profits a year or more later (Leach, 2010: 10).  
The analysis presented in Table 6.10 was conducted on the complete sample. Figure 6.12 
illustrates the mean EPS ratios for the data sub-sets of listed and delisted firms on an annual 
basis. 
 
Figure 6.12: Mean EPS values of the listed and delisted firms 
As seen in Figure 6.12, the annual mean EPS values of the delisted firms were lower than 
those of the listed firms. Furthermore, while the listed firms’ mean EPS values decreased 
during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis period, it was still positive. The delisted firms 
had a negative mean EPS value during 2008, the midpoint of this crisis. A negative EPS trend 
could result in investor concern and possible withdrawal of funds (Siegel & Shim, 2006: 256). 
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
C
en
ts
 p
er
 s
h
a
re
 
Mean EPS (listed firms) Mean EPS (delisted firms)
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 221 
6.3.1.2 ROA and ROE profitability ratios  
Tables 6.11 and 6.12 provide the descriptive statistics of the two profitability ratios.  
Table 6.11: ROA values for the complete sample (%) 
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2002 191 7.965 9.632 -148.000 130.610 23.269 
2003 192 9.455 11.714 -147.770 54.201 19.755 
2004 166 10.817 12.074 -61.606 47.539 13.400 
2005 161 11.203 12.234 -66.300 67.890 14.197 
2006 146 11.046 11.660 -267.353 74.124 26.550 
2007 141 13.541 12.113 -16.952 104.257 12.411 
2008
 149 14.027 13.075 -7.419 51.932 9.606 
2009 151 13.672 13.210 -48.313 102.251 13.475 
2010 141 12.347 12.192 -50.506 52.148 11.508 
Overall period 1 438
a) 
11.372 11.801 -267.400 130.610 17.261 
a) One extreme value was removed 
Table 6.12: ROE values for the complete sample (%) 
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2002 187 16.889 16.345 -373.214 645.277 81.263 
2003 191 12.230 16.331 -724.313 572.833 103.488 
2004 166 23.602 18.338 -179.902 452.009 67.214 
2005 160 24.488 22.361 -91.016 187.591 28.247 
2006 146 22.027 21.993 -570.263 317.212 58.921 
2007 141 26.234 23.773 -40.698 212.476 27.894 
2008
 150 22.742 20.065 -46.100 188.300 27.450 
2009 151 12.581 18.360 -572.336 116.566 57.877 
2010 141 22.664 16.512 -84.256 727.459 64.240 
Overall period 1 433
a)
 20.064 19.093 -724.313 727.459 64.597 
a) Six extreme values were removed 
Perusal of Tables 6.11 and 6.12 shows that the mean and median ROA and ROE profitability 
ratios differed considerably for the overall period. As confirmed by the substantial differences 
between the minimum and maximum values of both ratios, the sample firms had widely 
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varying profits (and losses). The overall ROE values were higher than the corresponding 
ROA values, possibly due to financial leverage. The large decreases in the median ROA 
(20092010) and ROE (20072010) ratios during the crisis period was not surprising, 
especially since South Africa experienced a recession in the first semester of 2009 (BER, 
2009). 
Figure 6.13 indicates the mean ROA values and Figure 6.14 the mean ROE values for the 
sub-sets of listed and delisted firms. 
 
Figure 6.13: Mean ROA values of the listed and delisted firms 
 
Figure 6.14: Mean ROE values of the listed and delisted firms 
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From Figures 6.13 and 6.14, it is clear that for the largest part of the study period, the mean 
ROA and ROE values for listed firms were higher than those of the delisted firms. The 
delisted firms’ ROE ratios fluctuated considerably during the study period. In 2009, the three 
delisted firms that were discussed in Section 6.2.2 had higher mean ROA and ROE ratios than 
their listed counterparts. 
6.3.2 Market-based performance variable 
In Table 6.13, the TSR descriptive statistics are provided for the complete sample. 
Table 6.13: TSR values for the complete sample (%) 
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2002 188 34.623 16.892 -89.352 933.334 95.971 
2003 190 41.416 32.059 -97.931 500.000 74.962 
2004 165 76.162 54.610 -70.000 1 659.755 147.652 
2005 159 47.487 32.104 -62.963 840.000 98.413 
2006 144 41.424 35.134 -71.333 270.588 46.300 
2007 139 36.021 14.343 -73.684 820.000 107.271 
2008
 144 -30.500 -29.808 -98.939 73.554 29.557 
2009 149 23.228 21.351 -80.769 116.497 37.021 
2010 139 25.410 21.693 -78.667 248.579 41.632 
Overall period 1 417
a) 
33.923 22.800 -98.939 1 659.755 89.409 
a) TSR data were only available for 227 companies on the McGregor BFA (2013) database 
As reflected in Table 6.13, the mean and median TSR values of the sample firms increased 
between 2002 and 2004, possibly as a result of South Africa’s high economic growth during 
this period. Economic growth could translate into higher financial performance and thus 
rising share prices (Fisher, 2012). The observed increases in the mean TSRs between 
20022004 is regarded as a positive trend, since investors typically seek steadily increasing 
positive share returns. 
The TSR dataset contained a number of extreme values. The maximum TSR in 2004 was for 
example ascribed to an “assets selling” strategy that the specific firm followed to return cash 
to shareholders (New Africa Investments Limited, 2004). The effect of these extreme values 
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on this study’s results should be considered. In Section 7.3, the usage of winsorising to 
address extreme financial values is explained. 
The mean and median TSR values gradually decreased in the lead-up to the 2007–2009 global 
financial crisis, as seen in Table 6.13. In 2008, the midpoint of this crisis, both the mean and 
median TSR values were negative. Between 2009 and 2010, the mean and median values 
rapidly increased again. The mean and median values differed considerably over the study 
period. The standard deviations confirmed that the sample firms had varying TSR values. The 
mean TSR values for the sub-sets of listed and delisted firms are indicated in Figure 6.15. 
 
Figure 6.15: Mean TSR values of the listed and delisted firms 
Figure 6.15 illustrates that the TSRs of the listed and delisted firms decreased considerably 
over the study period. It should be borne in mind that a firm’s share returns could be 
influenced by many factors, such as the market’s perception of a firm’s corporate governance 
compliance (or the lack thereof) and the implications of the 20072009 global financial crisis. 
The share returns of South African companies were severely influenced during this crisis 
period, resulting in negative TSR values for listed and delisted firms in 2008, as reflected in 
Figure 6.15. In addition to share prices, TSRs are also influenced by the size and stability of 
dividend payments over time (Erasmus, 2013). Companies that make losses generally do not 
pay dividends. The same applies to young and small firms. In South Africa, the number of 
firms that paid dividends decreased from 19772011 (Viviers, Firer & Muller, 2013). 
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As discussed in Section 6.2, the sample firms’ CGSs gradually improved over the study 
period. However, the 20072009 global financial crisis seemed to have impacted negatively 
on the performance variables, especially TSR. The influence of this crisis on the South 
African economy is considered in more detail in Section 6.4. 
6.4 The impact of the 20072009 global financial crisis on the 
South African economy 
Listed shares are amongst the most closely observed financial indicators in the global 
economy. The share market is a leading indicator of the business cycle (Tainer, 2006: 5). Past 
share market movements can be used to predict a country’s business cycle as part of a 
composite economic indicator (Bluedorn, Decressin & Terrones, 2014). In Section 6.4.1, 
trends in the gross domestic product (GDP) are examined, followed by a discussion on the 
FTSE/JSE All Share Index. This was done to determine when the negative effects of the 
economic disruption in the USA initially showed on the South African share market. 
6.4.1 GDP in South Africa 
The South African GDP average quarter-on-quarter growth rate over the period 2002–2010 is 
shown in Figure 6.16. 
 
Figure 6.16: GDP growth in South Africa over the period 20022010  
Source: Researcher’s own construction based on data provided by the BER (2013) 
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Figure 6.16 shows that the study period included a cycle of economic growth (2002–2006), 
followed by the global financial crisis (2007–2009) and the beginning of a recovery period 
(2010). In the first semester of 2009, the South African economy had a negative GDP growth 
rate.  
The 20072009 global financial crisis period was expected to have an effect on the sample 
firms’ profitability and share performance. Even the best firms in terms of corporate 
governance compliance experienced share returns decreases and declines in their accounting-
based performance measures. Such declines were not necessarily due to bad management or 
because their corporate governance compliance had declined, but were rather due to the 
impact of the 20072009 global financial crisis. 
6.4.2 Changes in the FTSE/JSE All Share Index 
In 2013, the FTSE/JSE All Share Index (also known as the ‘ALSI’ or ‘J203’) included 160 
JSE-listed firms that represented about 99 per cent of the JSE’s total market capitalisation 
(JSE, 2013). This share market index is weighted by the market capitalisation of each 
included share. The FTSE/JSE All Share Index values for the period 2002–2010 are provided 
in Figure 6.17 to consider the effect of the crisis on the JSE.  
 
Figure 6.17: The ALSI over the period 20022010 
Source: Researcher’s own construction based on data provided by the BER (2013) 
0
5 000
10 000
15 000
20 000
25 000
30 000
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
In
d
ex
 v
a
lu
e
 
ALSI
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 227 
Figure 6.17 shows that the FTSE/JSE All Share Index increased between 2003 and 2007. 
However, during 2008 and 2009, a decreasing trend was observed. Figure 6.18 illustrates the 
extent of the changes in the ALSI over the considered time period. 
 
Figure 6.18: Percentage change in the ALSI over the period 2002–2010 
Source: Researcher’s own construction based on data provided by the BER (2013) 
As seen in Figure 6.18, the considered time period was extremely volatile. The South African 
economy responds to both external shocks, such as a sudden increase in financial uncertainty, 
and internal shocks. On initial reaction, real share prices tend to decrease transitorily, 
followed by large “depressions” over the medium term (Ncube & Ndou, 2013: 170).  
The observed lag in the performance downturns (for EPS, ROA and ROE as indicated in 
Tables 6.106.12) relative to TSR (Table 6.13) can be explained by the link between GDP 
and accounting-based financial performance. The ROA, ROE and EPS ratios were generated 
by the firms’ operations. Changes in the economic environment can positively or negatively 
affect the operating conditions of companies and resultantly their financial performance.  
The researcher realised that there was an important link between the FTSE/JSE All Share 
Index and the sample firms’ TSRs. Therefore, the FTSE/JSE All Share Index and the TSR 
values were included in the CAPM and Fama–French three-factor regression analyses, as 
reported in Section 7.5. When interpreting the regression results in Chapter 7, the influence of 
the 20072009 global financial crisis on the sample firms’ financial performance was also 
borne in mind. 
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6.5 Summary and conclusions 
The mean and median CGSs of the complete sample, as well as those of the listed and delisted 
firms increased considerably over the study period. As noted in some of the annual reports, it 
takes time to design and implement acceptable corporate governance mechanisms and 
practices. In 2002, the disclosure dimension of the research instrument contributed the largest 
percentage to the mean CGS. Towards 2010, is seemed as if more firms had acceptable 
corporate governance compliance than in 2002. These positive results are encouraging for 
mainstream and responsible investors who want to include corporate governance when 
making investment decisions.  
Although an increasing number of firms voluntarily complied with the corporate governance 
guidelines, the overall mean CGS was below 68 per cent. As expected, firms tended to 
comply with the more “easy” guidelines, such as board composition and explained their non-
compliance with “tougher” aspects such as sustainability. There is still considerable scope for 
improvement, especially regarding compliance with Category 8 (corporate culture and 
behaviour) and Category 9 (sustainability reporting). JSE-listed firms could consider 
appointing an internal compliance officer and/or a corporate governance consultant to assist 
them in this regard. Some directors also require additional training to properly apply the King 
guidelines. Corporate governance compliance should not be considered a “tick-box” exercise 
of these guidelines, but rather as a means to improve corporate governance in practice. 
Six industries were examined in this study. The Telecommunications and Health Care firms 
had the best overall corporate governance compliance. Firms operating in these industries 
could provide promising investment opportunities for responsible investors. On average, the 
corporate governance compliance of the sample firms seemed to have increased, despite the 
global financial crisis of 2007–2009.  
For the largest part of the study period, delisted firms had lower accounting-based ratios than 
their listed counterparts. In terms of the market-based TSR measure, it was evident that the 
firms’ share prices performed better before 2007, compared to after 2009. The extensive 
decrease in the TSRs could possibly be, in part, ascribed to the 20072009 global financial 
crisis. The results of the inferential statistics are presented in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS:  
INFERENTIAL STATISTICS 
7.1 Introduction 
“Facts are stubborn, but statistics are more pliable.” 
This quote by Mark Twain (18351910) (in Feinberg, Kinnear & Taylor, 2013) shows that it 
can be difficult to interpret raw data (facts). Therefore, researchers typically use statistics to 
transform data into a more interpretable format. Various statistical analyses were conducted to 
achieve the research objectives of this study. 
As discussed in Section 3.4, there is inconclusive evidence in literature regarding the nature of 
the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance. Corporate 
governance was first entered in the preferred regression model as the independent variable 
and then as the dependent variable. Consideration was also given to whether the 
relationship(s) between the considered variables were not observed immediately, but perhaps 
only after some time. One-year lag periods were accordingly built into the regression models. 
In addition to the realised TSRs that were used for the panel regression analysis, risk-adjusted 
abnormal returns (Jensen’s alphas) were estimated for four corporate governance portfolios. 
These portfolios were compiled based on the sample firms’ CGSs. Both the CAPM and the 
Fama–French three-factor models were applied to estimate the alphas. 
In the remainder of this chapter, the results of the mixed-model ANOVA analyses are firstly 
presented, followed by the results of the panel regression analyses. In the third section, the 
results of the Chow test (used to establish a structural break in the financial dataset) are 
reported. The estimated risk-adjusted abnormal returns are discussed in Section 7.5. A 
comparison of the regression results for corporate governance and the market-based 
performance measures are provided in Section 7.6.  
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7.2 Mixed-model ANOVA 
Two specific research questions related to the CGSs of the sample firms were only in part 
answered by the descriptive analysis, namely: 
 What was the corporate governance compliance trend in the sample of JSE-listed 
companies over the research period? 
 Are there differences between the corporate governance compliance of JSE-listed 
companies and that of delisted companies?  
Based on the descriptive statistics reported in Section 6.2.1, it seemed as if the mean CGSs of 
the complete sample increased steadily over the study period. The mean CGSs of the listed 
and delisted firms also appeared to differ (refer to Section 6.2.2). A mixed-model ANOVA 
was therefore used to determine the significance of the observed trend in the CGSs over time, 
and the perceived differences between the CGSs of the listed and delisted companies.  
The mixed-model ANOVA includes both fixed effects (between subjects) and random effects 
(within subjects) factors (Reinard, 2006). For the purpose of the current study, the considered 
fixed effects factors were ‘year’, ‘listed/delisted’ and ‘year listed/delisted interaction’ 
(denoted as ‘year*listed/delisted’). The random effects factor was ‘company’. 
A restricted maximum likelihood solution with type III decomposition was performed to 
estimate the variance components of the random effects in the model (O’Connell & McCoach, 
2008: 247). The type III decomposition (also referred to as the ‘type III sum of squares’) of an 
effect is determined by adjusting for any other terms that do not contain it (Sahai & Ageel, 
2000). 
One of the assumptions of the mixed-model ANOVA is that the dependent variable is 
approximately normally distributed. The financial dataset contained a number of outlier 
values and was hence winsorised. This technique improved the deviation from the normality 
assumption. 
The results of the mixed-model ANOVA conducted on the mean CGSs are provided in Table 
7.1. This model was used to consider differences over the entire study period. To determine 
whether the mean CGSs differed significantly from one year to the next, Fisher’s LSD test 
was used. The results of this test are shown in Table 7.2. 
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Table 7.1: Results of the mixed-model ANOVA conducted on the mean CGS data 
Effect 
Numerator 
degrees of 
freedom 
Denominator 
degrees of 
freedom 
F-value p-value 
Year 7 1 037 112.629** 0.000
 
Listed/delisted 1 225 11.484** 0.001
 
Year*listed/delisted 7
 
1 037 1.110 0.354 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
Conducted for the period 2002–2009 (since there were no delisted companies in the sample for 2010) 
Table 7.2: Fisher’s LSD test for the mean CGSs over time 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
2002  0.000
** 
0.000
** 
0.000
** 
0.000
** 
0.000
**
 0.000
** 
0.000
** 
0.000
** 
2003   0.000
** 
0.000
**
 0.000
** 
0.000
** 
0.000
** 
0.000
** 
0.000
** 
2004    0.000
** 
0.000
** 
0.000
** 
0.000
** 
0.000
** 
0.000
** 
2005     0.171 0.001
** 
0.000
** 
0.000
** 
0.000
** 
2006      0.065
** 
0.000
** 
0.000
** 
0.000
** 
2007       0.002
** 
0.000
** 
0.000
** 
2008        0.000
** 
0.000
** 
2009         0.000
** 
2010          
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
As seen in the first row of Table 7.1, the mean CGSs of the firms differed significantly over 
the entire study period. Furthermore, review of Table 7.2 shows that all the annual increases 
in the mean CGSs were statistically significant, except for the annual increase from 2005 to 
2006. In the second row of Table 7.1, a significant difference was also observed between the 
CGSs of the listed and delisted firms. 
These results were not surprising. As time progressed, South African firms probably became 
more familiar with the recommendations of the King II Report. In addition, the JSE Listing 
Requirements (JSE, 2005) obligate listed companies to disclose their compliance with the 
King II Report’s guidelines or to explain non-compliance. Firms that remained listed were 
thus expected to improve their corporate governance compliance over time. 
Given the steady increases in the mean CGSs over time, it seems as if the firms’ corporate 
governance compliance were not negatively influenced by the global financial crisis of 2007–
2009. However, this crisis had an effect on the financial performance of the sample firms, as 
reflected by the lower mean financial performance variables during this period (see Section 
6.3). In the following section, the relationship between CGS and the financial performance 
variables (EPS, ROA, ROE and TSR) are examined by means of panel regression analysis. 
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7.3 Analysis of panel data  
Annual CGS observations were available for 230 firms. The required financial data were, 
however, only available for 227 of these firms (1 417 annual observations). In addition, the 
descriptive statistics revealed that the financial data included extreme values. Winsorising (as 
described by Vinzi et al., 2010) was hence used to adjust these values. Any value in excess of 
three standard deviations from the mean was classified as an outlier value and was replaced 
by a value equal to the mean ± three standard deviations. All the inferential statistics were 
conducted on the winsorised dataset, henceforth referred to as the complete sample. 
Fixed effects and random effects regression models are commonly used to analyse panel data 
(Hassett & Paavilainen-Mäntymäki, 2013: 45). The choice between the two models depends 
on the nature of a study’s dataset. Both the F-test for fixed effects and the Hausman test for 
random effects were thus applied in the current study to determine the appropriate regression 
model for each analysis. In addition, the BreuschPagan test was employed to test for 
possible heteroskedastic specification error. 
Both simple and multiple regression analyses were conducted. The independent and 
dependent variables had to be clearly defined. As indicated earlier, previous corporate 
governance researchers found inconclusive evidence on the nature (positive or negative) of 
the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance. To investigate this 
relationship, separate regression analyses were conducted on CGS as the independent and 
dependent variable respectively. 
7.3.1 Regression analysis results for the complete sample 
Firstly, CGS was entered as the independent variable in the preferred regression model. 
Thereafter, financial performance was considered as the independent variable. 
7.3.1.1 Corporate governance as the independent variable 
Four separate regression analyses were conducted on the complete sample with CGS as the 
independent variable and EPS, ROA, ROE and TSR respectively as the dependent variable. 
The results of these regression analyses are provided in Tables 7.3–7.6. 
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Table 7.3: Regression analysis results for EPS and CGS 
Model summary 
Preferred model Test for fixed effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Fixed effects 13.15
** 
13.52
** 
60.96
** 
(1, 1 102) 
    
Regression coefficient Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
3.802
**
 0.487 7.808
** 0.000 
    
BreuschPagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) t-value adjusted for heteroskedasticity  
2007.67
**
 5.117
**
 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
R-squared = 0.05 
The quality of fit of the preferred fixed effects regression model was significant. 
Table 7.4: Regression analysis results for ROA and CGS 
Model summary 
Preferred model Test for fixed effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Fixed effects 10.71
** 
7.49
** 
5.20
*
 (1, 1 102) 
    
Regression coefficient Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
0.033
*
 0.015 2.279
* 0.023 
    
BreuschPagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) t-value adjusted for heteroskedasticity  
589.69
**
 1.773 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
R-squared = 0.00 
The quality of fit of the preferred fixed effects regression model was significant. 
Table 7.5: Regression analysis results for ROE and CGS 
Model summary 
Preferred model Test for fixed effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Fixed effects 3.60
** 
6.57
** 1.83 (1, 1 102) 
    
Regression coefficient Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
0.169 0.125 1.352 0.177 
    
BreuschPagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) t-value adjusted for heteroskedasticity  
2 349.01
**
 1.093 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
R-squared = 0.00 
The quality of fit of the preferred fixed effects regression model was not significant. 
A highly statistically significant positive regression coefficient was observed in Table 7.3. 
Based on this finding, it can be inferred that firms that had high CGSs also reported high EPS 
ratios. Investors are, in general, interested in EPS as a measure of accounting-based 
performance (Shim & Lansner, 2001: 227). 
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The positive association between CGS and EPS was not entirely unexpected, as both variables 
can be influenced by management. The EPS ratio can, for example, be “inflated” by using 
share buybacks, without improving the firm’s actual financial performance (Shim & Lansner, 
2001: 227). The CGSs of firms could also be artificially improved by employing window-
dressing practices. The positive relationship between these two variables should hence be 
cautiously interpreted. 
A fixed-effects regression analysis was also conducted on CGS and the inflation-adjusted 
EPS. A significant positive relationship was observed between CGS and the real EPS. 
Nominal EPS values were used for the panel regression analyses reported in the following 
sections. 
The relationship between CGS and the market-based TSR variable was also examined. The 
results of this regression analysis are reported in Table 7.6. 
Table 7.6: Regression analysis results for TSR and CGS 
Model summary 
Preferred model Test for fixed effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Fixed effects 1.35
** 
20.53
** 
12.46
**
 (1, 1 102) 
    
Regression coefficient Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
-0.006
** 0.002 -3.530**
 
0.000 
    
BreuschPagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) 157.43 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
R-squared = 0.01 
The quality of fit of the preferred fixed effects regression model was significant. 
No adjustment was made for heteroskedasticity, since the BreuschPagan test statistic was not significant. 
A highly significant negative regression coefficient can be seen in Table 7.6. A well-
functioning capital market requires a robust corporate governance framework that rewards 
shareholders for their (competent) monitoring of managers’ actions (OECD, 2012b). This 
negative relationship was hence unexpected. 
The TSRs of firms could be directly influenced by increases and decreases in share prices, 
dividend pay-outs or both. Officer (2006) reported that companies with weak corporate 
governance compliance are more likely to pay out cash dividends. Such firms often 
experience positive share price reactions to dividend announcements, leading to an increase in 
their TSRs. Firms with low CGSs that pay out cash dividends can hence report high TSRs. 
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This argument might explain the negative relationship observed between CGS and TSR in 
this study. The sample firms with low CGSs could possibly have used their dividend policy to 
compensate investors for agency problems.  
On the other hand, badly governed firms could reinvest all attributable profits in positive NPV 
projects. This could be done in an attempt to limit the need for additional external capital and 
scrutiny by (new) investors. If attributable profit was reinvested in positive NPV project(s), a 
firm’s share price could increase, since future dividends might be high(er) (Officer, 2006). 
Accordingly, the TSRs of badly governed firms (with low CGSs) could be high. 
Four other explanations for the reported negative association between CGS and TSR were 
considered, namely high corporate governance compliance costs, window-dressing practices, 
herding theory and the study period. Firstly, it was evident from the content analysis that the 
implementation of compliance mechanisms was costly, both in terms of time and money 
allocated. For example, director development and HIV and AIDS programmes could take 
years to yield returns. Such programmes are also typically costly to implement. 
Discussions with market leaders and board members confirmed that corporate governance 
compliance is often viewed as being too costly and time-consuming (Krige, 2014; Schenk, 
2014). Some investors also regard (expensive) corporate governance initiatives as 
unnecessary. As a result, the share market could penalise firms with high CGSs. According to 
this argument, the share market probably did not appreciate the corporate governance 
initiatives undertaken by the sample firms over the research period, resulting in the negative 
association between CGS and TSR. 
Secondly, some firms could engage in corporate governance window-dressing practices, 
while simultaneously hiding corporate governance risks and failures. Firms that employed 
such practices could have obtained higher CGSs than those which they actually “deserved”. 
Mistrust in the accuracy of the reported corporate governance practices and/or the information 
content thereof (in relation to the large amounts of money and time spend) could possibly 
have led to low share prices and hence low TSRs of (some) firms with high CGSs. 
In addition, some shareholder activists, such as Theo Botha, publicly criticise the poor (or 
inappropriate) corporate governance practices of certain South African firms (Planting, 2012; 
Steyn, 2011). Bhana (2010) considered the effect of Botha’s public criticism on the share 
prices of a sample of JSE-listed firms for the period January 2003June 2006. He found that 
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the firms’ share prices reacted negatively to Botha’s criticism. The negative effect was 
immediate and could last for up to a year. Shareholders could also have observed the high 
compliance costs of (some) firms and poor corporate governance compliance and window-
dressing practices of others. These observations could have made their perceptions regarding 
the corporate governance compliance of South African companies even more negative. 
Thirdly, while managers could have a considerable influence on EPS, TSR is mainly 
determined by the market. Herding theory (see Section 2.4.1), suggests that, if some market 
participants reacted negatively to high compliance costs of (some of) the sample firms, the 
corporate governance-related perceptions of other shareholders could be negatively 
influenced. Such negative perceptions could result in decreases in share prices and hence 
lower TSRs. Especially during the 20072009 period, investors acted very irrationally and 
many market participants have engaged in herding behaviour (Mitchell & Wilmarth, 2010). 
Fourthly, with regard to the considered study period, an increasing trend was observed in the 
mean CGSs. The mean TSRs were, however, negatively affected by the 20072009 global 
financial crisis. These contrasting trends make it difficult to determine whether the negative 
relationship between CGS and TSR was observed due to the market’s lack of appreciation of 
corporate governance compliance initiatives (or even penalisation for such initiatives) or due 
to the changes in these two variables over the examined time period. 
Table 7.7 provides a summary of the regression results reported in this section. 
Table 7.7: Summary of the reported regression results (CGS as the independent 
variable) 
Dependent variable 
Reported regression coefficient 
(adjusted for heteroskedasticity where applicable) 
Accounting-based measure EPS Positive (significant at the 1%  level) 
Accounting-based measure ROA Positive (not significant) 
Accounting-based measure ROE Positive (not significant) 
Market-based measure TSR Negative (significant at the 1% level) 
Disparate results were reported in Table 7.7. A significant positive relationship was perceived 
between CGS and the accounting-based EPS ratio. In contrast, a negative association was 
observed between CGS and the market-based TSR measure. Although the positive association 
between CGS and EPS is encouraging, an increase in the EPS ratio does not necessarily result 
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in additional shareholder value creation. For example, if a firm uses additional debt financing 
to repurchase shares, its EPS could improve. Such an increase does not per se compensate 
shareholders for the additional risk associated with increased leverage (Cahill, 2010; Kapil, 
2011: 258). 
7.3.1.2 Corporate governance as the dependent variable 
To determine whether the CGSs of the sample firms were perhaps related to their annual 
financial performance, regression analyses were conducted with CGS as the dependent 
variable. The results of the multiple regression analysis conducted on CGS and EPS, ROA 
and ROE are reported in Table 7.8. 
Table 7.8: Regression analysis results for CGS and the accounting-based variables 
EPS, ROA and ROE 
Model summary 
Preferred model 
Test for fixed effects 
(F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Fixed effects 18.22
** 
174.88
** 
20.42
** 
(3, 1 100)
 
     
Regression coefficients Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
EPS 0.014
** 0.002 7.446**
 
0.000 
ROA -0.042 0.069 -0.609 0.543 
ROE 0.002 0.008 0.317 0.752 
     
BreuschPagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) t-value adjusted for heteroskedasticity  
EPS 
441.96
**
 
4.662
** 
ROA -0.488 
ROE 0.265 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
R-squared = 0.05 
The quality of fit of the preferred fixed effects regression model was significant. 
A significant positive EPS regression coefficient can be seen in Table 7.8. The observed 
positive association between CGS and EPS shows that firms with high accounting-based 
earnings had high CGSs. Such firms probably had more profits available to invest in 
corporate governance compliance mechanisms. (Simple regression analyses were also 
conducted for each of the individual accounting-based variables. The results were similar to 
those shown in Table 7.8). 
In addition to the three accounting-based measures, the market-based TSR variable was added 
to the regression model, as indicated in Table 7.9. 
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Table 7.9: Regression analysis results for CGS and EPS, ROA, ROE and TSR 
Model summary 
Preferred model 
Test for fixed effects 
(F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Fixed effects 18.46
** 
2 065.78
** 
18.62
** 
(4, 1 099)
 
     
Regression coefficient Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
EPS 0.014
** 0.002 7.323**
 
0.000
 
ROA -0.024 0.069 -0.343 0.731 
ROE 0.004 0.008 0.488 0.625 
TSR -1.933
** 0.545 -3.547**
 
0.000 
     
BreuschPagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) t-value adjusted for heteroskedasticity  
EPS 
445.04
**
 
4.770
** 
ROA -0.279 
ROE 0.406 
TSR -3.741
** 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
R-squared = 0.06 
The quality of fit of the preferred fixed effects regression model was significant. 
Table 7.9 displays similar significance levels and signs of the accounting-based measures’ 
regression coefficients than those reported in Table 7.8. In addition, the negative TSR 
regression coefficient was highly significant. It thus seems as if an inverse relationship indeed 
existed between CGS and TSR, where the dependent variable was high when the independent 
variable was low and vice versa. The same reasons provided in Section 7.3.1.1 for the 
observed relationships hold here as well. 
The regression analyses that were reported in Section 7.3.1 were conducted on the complete 
sample. The dataset was subsequently divided into two data sub-sets according to the listing 
status of the sample firms. Regression analyses were also conducted on these two data sub-
sets. This was done to determine whether the associations observed between CGS and the 
financial performance measures differed between listed and delisted firms. 
7.3.2 Regression analysis results for the data sub-set of listed firms 
In accordance with the regression analysis conducted on the complete sample, separate 
analyses were conducted on CGS as the independent and dependent variable respectively. 
7.3.2.1 Corporate governance as the independent variable 
Tables 7.10–7.12 contain the results of the regression analyses for listed firms with EPS, 
ROA and ROE respectively as the dependent variable. 
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Table 7.10: Regression analysis results for the sub-set of listed firms (EPS as the 
dependent variable) 
Model summary 
Preferred model Test for fixed effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Fixed effects 14.64
** 
9.69
** 
55.34
** 
(1, 973) 
    
Regression coefficient Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
3.838
** 0.516 7.439**
 
0.000 
    
BreuschPagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) t-value adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
1 356.08
**
 4.742
**
 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
R-squared = 0.05 
The quality of fit of the preferred fixed effects regression model was significant. 
Table 7.11: Regression analysis results for the sub-set of listed firms (ROA as the 
dependent variable) 
Model summary 
Preferred model Test for fixed effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Fixed effects 12.06
** 
5.86
* 2.24
 
(1, 973) 
    
Regression coefficient Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
0.022 0.015 1.497 0.135 
    
BreuschPagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) t-value adjusted for heteroskedasticity  
479.47
**
 1.175 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
R-squared = 0.00 
The quality of fit of the preferred fixed effects regression model was not significant. 
Table 7.12: Regression analysis results for the sub-set of listed firms (ROE as the 
dependent variable) 
Model summary 
Preferred model Test for fixed effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Fixed effects 4.08
** 
8.05
** 0.07
 
(1, 973) 
    
Regression coefficient Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
-0.033 0.12 -0.272 0.786 
    
BreuschPagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) t-value adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
2 375.52
**
 -0.234 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
R-squared = 0.00 
The quality of fit of the preferred fixed effects regression model was not significant. 
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Perusal of Tables 7.107.12 shows that only one regression model was significant and 
warrant discussion. In line with the regression analysis conducted on the complete sample 
(Table 7.3), a highly significant positive regression coefficient was also reported in Table 
7.10. A positive association was thus once again observed between CGS and EPS. Table 7.13 
provides the results of the regression analysis conducted on the market-based TSR variable 
and CGS. 
Table 7.13: Regression analysis results for the sub-set of listed firms (TSR as the 
dependent variable) 
Model summary 
Preferred model Test for fixed effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Fixed effects 1.35
** 
23.04
** 
13.67
** 
(1, 973) 
    
Regression coefficient Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
-0.006
** 0.002 -3.698** 0.000 
    
BreuschPagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) 128.79 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
R-squared = 0.01 
The quality of fit of the preferred fixed effects regression model was significant. 
No adjustment was made for heteroskedasticity, since the BreuschPagan test statistic was not significant. 
A significant negative regression coefficient is reported in Table 7.13. This result is also in 
line with the negative relationship reported between CGS and TSR for the complete sample.  
7.3.2.2 Corporate governance as the dependent variable 
The results of the regression analysis conducted with CGS as the dependent variable are 
reported in Table 7.14. 
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Table 7.14: Regression analysis results for the sub-set of listed firms (CGS as the 
dependent variable) 
Model summary 
Preferred model Test for fixed effects 
(F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Fixed effects 18.49
** 
35.70
** 
17.88
** 
(4, 970)
 
     
Regression coefficient Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
EPS 0.015
** 0.002 7.284**
 
0.000 
ROA -0.053 0.075 -0.696 0.487 
ROE -0.010 0.009 -1.106 0.269 
TSR -2.032
** 0.589 -3.448**
 
0.001 
     
BreuschPagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) t-value adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
EPS 
398.73
**
 
4.654
** 
ROA -0.578 
ROE -1.002 
TSR -3.652
** 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
R-squared = 0.07 
The quality of fit of the preferred fixed effects regression model was significant. 
As seen in Table 7.14, TSR had a significant negative regression coefficient and EPS a 
significant positive one. These results were comparable to the significant regression results 
reported for the complete sample. Furthermore, irrespective of whether CGS was the 
dependent or independent variable in the preferred regression model, the sign of the 
relationships observed between CGS and EPS (positive) and CGS and TSR (negative) stayed 
the same.  
In Section 7.3.3, the researcher considers the sub-set of delisted firms to establish whether the 
regression results differed from those reported in Sections 7.3.1 (for the complete sample) and 
7.3.2 (for the sub-set of listed firms).  
7.3.3 Regression analysis results for the sub-set of delisted firms 
The majority of the sample firms (69.13%) remained listed on the JSE during the study 
period. Almost a third of the sample (30.87%), though, delisted. These delisted firms could 
have influenced the regression results. Regression analyses were hence conducted for the sub-
set of the sample containing only those firms that delisted from the JSE during the study 
period. Corporate governance was first used as the independent variable in the preferred 
regression model, as reported in Section 7.3.3.1. Thereafter, it was used as the dependent 
variable, as reflected in Section 7.3.3.2. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 242 
7.3.3.1 Corporate governance as the independent variable 
In contrast to the previous two sections, where the results of fixed effects regression models 
were reported, random effects regression models were considered as the appropriate models 
for most of the analyses reported in this section. As discussed in Section 5.10.2.5, the fixed 
effects regression model controls for omitted variables in panel data that are constant over 
time and vary across the cross-sectional units (Gossy, 2008: 126; Yang & Miller, 2008: 584). 
In contrast, the random effects regression model allows for the inclusion of time-invariant 
variables as well as variation between and within the considered units (Dwyer et al., 2012: 
130–131; Torres-Ryna, 2013), as explained in Section 5.10.2.6.  
The results of the regression analyses conducted on CGS and EPS, ROA, ROE and TSR 
respectively for the sub-set of delisted firms are provided in Tables 7.15–7.18. 
Table 7.15: Regression analysis results for the sub-set of delisted firms (EPS as the 
dependent variable) 
Model summary 
Preferred model 
Test for fixed effects 
(F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Random effects 6.35
** 2.40
 
20.76
** 
(1, 158)
 
     
Regression coefficients Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
Intercept -137.344
** 51.739 -2.655**
 
0.009 
CGS 4.999
** 1.102 4.538**
 
0.000 
     
BreuschPagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) t-value adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
Intercept 
862.38
**
 
-3.351
** 
CGS 3.905
** 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
R-squared = 0.12 
The quality of fit of the preferred random effects regression model was significant. 
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Table 7.16: Regression analysis results for the sub-set of delisted firms (ROA as the 
dependent variable) 
Model summary 
Preferred model 
Test for fixed effects 
(F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Random effects 5.36
** 0.11
 
13.78
** 
(1, 158)
 
     
Regression coefficients Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 5.366
** 1.777 3.019**
 
0.003 
CGS 0.122
** 0.038 3.206**
 
0.002 
     
BreuschPagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) t-value adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
Intercept 
98.80
**
 
2.775
** 
CGS 2.620
** 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
R-squared = 0.08 
The quality of fit of the preferred random effects regression model was significant. 
Table 7.17: Regression analysis results for the sub-set of delisted firms (ROE as the 
dependent variable) 
Model summary 
Preferred model 
Test for fixed effects 
(F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model 
F (df) 
Random effects 2.13
** 3.30
  
14.44
** 
(1, 158)
 
     
Regression coefficients Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
Intercept -40.998
** 14.148 -2.898**
 
0.004 
CGS 1.177
** 0.309 3.809**
 
0.000 
     
BreuschPagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) t-value adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
Intercept 
158.01
**
 
-2.702
** 
CGS 3.895
** 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
R-squared = 0.08 
The quality of fit of the preferred random effects regression model was significant. 
Table 7.15 indicates that the positive CGS regression coefficient was statistically significant. 
The positive regression coefficient shows that delisted firms with high CGSs had high EPS 
ratios. This result is in line with the results indicated for both the complete sample and the 
sub-set of listed companies. 
A significant positive CGS regression coefficient was reported in both Tables 7.16 and 7.17. 
In contrast to these significant regression coefficients reported for the delisted firms, both 
ROA and ROE for the sub-set of listed firms did not have significant regression coefficients. 
It thus seems as if the observed relationships between CGS and the ROA and ROE ratios 
respectively were of more significance for delisted firms than for their listed counterparts. 
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Less profitable delisted firms possibly had less profit to plow back into projects, including 
corporate governance initiatives, than their more profitable counterparts. 
Table 7.18: Regression analysis results for the sub-set of delisted firms (TSR as the 
dependent variable) 
Model summary 
Preferred model Test for fixed effects (F) Fit of the model F (df) 
Pooled OLS 1.31
 
0.91
 
(1, 158)
 
     
Regression coefficients Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 0.164 0.101 1.627 0.106 
CGS 0.002 0.002 0.953 0.342 
     
BreuschPagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) 32.22 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
R-squared = 0.01 
The quality of fit of the preferred pooled OLS regression model was not significant. 
No adjustment was required for heteroskedasticity, since the BreuschPagan test statistic was not significant. 
If the F-test statistic for fixed effects is not significant, as indicated in Table 7.18, the data are 
poolable (Park, 2011). A pooled OLS regression model was hence used. The regression 
coefficients of such a model are constant across time periods and units (Menard, 2008: 234). 
However, the quality of fit of this model was not significant. 
Many researchers exclude delisted firms from their samples, as some databases do not provide 
this data. However, the researcher is of the opinion that future corporate governance 
researchers should also include delisted firms in their samples, especially in the aftermath of 
the 20072009 global financial crisis and more recent turmoil in Europe. Since such firms 
provided contrasting results compared to the listed firms, the exclusion of delisted firms could 
expose the results of a similar study to survivorship bias. 
7.3.3.2 Corporate governance as the dependent variable 
The results of the regression analysis conducted with CGS as the dependent variable and 
financial performance as the independent variable are provided in Table 7.19. 
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Table 7.19: Regression analysis results for the sub-set of delisted firms (CGS as the 
dependent variable) 
Model summary 
Preferred model Test for fixed effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model F 
(df) 
Fixed effects 17.51
** 
12.84
* 
4.52
** 
(4, 125)
 
     
Regression coefficients Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
EPS 0.009
 
0.005 1.866
 
0.064 
ROA 0.112 0.154 0.732 0.465 
ROE 0.038
** 0.014 2.769**
 
0.006 
TSR -1.096 1.362 -0.805 0.423 
     
BreuschPagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) t-value adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
EPS 
54.55
**
 
2.455
* 
ROA 0.570 
ROE 2.110
* 
TSR -0.791 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
R-squared = 0.13 
The quality of fit of the preferred fixed effects regression model was significant. 
As indicated in Table 7.19, the positive regression coefficients of both EPS and ROE were 
significant. It hence seems as if delisted firms with high accounting-based performance 
(specifically measured by EPS and ROE) had high CGSs. It also implies that delisted firms 
with low profit levels might possibly spend less money on corporate governance initiatives, 
resulting in low CGSs. 
The CGS and financial performance variable(s) of only the current year were included in the 
regression analyses reported in Sections 7.3.1–7.3.3. To consider whether the relationship 
between corporate governance and financial performance takes time to be reflected, CGS was 
lagged for a period of one year. 
7.3.4 Regression analysis results for the lagged CGS  
The inclusion of one-year lagged variables (denoted as ‘lag1’) resulted in similar regression 
results as those reported in Section 7.3.1 for the complete sample. 
7.3.4.1 Lagged CGS as the independent variable 
The results of the regression analysis conducted on the lagged CGS as the independent 
variable and EPS, ROA, ROE and TSR respectively are reported in Tables 7.20–7.23. 
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Table 7.20: Regression analysis results for the lagged CGS (EPS as the dependent 
variable) 
Model summary 
Preferred model Test for fixed effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model F (df) 
Fixed effects 14.46
** 
13.03
** 
43.89
** 
(1, 897) 
    
Regression coefficient Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
3.553
** 0.536 6.625**
 
0.000 
    
BreuschPagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) t-value adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
1 516.81
**
 4.879
**
 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
R-squared = 0.05 
The quality of fit of the preferred fixed effects regression model was significant. 
Table 7.21: Regression analysis results for the lagged CGS (ROA as the dependent 
variable) 
Model summary 
Preferred model Test for fixed effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model F (df) 
Fixed effects 12.52
** 
20.34
** 2.65
 
(1, 897) 
    
Regression coefficient Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
-0.025 0.015 -1.628 0.104 
    
BreuschPagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) t-value adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
535.92
**
 -1.152 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
R-squared = 0.00 
The quality of fit of the preferred fixed effects regression model was not significant. 
Table 7.22: Regression analysis results for the lagged CGS (ROE as the dependent 
variable) 
Model summary 
Preferred model Test for fixed effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model F (df) 
Fixed effects 4.16
** 
8.08
** 0.01
 
(1, 897) 
    
Regression coefficient Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
-0.013 0.125 -0.103 0.918 
    
BreuschPagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) t-value adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
1 797.19
**
 -0.082 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
R-squared = 0.00 
The quality of fit of the preferred fixed effects regression model was not significant. 
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A significant positive regression coefficient can be observed in Table 7.20. Some of the 
sample firms with high corporate governance compliance in yeart-1 thus had high EPS ratios 
in yeart. Given that JSE-listed firms are expected to comply (or explain their non-compliance) 
with the King guidelines, it is encouraging to see that corporate governance compliance had a 
significant positive association with EPS, both in the given year and one year later.  
Table 7.23: Regression analysis results for the lagged dataset (TSR as the dependent 
variable) 
Model summary 
Preferred model Test for fixed effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model F (df) 
Fixed effects 1.52
** 
63.48
** 
57.20
** 
(1, 897) 
    
Regression coefficient Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
-0.014
** 0.002 -7.563**
 
0.000 
    
BreuschPagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) 130.10 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
R-squared = 0.06 
The quality of fit of the preferred fixed effects regression model was significant. 
No adjustment was made for heteroskedasticity, since the BreuschPagan test statistic was not significant. 
When the CGS was lagged for one year, a significant negative regression coefficient was 
reported in Table 7.23. This observation is in line with the significant negative relationship 
that was observed between CGS and TSR for the complete sample. The negative relationship 
hence still held, even after one year. 
7.3.4.2 CGS as the dependent variable 
The relationship between CGS as the dependent variable and the lagged performance 
variables (respectively EPS_lag1, ROA_lag1, ROE_lag1 and TSR_lag1) was also considered. 
This was done to determine whether the firms’ financial performance in the previous year was 
related to their CGSs in the current year. 
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Table 7.24: Regression analysis results for the lagged financial performance variables 
(CGS as the dependent variable) 
Model summary 
Preferred model 
Test for fixed effects (F) 
Hausman test for 
random effects (F) 
Fit of the model F 
(df) 
Fixed effects 32.86
** 
87.34
** 
11.72
** 
(4, 894)
 
     
Regression coefficients Standard error t-value Pr > |t| 
EPS_lag1 0.008
** 0.002 4.807** 0.000 
ROA_lag1 0.100
 
0.058 1.713 0.087 
ROE_lag1 -0.007 0.007 -0.966 0.334 
TSR_lag1 -1.382
** 0.45 -3.070** 0.002 
     
BreuschPagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP) t-value adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
EPS_lag1 
541.74
**
 
3.340
** 
ROA_lag1 1.319 
ROE_lag1 -0.711 
TSR_lag1 -2.865
** 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
R-squared = 0.05 
The quality of fit of the preferred fixed effects regression model was significant. 
A significant positive regression coefficient can be observed in Table 7.24 for the lagged EPS. 
Based on this finding, high EPS in yeart-1 was positively related to the sample firms’ CGSs in 
yeart. A possible explanation for this result is that firms that reported high accounting-based 
performance in the previous year could plow back more profit into, inter alia, corporate 
governance compliance initiatives in the following year. It should, however, be noted that the 
firms’ EPS ratios could also have increased due to inflation, while the annual CGSs improved 
irrespective of what was happening in the South African economy during the study period. 
The observed negative relationship between CGS and TSR_lag1 could suggest that, if TSR 
was negative in yeart-1 (the shareholders’ value hence decreased), the firm’s board could have 
attempted to increase their corporate governance compliance in the following year. The board 
could do this without realising that it would not (necessarily) be positively perceived by the 
market. In line with the arguments presented earlier that the market could regard corporate 
governance compliance as too costly and time-consuming, such compliance attempts could be 
associated with low (rather than high) TSRs. 
In conclusion, a negative association was observed between TSR and CGS, irrespective of 
whether CGS was considered as the dependent or independent variable. The lagging of the 
variables also revealed similar results. Despite these negative observations, the researcher 
believes that if a firm’s directorate effectively oversees the appointed managers, possible 
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value decreasing activities could be timeously recognised and addressed. The South African 
market is perhaps not yet properly educated regarding the role and importance of the board as 
well as corporate governance compliance mechanisms in this regard. 
To shed light on the negative association between CGS and TSR and to reflect on the possible 
effect of a crisis period on the relationship between corporate governance and financial 
performance, the association between these two variables during the 1997–1998 Asian crisis 
were investigated. 
7.3.5 Corporate governance ratings and share price performance during 
the 1997–1998 Asian crisis 
In 2001, Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (in Leong, 2005), Asia’s leading independent 
brokerage and investment group, reported on the corporate governance ratings and five-year 
share price performance of selected emerging Southeast Asian countries. The research period 
included the 1997–1998 Asian crisis. The results are provided in Table 7.25. 
Table 7.25: Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia corporate governance rating and share 
price performance of selected emerging Southeast Asian countries 
Country 
Overall corporate governance 
rating (%) 
Five-year share price 
performance (%)
 
(19962000) 
Indonesia 37 -61.4% 
Malaysia 57 -40.1% 
Philippines 44 -61.4% 
Singapore 65 62.7% 
Thailand 55 -41.9% 
Source: Leong (2005) 
As seen in Table 7.25, emerging countries such as Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, 
reported above-average corporate governance ratings (more than 50% compliance) over the 
period 19962000. In the current study, average corporate governance compliance of 67.568 
per cent was reported over the period 20022010. The corporate governance ratings in both 
studies hence reflected above-average compliance, despite the fact that both periods included 
a financial crisis. 
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In contrast to the above-average corporate governance compliance, most of the emerging 
countries reported negative share price performance over the period 19962000. The 2007–
2009 global financial crisis also had a negative effect on the mean TSRs of the sample firms 
in this study. During 2008, the midpoint of the recent crisis period, a negative mean TSR was 
reported. Both the 1997–1998 Asian crisis and the 20072009 global financial crisis thus had 
a negative influence on the share performance of firms operating in emerging markets, 
including South Africa (Madubeko, 2010; Stalls, 1999). 
7.4 The 2007–2009 global financial crisis period 
According to Boorman and Christensen (2010), the 2007–2009 global financial crisis started 
to have an effect on emerging African economies by the middle of 2007. The researcher 
determined the specific month during this crisis period that the negative effects of the 
economic disruption in the USA showed on the FTSE/JSE All Share Index values as 
discussed in Section 6.4.2. It was accordingly determined that the substantial decrease in the 
share prices of JSE-listed companies started during May 2008. 
A Chow test was used to determine whether a statistically significant structural break 
occurred in the financial dataset in 2008. The Durbin–Watson test statistic indicated that 
significant positive autocorrelation was present in the financial dataset. The SAS AUTOREG 
procedure was hence applied, since it can estimate time-series regression models when errors 
are autocorrelated (SAS Institute, 2014). The results of the Chow test are provided in Table 
7.26. 
Table 7.26: Results of the Chow test for a structural break in the financial dataset at 
 2008 
Dependent variable 
Durbin–Watson test 
for autocorrelation (d) 
F-value Pr > F 
EPS 1.159 0.81 0.495
 
ROA 1.612 3.87 0.097
 
ROE 0.739 19.86 0.004
** 
TSR 1.804 8.80 0.023
* 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
Numerator degrees of freedom: 2; Denominator degrees of freedom: 5 
Table 7.26 shows that a statistically significant structural break was noted in 2008 for the 
ROE and TSR variables respectively. While the average CGSs consistently increased over the 
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study period (as seen in Section 6.2.1), the ROE and TSR financial performance variables 
were not stable before or after 2008. 
In Section 7.3, a negative association was reported between CGS and TSR. This market-based 
performance measure is, however, rather unsophisticated. The TSR measure does not 
incorporate the risk associated with a firm’s shares (Kroumova, Sesil, Kruse & Blasi, 2002: 
87). It was therefore decided to use both the single-factor CAPM and the Fama–French three-
factor model to estimate risk-adjusted abnormal returns for four corporate governance 
portfolios. These portfolios were compiled based on the sample firms’ CGSs. 
Regression analyses, based on these two models, were firstly conducted on the complete 
sample. As discussed in this section, May 2008 was identified as the month during which the 
substantial decrease in the share prices of JSE-listed companies started (as a result of the 
global financial crisis). Regression analyses were thus also conducted for the periods before 
and after May 2008. These analyses were done to determine whether or not corporate 
governance compliance was equally important to investors during the period that preceded the 
crisis as well as the period thereafter. 
7.5 Estimating risk-adjusted abnormal returns 
The risk-adjusted abnormal return (denoted by Jensen’s alpha or α) can be determined by 
comparing the TSR of a share or portfolio with its expected return (Jensen, 1968). A positive 
alpha indicates that a portfolio has realised a return in excess of the market (Erasmus, 2013). 
For the purpose of this study, four corporate governance (CG) portfolios were constructed. 
All firms that provided corporate governance data during a given month were considered for 
inclusion in the monthly portfolio. The firms were then ranked according to their CGSs. 
Thereafter, the 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles were calculated, in line with French (2013). All 
companies with a CGS within one of these two quartiles were included in portfolios CG 1 
(firms with the lowest CGSs) or CG 4 (firms with the highest CGSs) respectively. Portfolio 
CG 2 consisted of firms within quartile 2 and portfolio CG 3 of companies within quartile 3. 
For estimation purposes, a proxy for the market return had to be identified. The researcher 
considered two proxies used by previous South African researchers (Strugnell et al., 2011; 
Van Rensburg & Robertson, 2003; Ward & Muller, 2012), namely the monthly return on the 
FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203) and the monthly return on an equally-weighted portfolio. 
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The monthly equally-weighted portfolio returns were determined by considering all sample 
firms that provided a share return for a given month. The average for this entire group of 
firms was then calculated and used as a proxy for the market return. 
7.5.1 Application of the CAPM 
In this section, the application of a regression model based on the CAPM is discussed. This 
regression model was used to estimate risk-adjusted abnormal returns for each of the four CG 
portfolios. Both the statistical and economic significance of the results were considered. The 
economic significance of a finding relates to whether a specific result could indicate that a 
theory is useful or whether an abnormal return could be regarded as substantial, even though 
it was not statistically significant (McCloskey & Ziliak, 1996). The monthly return on an 
equally-weighted portfolio was firstly used as a proxy for the market return (Table 7.27), 
followed by the return on the J203 (Table 7.28). 
Table 7.27: Results of the four CG portfolios (CAPM; monthly returns on an equally-
weighted portfolio) 
CG portfolio 
Mean 
CGS 
Mean  
TSR 
Estimate 
of α 
Estimate 
of β 
R-
squared 
Standard 
error 
F-value 
1 (very low) 35 4.140% 0.812%
*
 0.907
** 0.611 0.034 166.211
** 
2 (low to average) 49 0.385% -0.792% 1.222
** 0.603 0.046 160.928
** 
3 (moderate) 56 1.463% -0.327% 0.989
** 0.667 0.033 212.124
** 
4 (high) 64 2.450% 0.331% 0.885
** 0.713 0.026 263.218
** 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
Degrees of freedom: 1; 106 
The quality of fit of all models was significant. 
The following regression equation was estimated based on monthly data (t) for each of the four CG portfolios (p) 
(Lee et al., 2009): 
(Rpt - Rft) = αp + βp (Rmt –  Rft)+ ϵp  
where: 
Rpt is the return on portfolio p during month t 
Rft is the monthly risk-free rate (as measured by the return on the R186) 
Rmt is the return on an equally-weighted portfolio consisting of all the shares in the dataset during the month 
αp  is the estimated risk-adjusted abnormal return generated by portfolio p 
βp is the systematic risk of portfolio p 
ϵp  is the error term 
As seen in Table 7.27, the mean TSR of the portfolio that contained the firms with the lowest 
CGSs (CG 1) was higher than the mean TSR of the portfolio compiled of the firms with the 
highest CGSs (CG 4). This result is in line with the argument presented in Section 7.3.1 that 
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the market seemed to have reacted negatively towards the (reporting of) corporate governance 
initiatives of firms with high CGSs. Such firms typically spend a considerable amount of time 
and money on corporate governance initiatives, while the firms in portfolio CG 1 most likely 
spend very little time and money on such mechanisms. If the market’s perception with regard 
to corporate governance compliance was negative (based on the reasoning that resources 
could be “better employed” to improve share prices and dividends), firms in portfolio CG 4 
could possibly be “penalised” for their high compliance, resulting in low(er) TSRs. 
A positive, but not significant alpha can be observed for Portfolio CG 4 in Table 7.27.  In 
contrast, a significant positive alpha was reported for portfolio CG 1. The significant alpha of 
portfolio CG 1 was disconcerting. Based on this result, it appeared as if the companies with 
the lowest CGSs were good investment options in terms of risk-adjusted performance. 
Specific consideration was hence given to the firms that were included in this portfolio. 
Portfolio CG 1 comprised some delisted and well-known listed firms that showed little 
interest in corporate governance compliance. This observation was based on the content 
analysis of the firms’ annual reports. The researcher is of the opinion that some of these firms 
regarded corporate governance compliance as a “tick-box exercise”, which does not 
necessarily enhance actual corporate governance practices. 
A comparison of the beta (systematic risk) estimates and alphas revealed an interesting 
observation. Even though the alpha of portfolio CG 1 was higher than the alpha reported for 
portfolio CG 3, the beta values of these two portfolios were almost the same. This observation 
was contrary to the common expectation that return would increase when risk increases. 
Previous researchers (Strugnell et al., 2011; Van Rensburg & Robertson, 2003) reported that 
the beta estimates of South African firms could be inversely related to their returns. The 
interpretation of beta values should thus be conducted with care within the South African 
corporate context (Erasmus, 2013). 
The equally-weighted return that was used for the regression estimation reported in Table 
7.27 only included the sample firms. The reported alphas thus related to outperformance 
against a group of pre-selected firms. The use of equally-weighted returns could thus have 
had an impact on the reported regression results.  
In the original CAPM equation, the return on the total market portfolio, consisting of all 
assets in the investment universe, is considered (Ho & Lee, 2004: 36). As it is practically 
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impossible to hold the entire market portfolio, the return on the J203 was used as an 
alternative estimate for the South African market portfolio, as reported in Table 7.28. 
Table 7.28: Results of the four CG portfolios (CAPM; monthly returns on the J203) 
CG portfolio 
Mean 
CGS 
Mean  
TSR 
Estimate 
of α 
Estimate 
of β 
R-
squared 
Standard 
error 
F-value 
1 (very low) 35 4.140% 1.757%
**
 0.586
** 0.234 0.047 32.356
**
 
2 (low to average) 49 0.385% 0.606% 0.486
** 0.087 0.070 10.143
**
 
3 (moderate) 56 1.463% 0.654% 0.759
** 0.360 0.045 59.693
**
 
4 (high) 64 2.450% 1.250%
** 
0.580
** 0.281 0.041 41.374
**
 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
Degrees of freedom: 1; 106 
The quality of fit of all models was significant. 
The following regression equation was estimated based on monthly data (t) for each of the four CG portfolios (p) 
(Lee et al., 2009): 
(Rpt - Rft) = αp + βp (Rmt –  Rft)+ ϵp  
where: 
Rmt is the monthly return on the J203 
The results reported in Table 7.28 differ from those shown in Table 7.27 in two ways. Firstly, 
the positive alpha of portfolio CG 4 is now significant. The positive risk-adjusted return 
reported for this portfolio could be seen as a reward for investors who invested in the 
companies with the highest CGSs. Secondly, the alphas reported in Table 7.28 are larger than 
those reported in Table 7.27. It hence seems as if the four corporate governance portfolios 
outperformed the J203 by more than the equally-weighted index. 
Although the CAPM has certain limitations (refer to Section 2.4.3), the model was used for its 
explanatory power. In addition to this single-factor model, the Fama–French three-factor 
model was also used to estimate risk-adjusted abnormal returns. 
7.5.2 Application of the Fama–French three-factor model 
Fama and French (1992; 1993) argue that the spread in returns between small and large firms 
as well as the spread in returns between value and growth shares should be considered in 
addition to the CAPM market risk estimate. The regression analyses based on the Fama–
French three-factor model was conducted on the same four CG portfolios as discussed earlier. 
The firms were also sorted based on their market capitalisation. The companies in the lowest 
market capitalisation quartile were defined as small and the firms in the highest market 
capitalisation quartile were defined as big. Thereafter, the average monthly TSRs for the big 
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quartile were subtracted from the average monthly TSRs for the small quartile (defined as the 
SMB factor) for each of the observed 108 months.  
The companies were then also ranked based on their BE/ME ratios. The firms above the 70
th
 
percentile were defined as value shares, while the firms included in the 1
st
 to the 30
th
 
percentiles were defined as growth shares. The average monthly TSR for the growth shares 
(low) was subtracted from the average monthly TSR for the value shares (high) for each of 
the considered months to obtain the HML factor. The regression results, based on the Fama–
French three-factor regression model, are provided in Table 7.29. Three betas are reported, 
namely beta1 (the systematic risk), beta2 (the sensitivity of the portfolio to the size factor) and 
beta3 (the sensitivity of the portfolio to the value/growth factor). 
Table 7.29: Results of the four CG portfolios (FamaFrench three-factor model; 
monthly returns on an equally-weighted portfolio) 
CG 
portfolio 
Mean 
CGS 
Mean  
TSR 
Estimate 
of α 
Estimate 
of β1 
Estimate 
of β2 
Estimate 
of β3 
Adjusted 
R-squared 
Standard 
error 
F-value 
1  
(very low) 
35 4.140% -0.027% 0.939
** 
-0.216
**
 0.504
**
 0.851 0.021 204.228
**
 
2  
(low to 
average) 
49 0.385% -0.209% 1.077
**
 0.515
**
 -0.093 0.801 0.033 144.713
**
 
3  
(moderate) 
56 1.463% -0.169% 1.037
**
 -0.121
**
 -0.210
**
 0.735 0.029 100.015
**
 
4  
(high) 
64 2.450% 0.478%
**
 0.955
** 
-0.184
**
 -0.245
**
 0.883 0.017 270.179
**
 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
Degrees of freedom: 3; 104 
The quality of fit of all models was significant. 
The following regression equation was estimated based on monthly data (t) for each of the four CG portfolios (p) 
(Fama & French, 1992): 
(Rpt - Rft) = αp + βp1 (Rmt –  Rft)+ βp2SMB + βp3HML +  ϵp 
where: 
Rpt is the return on portfolio p  during month t 
Rft is the monthly risk-free rate (as measured by the return on the R186) 
Rmt is the return on an equally-weighted portfolio consisting of all the shares in the dataset during the month 
αp  is the estimated risk-adjusted abnormal return generated by portfolio p 
β
p1
 is the systematic risk of portfolio p 
β
p2
is the sensitivity of portfolio p to the size factor 
β
p3
is the sensitivity of portfolio p to the value/growth factor 
SMB is the size factor 
HML is the value/growth factor 
ϵp  is the error term 
When the size and value/growth factors were entered in the regression model, only portfolio 
CG 4 had a significant positive alpha, as shown in Table 7.29. This is an encouraging result, 
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since those investors who considered the CGSs of the sample firms when constructing their 
investment strategy would have been rewarded in risk-adjusted terms.  
Except for beta3 of portfolio CG 2, all other betas were statistically significant. A negative 
size beta, as observed for portfolios CG 3 and CG 4, indicates that returns tend to fall when 
the outperformance of small relative to large shares increase (Estrada, 2011). Rezaee (2011) 
and Solomon (2007) note that smaller firms could experience more corporate governance 
compliance difficulties than their larger counterparts. Portfolios CG 3 and CG 4 reported 
significant negative value/growth betas, while portfolio CG 1 had a significant positive beta3. 
These negative betas indicate that growth shares have outperformed value shares (Estrada, 
2011). Growth shares typically have above-average earnings growth and pay little (or no) 
dividends. Growth firms typically prefer to reinvest earnings to fund growth opportunities 
rather than to pay out dividends (Besley & Brigham, 2008: 268). Such firms could thus have 
more funds available to invest in corporate governance initiatives, than their counterparts that 
pay out dividends. The results of the regression analysis with the inclusion of the monthly 
return on the J203 as the market return proxy are reported in Table 7.30. 
Table 7.30: Results of the four CG portfolios (FamaFrench three-factor model; 
monthly returns on the J203) 
CG 
portfolio 
Mean 
CGS 
Mean  
TSR 
Estimate 
of α 
Estimate 
of β1 
Estimate 
of β2 
Estimate 
of β3 
Adjusted 
R-squared 
Standard 
error 
F-value 
1  
(very low) 
35 4.140% 1.061%
** 
0.593
** -0.039 0.495
**
 0.448 0.040 29.952
**
 
2  
(low to 
average) 
49 0.385% 1.065%
* 
0.609
**
 0.712
**
 -0.102 0.478 0.053 33.677
**
 
3  
(moderate) 
56 1.463% 0.993%
* 
0.768
**
 0.084 -0.220
**
 0.385 0.044 23.315
**
 
4  
(high) 
64 2.450% 1.595%
**
 0.572
** -0.006 -0.254
**
 0.342 0.039 19.499
**
 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
Degrees of freedom: 3; 104 
The quality of fit of all models was significant. 
The following regression equation was estimated based on monthly data (t) for each of the four CG portfolios (p) 
(Fama & French, 1992): 
(Rpt - Rft) = αp + βp1 (Rmt –  Rft)+ βp2SMB + βp3HML +  ϵp 
where: 
Rmt is the monthly return on the J203 
Perusal of Table 7.30 reveals that Portfolio CG 4 once again had the highest significant alpha. 
The reported alphas were also larger than those shown in Table 7.29. The risk-adjusted 
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abnormal returns yielded above the J203 thus seemed to be higher than those yielded above 
the equally-weighted index. This comment is in line with the observation that the reported 
alphas were higher in Table 7.28 (when the J203 was used as the market proxy) than in Table 
7.27 for the CAPM-based regression analyses. 
As seen in Table 7.30, only one beta2 estimate was significant. In contrast, all beta2 estimates 
reported in Table 7.29 were significant. When the J203 was used as a proxy for the market 
return, it thus seemed as if the size of the firms had a less significant effect on the regression 
results. A possible reason for this observation is that, since the J203 is weighted according to 
market capitalisation, companies’ sizes were already accounted for (Ward & Muller, 2012). 
Lee and Yeh (2004) suggested that firms with low corporate governance compliance are 
likely to be affected more during economic downturns than their counterparts with high 
compliance. As explained in Section 7.4, May 2008 was identified as the month during which 
the global financial crisis started to show a substantial impact on the South African share 
market. Hence, the trends in the alphas up to May 2008 (denoted as ‘before May 2008’) and 
from May 2008 until the end of the study period (denoted as ‘after May 2008’) were 
examined. 
7.5.3 Regression analyses conducted for the periods before and after 
May 2008 
In line with the CAPM and FamaFrench three-factor regression analyses reported in the 
previous two sections, the monthly equally-weighted portfolio return and the monthly return 
on the J203 were respectively used as a proxy for the market return. Table 7.31 provides the 
pre-May 2008 CAPM-based regression results, whereas Table 7.32 indicates the post-May 
2008 regression results. 
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Table 7.31: Results of the four CG portfolios (CAPM; before May 2008) 
Market proxy: monthly equally-weighted portfolio returns 
CG portfolio 
Mean 
CGS 
Mean  
TSR 
Estimate 
of α 
Estimate 
of β 
R-
squared 
Standard 
error 
F-value 
1 (very low) 31 5.560% 1.363%
**
 0.900
** 0.569 0.036 99.028
**
 
2 (low to average) 46 0.390% -0.983% 1.234
** 0.608 0.046 116.482
**
 
3 (moderate) 54 1.625% -0.495% 0.973
** 0.616 0.035 120.135
**
 
4 (high) 62 2.731% 0.080%
 
0.895
** 0.734 0.025 207.181
**
 
Market proxy: monthly returns on the FTSE/JSE All Share Index 
CG portfolio 
Mean 
CGS 
Mean  
TSR 
Estimate 
of α 
Estimate 
of β 
R-
squared 
Standard 
error 
F-value 
1 (very low) 31 5.560% 2.528%
**
 0.563
** 0.162 0.050 14.531
**
 
2 (low to average) 46 0.390% 0.874% 0.457
* 0.061 0.071 4.863
*
 
3 (moderate) 54 1.625% 0.634% 0.763
** 0.276 0.049 28.649
**
 
4 (high) 62 2.731% 1.166%
* 
0.644
** 0.278 0.041 28.884
**
 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
Degrees of freedom: 1; 75 
The quality of fit of all models was significant. 
The following regression equation was estimated based on monthly data (t) for each of the four CG portfolios (p) 
(Lee et al., 2009): 
(Rpt - Rft) = αp + βp (Rmt –  Rft)+ ϵp 
t = months 1–77 
Table 7.32: Results of the four CG portfolios (CAPM; after May 2008) 
Market proxy: equally-weighted monthly portfolio returns 
CG portfolio 
Mean 
CGS 
Mean  
TSR 
Estimate 
of α 
Estimate 
of β 
R-
squared 
Standard 
error 
F-value 
1 (very low) 44 0.194% -0.457% 0.789
** 0.741 0.022 85.732
**
 
2 (low to average) 57 -0.918% -0.627% 1.303
** 0.601 0.050 45.223
**
 
3 (moderate) 63 0.881% 0.245% 1.043
** 0.809 0.024 127.193
**
 
4 (high) 68 1.575% 1.000%
 
0.886
** 0.673 0.029 61.679
**
 
Market proxy: monthly returns on the FTSE/JSE All Share Index 
CG portfolio 
Mean 
CGS 
Mean  
TSR 
Estimate 
of α 
Estimate 
of β 
R-
squared 
Standard 
error 
F-value 
1 (very low) 44 0.194% -0.314% 0.500
** 0.404 0.033 20.376
**
 
2 (low to average) 57 -0.918% -0.600% 0.412
 
0.082 0.076 2.673 
3 (moderate) 63 0.881% 0.468% 0.726
** 0.533 0.037 34.303
**
 
4 (high) 68 1.575% 1.119%
 
0.480
** 0.268 0.044 10.995
**
 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
Degrees of freedom: 1; 30 
The quality of fit of all models was significant, except for the regression analysis conducted for portfolio CG 2 
(J203 data were used). 
The following regression equation was estimated based on monthly data (t) for each of the four CG portfolios (p) 
(Lee et al., 2009): 
(Rpt - Rft) = αp + βp (Rmt –  Rft)+ ϵp 
t = months 77–108 
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As expected, the mean CGSs of the four CG portfolios differed for the periods before (Table 
7.31) and after May 2008 (Table 7.32). The mean TSR of portfolio CG 1 (comprising firms 
with the lowest CGSs) was higher than the mean TSR of portfolio CG 4 (compiled of the 
firms with the highest CGSs) in the period before May 2008. However, after May 2008, the 
opposite situation occurred. During and after the crisis, investors seemed to have benefitted in 
market-based terms if they had invested in the sample firms with high corporate governance 
compliance. 
An important difference was observed regarding the risk-adjusted abnormal returns reported 
in Tables 7.31 and 7.32. Portfolio CG 1 reported the highest significant alpha before the crisis 
started, irrespective of the market proxy. (The reported alphas were, however, higher when 
the J203 was employed). Although none of the alphas reported in Table 7.32 were statistically 
significant, the signs were of economic significance. In the period after May 2008, portfolio 
CG 1 had a negative alpha, while portfolio CG 4 now reported a positive alpha (for both 
market proxies). 
A probable reason for this encouraging turn of events is that corporate governance was 
perhaps not important to investors before the start of the financial crisis. However, once the 
crisis had commenced, the sound corporate governance compliance of the firms included in 
portfolio CG 4 possibly helped them to “weather the financial storm better” (as predicted in 
the literature). Their counterparts with the lowest CGSs (portfolio CG 1) reported negative 
alphas. During the crisis period, the corporate governance “under-performers” hence seemed 
to also under-perform in risk-adjusted terms. 
The FamaFrench three-factor model was also employed to conduct regression analyses on 
the pre- and post-May 2008 data, as reported in Tables 7.33 and 7.34. 
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Table 7.33: Results of the four CG portfolios (FamaFrench three-factor model; 
before May 2008) 
Market proxy: monthly equally-weighted portfolio returns 
CG 
portfolio 
Mean 
CGS 
Mean  
TSR 
Estimate 
of α 
Estimate 
of β1 
Estimate 
of β2 
Estimate 
of β3 
Adjusted 
R-
squared 
Standard 
error 
F-value 
1  
(very low) 
31 5.560% -0.388%
 
0.962
** 
-0.208
**
 0.577
**
 0.840 0.022 133.765
**
 
2  
(low to 
average) 
46 0.390% -0.148%
 
1.080
**
 0.454
**
 -0.137
 
0.774 0.034 87.768
**
 
3 
(moderate) 
54 1.625% 0.178%
 
1.003
**
 -0.073 -0.281
**
 0.686 0.032 56.346
**
 
4  
(high) 
62 2.731% 0.409% 0.962
** 
-0.187
** 
-0.196
**
 0.877 0.017 181.896
**
 
Market proxy: monthly returns on the FTSE/JSE All Share Index 
CG 
portfolio 
Mean 
CGS 
Mean  
TSR 
Estimate 
of α 
Estimate 
of β1 
Estimate 
of β2 
Estimate 
of β3 
Adjusted 
R-
squared 
Standard 
error 
F-value 
1  
(very low) 
31 5.560% 0.820%
 
0.662
** -0.039 0.597
**
 0.427 0.041 19.910
**
 
2  
(low to 
average) 
46 0.390% 1.421%
 
0.545
**
 0.636
**
 -0.133
 
0.401 0.056 17.989
**
 
3 
(moderate) 
54 1.625% 1.390%
* 
0.736
**
 0.105 -0.256
*
 0.301 0.048 11.930
**
 
4  
(high) 
62 2.731% 1.676%
**
 0.608
** -0.020
 
-0.181 0.290 0.040 11.347
**
 
** Significant at the 1% level ** Significant at the 5% level  
Degrees of freedom: 3; 73 
The quality of fit of all models was significant. 
The following regression equation was estimated based on monthly data (t) for each of the four CG portfolios (p) 
(Fama & French, 1992): 
(Rpt - Rft) = αp + βp1 (Rmt –  Rft)+ βp2SMB + βp3HML +  ϵp  
where t = months 1–77 
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Table 7.34: Results of the four CG portfolios (FamaFrench three-factor model; after 
May 2008) 
Market proxy: equally-weighted monthly portfolio returns 
CG 
portfolio 
Mean 
CGS 
Mean  
TSR 
Estimate 
of α 
Estimate 
of β1 
Estimate 
of β2 
Estimate 
of β3 
Adjusted 
R-
squared 
Standard 
error 
F-value 
1  
(very low) 
44 0.194% -0.003% 0.880
** 
-0.261
**
 0.354
**
 0.876 0.015 73.910
**
 
2  
(low to 
average) 
57 -0.918% 0.112%
 
1.142
**
 0.759
**
 0.016
 
0.907 0.024 101.615
**
 
3 
(moderate) 
63 0.881% 0.011%
 
1.117
**
 -0.329
** 0.037 0.915 0.016 112.768
**
 
4  
(high) 
68 1.575% -0.070% 0.870
** 
-0.143
** 
-0.475
**
 0.927 0.014 133.174
**
 
Market proxy: monthly returns on the FTSE/JSE All Share Index 
CG 
portfolio 
Mean 
CGS 
Mean  
TSR 
Estimate 
of α 
Estimate 
of β1 
Estimate 
of β2 
Estimate 
of β3 
Adjusted 
R-
squared 
Standard 
error 
F-value 
1  
(very low) 
44 0.194% -0.071%
 
0.508
** 0.034 0.105 0.361 0.034 6.837
**
 
2  
(low to 
average) 
57 -0.918% 0.026%
 
0.665
**
 1.143
**
 -0.308
 
0.652 0.046 20.398
**
 
3 
(moderate) 
63 0.881% -0.027%
 
0.740
**
 0.068 -0.290 0.537 0.037 12.988
**
 
4  
(high) 
68 1.575% -0.133% 0.512
** 0.151
 
-0.722
**
 0.576 0.033 15.040
**
 
** Significant at the 1% level * Significant at the 5% level  
Degrees of freedom: 3; 28 
The quality of fit of all models was significant. 
The following regression equation was estimated based on monthly data (t) for each of the four CG portfolios (p) 
(Fama & French, 1992):  
(Rpt - Rft) = αp + βp1 (Rmt –  Rft)+ βp2SMB + βp3HML +  ϵp  
where t = months 77–108 
As indicated in Table 7.33, when the equally-weighted index was employed, portfolio CG 4 
had a positive alpha, albeit not significant, while portfolio CG 1 had a not significant negative 
alpha. In addition, portfolio CG 4 had a significant positive alpha in the before May 2008 
period when the J203 was used. Investors who had invested in the firms with the highest 
CGSs (portfolio CG 4) would hence have earned positive risk-adjusted abnormal returns 
during the before May 2008 period.  
With regard to the betas reported in Table 7.33, the negative value/growth betas that were 
indicated for the majority of the portfolios could be an indication that growth shares 
outperformed value shares over the period January 2002 to May 2008. 
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It is of economic significance that the risk-adjusted abnormal returns of the sample firms with 
the lowest and highest CGSs (portfolios CG 1 and CG 4 respectively) were both negative 
during the after May 2008 period, as reported in Table 7.34. The global financial crisis hence 
seemed to have had a negative impact on the risk-adjusted financial performance of the 
sample firms. 
In the broader ESG context, the EDHEC-Risk Institute (Amenc & Le Sourd, 2010) evaluated 
the performance of RI investments over the period 20022009. They also applied the Fama–
French three-factor model and mostly reported statistically not significant negative alphas. 
These authors also (partly) ascribed the negative results to the impact of the 20072009 
global financial crisis period. 
When the results of the regression analyses conducted on CGS and TSR (Section 7.3) as well 
as the reported risk-adjusted abnormal returns (Sections 7.5) were examined, contrasting 
outcomes were noted. A comparison of the results for these two market-based measures is 
provided in Section 7.6. 
7.6 Comparison of the regression analyses results for CGS and the 
market-based performance measures 
The panel regression analysis conducted on CGS and TSR for the complete sample revealed a 
negative relationship between these two variables. This negative association prevailed, 
irrespective of whether TSR was entered as the dependent or independent variable in the 
preferred regression model. In addition, when TSR and CGS respectively were lagged, a 
negative association was still observed. 
Although the negative TSR and CGS regression coefficients were significant, low R-squared 
values were reported. The majority of the variance in the share returns was thus explained by 
other factors, including the 20072009 global financial crisis. It should also be noted that the 
relatively unsophisticated TSR measure is not adjusted for risk. Risk-adjusted abnormal 
returns were hence estimated. A summary of the resultant alphas reported in Sections 
7.5.17.5.3 for portfolios CG 1 and CG 4 is provided in Table 7.35. 
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Table 7.35: Summary of the alphas reported for portfolios CG 1 (firms with the lowest 
CGSs) and CG 4 (firms with the highest CGSs) 
Portfolio
a)
 
Entire study period  
(2002–2010) 
Before May 2008 After May 2008 
CAPM 
Panel A Panel B Panel C 
Equally 
weighted 
index 
J203 
Equally 
weighted 
index 
J203 
Equally 
weighted 
index 
J203 
CG 1 
Positive; 
significant 
Positive; 
significant 
Positive; 
significant 
Positive; 
significant 
Negative;  
not significant 
Negative;  
not significant 
CG 4 
Positive; 
not significant 
Positive; 
significant 
Positive; 
not significant 
Positive; 
significant 
Positive; 
not significant 
Positive;  
not significant 
Portfolio
a)
 
FamaFrench three-factor model 
Panel D Panel E Panel F 
Equally 
weighted 
index 
J203 
Equally 
weighted 
index 
J203 
Equally 
weighted 
index 
J203 
CG 1 
Negative; 
not significant 
Positive; 
significant 
Negative; 
not significant 
Positive; 
not significant 
Negative; 
not significant 
Negative; 
not significant 
CG 4 
Positive; 
significant 
Positive; 
significant 
Positive; 
not significant 
Positive; 
significant 
Negative; 
not significant 
Negative; 
not significant 
a) The quality of fit of all models was significant. 
As seen in Panel A of Table 7.35, investors who invested in portfolio CG 4 (consisting of the 
firms with the highest CGSs) received positive abnormal returns when the CAPM was 
applied. The alpha of this portfolio was, however, only significant when the J203 was 
employed as the market proxy. 
When the FamaFrench three-factor regression model was applied, portfolio CG 4 had a 
statistically significant positive alpha (Panel D), irrespective of the considered market proxy. 
These results are in contrast to the negative relationship reported between CGS and the non-
risk-adjusted TSR measure for the complete sample. Investors could thus have earned positive 
risk-adjusted abnormal returns if they invested in the sample firms with the highest CGSs 
over the research period. 
With regard to the before May 2008 CAPM regression analyses (Panel B), a significant, 
positive alpha was reported for portfolio CG 4 when the J203 was employed. A positive, but 
not significant alpha was noted when the equally-weighted index was considered. As seen in 
Panel C, portfolio CG 1 had a negative alpha and portfolio CG 4 a positive alpha, irrespective 
of the considered market proxy in the after May 2008 period. None of the results reported in 
Panel C were, however, significant. 
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When the FamaFrench three-factor regression model was employed, portfolio CG 4 had a 
positive alpha in the before May 2008 period (Panel E). The risk-adjusted abnormal return 
was, however, only significant when the J203 was used as the market proxy. The results of 
the FamaFrench three-factor regression model (Panels D and E) hence show that investors 
could have benefitted, in risk-adjusted terms, if they had invested in the firms included in 
portfolio CG 4, both over the entire study period and before May 2008.  
No significant alphas were reported for the after May 2008 period (Panel F) when the 
FamaFrench three-factor model was used. The negative alphas of both portfolios CG 1 and 
CG 4 probably showed that the 20072009 global financial crisis had a negative effect on the 
financial performance of (almost) all the sample firms. 
The researcher realises that other factors (besides corporate governance compliance) could 
have influenced the reported risk-adjusted abnormal returns of the four portfolios. Hence, it is 
difficult to isolate the possible contribution of corporate governance compliance. In practice, 
it is also challenging to assess whether the implementation of corporate governance guidelines 
is truly a sign of sound corporate governance compliance, or merely window-dressing 
(Kouwenberg & Phunnarungsi, 2013). Although there could be other factors that had an 
influence on the alphas, the results still suggest that investors could benefit, in risk-adjusted 
market-based terms, by investing in firms with the highest corporate governance compliance. 
7.7 Summary and conclusions 
In Table 7.36, this study’s research questions and hypotheses are linked to the most important 
outcomes of the statistical analyses. 
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Table 7.36: Summary of the most important outcomes of the statistical analyses 
Hypotheses Outcome 
H01: There is no relationship 
between corporate governance 
and the accounting-based 
performance of JSE-listed 
companies. 
Reject H01 
A significant positive relationship was observed between CGS and EPS, 
irrespective of whether CGS was considered to be the dependent or 
independent variable. 
This positive relationship could, however, be influenced by the actions of 
the sample companies’ managers, as managers typically have direct control 
over both corporate governance compliance and EPS. 
No significant relationships were reported between CGS and the ROA and 
ROE profitability ratios respectively. 
 
 
H02: There is no relationship 
between corporate governance 
and the market-based 
performance of JSE-listed 
companies. 
Reject H02 
A significant negative association was found between CGS and TSR. This 
relationship prevailed when CGS was entered as the dependent variable 
(rather than the independent variable) in the preferred regression model.  
The TSR measure is, however, not risk-adjusted. 
In contrast, positive risk-adjusted abnormal returns were reported for the 
firms with the highest CGSs (portfolio CG 4).  
These encouraging risk-adjusted market-based results were observed for the 
regression analyses based on both the CAPM and Fama-French three-factor 
models over the entire study period. 
 
Research questions Outcome 
How important was sound 
corporate governance compliance 
for the sample firms? 
The CGSs of the sample firms ranged from high (CGS above 75%) to very 
low (CGS equal to or below 25%). It hence seems as if corporate 
governance compliance was not equally important to all the firms. 
In addition, based on the content analysis, some well-known listed firms 
and delisted firms appeared to regard compliance with the King guidelines 
as a mere “tick-box exercise” which does not per se enhance corporate 
governance compliance in practice. 
Although the annual mean CGSs increased over time, the overall level of 
compliance was 67.568 per cent. In general, the corporate governance 
compliance of JSE-listed firms could (and should) thus still improve.  
Recommendations to train and educate directors (amongst others) to 
improve the corporate governance compliance of JSE-listed firms are 
provided in Section 8.5. 
What was the corporate 
governance compliance trend in 
the sample of JSE-listed 
companies over the research 
period? 
A statistically significant increasing compliance trend was observed over 
the study period.  
In addition, the Fisher’s LSD test showed that all but one of the annual 
increases in the mean CGSs were statistically significant. 
What was the trend in the 
disclosure and acceptability 
dimensions of the CGSs over the 
research period? 
The contribution of the acceptability dimension to the annual mean CGSs 
increased over time.  
This is an encouraging sign, since the sample firms did not only improve 
their corporate governance disclosure, but also complied in a more 
acceptable manner with the King II guidelines at the end of the study 
period. 
If investors realise that, over time, the sample firms complied in a more 
acceptable manner with the corporate governance guidelines, instead of 
merely “ticking off” their disclosure (or the lack thereof) with the King 
guidelines, their perceptions with regard to corporate governance 
compliance could become more positive in future.  
This is of importance, since firms have to attract capital from an 
increasingly discerning group of investors. 
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Research questions Outcome 
Are there differences between the 
corporate governance compliance 
of JSE-listed companies and that 
of delisted companies? 
A statistically significant difference was observed between the mean CGSs 
of listed companies and those of delisted companies.  
The JSE Listing Requirements (JSE, 2005) oblige listed firms to comply 
with the King II guidelines or explain non-compliance. It was hence 
expected that firms that remained listed would have better compliance than 
their counterparts that delisted. 
However, it should be noted that not all firms necessarily delist due to a 
lack of corporate governance compliance. In 2009, three delisted firms had 
high CGSs (above 75%). Two of these firms delisted after they were 
combined with other companies by means of a merger and takeover. The 
third company delisted since the market sentiment towards small JSE-listed 
firms was not regarded as favourable, specifically in the aftermath of the 
20072009 global financial crisis. 
Are there differences between the 
corporate governance compliance 
of companies listed in different 
JSE industries? 
It is promising to note that the corporate governance compliance of all six 
considered JSE-industries improved over time.  
The Health Care and Telecommunications industries had the highest 
corporate governance compliance.  
Both of these industries are heavily regulated and consisted of only a small 
number of firms (nine Health Care and five Telecommunications firms). 
Competition to comply with the King guidelines could possibly be severer 
in these two industries than in the other four industries. 
Was the relationship between 
corporate governance and 
financial performance noticeable 
immediately (in the given year) or 
only after a period of time? 
Firms with high CGSs had a positive association with EPS, both in the 
given year and one year later. On the other hand, a negative relationship 
was reported between CGS and TSR in the given year as well as for the 
lagged variables.  
The relationships between CGS and EPS and TSR respectively were thus 
immediately noticeable (and did not change when the variables were 
lagged).  
Was there an association between 
the corporate governance 
compliance of the top CGS firms 
in the sample and their risk-
adjusted financial performance? 
Both the CAPM and the FamaFrench three-factor regression models 
indicated significant positive alphas for portfolio CG 4 (consisting of the 
firms with the highest CGSs) when the J203 was used as the market proxy.  
These encouraging results were observed over the entire study period and 
for the period before May 2008. 
Does 2008, the midpoint of the 
2007–2009 global financial crisis, 
represent a structural break in the 
financial dataset? 
The significant Chow test results showed that 2008 indeed represented a 
structural break in the financial dataset (specifically with regard to ROE 
and TSR). 
What was the effect of the 
20072009 global financial crisis 
on the financial performance of 
JSE-listed companies included in 
the sample? 
Based on the descriptive statistics, it seemed as if the 20072009 global 
financial crisis had a negative effect on the EPS, ROA, ROE and TSR 
performance variables. Negative TSR values were noted in 2008, the midst 
of the crisis period. 
In addition, when the FamaFrench three-factor model was applied, 
negative (not significant) alphas were reported for both portfolio CG 1 
(consisting of the firms with the lowest CGSs) and portfolio CG 4 
(compiled out of the firms with the highest CGSs) for the period after May 
2008. These results possibly reflected the negative effect of the crisis on the 
market-based performance of the sample firms. 
In summary, a positive association was noted between EPS and CGS in this study. Despite the 
observed negative association between TSR and CGS, positive risk-adjusted abnormal returns 
were reported for the portfolio consisting of the firms with the highest CGSs over the entire 
study period. In addition to deriving long-term value from their investments, responsible 
investors also aim to drive improvements in investee companies’ corporate governance (and 
social and environmental) practices (Krosinsky, Robins & Viederman, 2012; US SIF, 2014). 
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Such investors typically “put their money where their morals are” (Fehrenbacher, 2001), by 
deriving both financial and non-financial utility from their investments. If there are enough 
responsible investors, they might affect share pricing, irrespective of whether investments in 
firms with high corporate governance compliance are financially (more) beneficial in 
comparison to mainstream investments (Fehrenbacher, 2001; Manescu, 2010b). 
During the research period, there was a lack of ESG information that investors could use 
when evaluating JSE-listed firms. The researcher is of the opinion that shareholder activism in 
South Africa could increase in future if ESG reporting improves, if more measuring 
instruments are developed and if more reliable ESG data are made publicly available (at a 
reasonable cost). An extensive discussion on the study’s findings will be provided in the final 
chapter. Conclusions will also be reported and recommendations made for future research, 
based on the identified limitations. 
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CHAPTER 8 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance initially gained attention in South Africa with the publication of the 
first King Report in 1994. The boards and managers of JSE-listed firms were guided by this 
report and the subsequent King Reports to commence with and improve their corporate 
governance compliance. The King guidelines, however, received criticism for encouraging a 
tick-box compliance mentality (Heath, 2014; Morar Incorporated, 2014). Furthermore, some 
corporate governance compliance initiatives require a considerable amount of time and 
money. High compliance costs might prevent firms from effectively implementing the King 
guidelines. Such costs could also have an influence on investors’ perceptions of corporate 
governance. Investors could perceive corporate governance as an “unnecessary expense” that 
reduces their investee firms’ ability to pursue profitable opportunities.  
Most investors are mainly interested in whether or not they can make money from a specific 
investment. Some investors also take non-financial factors, such as corporate governance 
compliance, into account when analysing investment opportunities and exercising their 
ownership rights (Micharikopoulos & Danalis, 2010; Roy & Gitman, 2012). Such responsible 
investors are not merely concerned about an investment’s potential risk and return; they aim 
to “do well by doing good” (Laszlo, 2008: 22). In line with this motto, responsible investors 
typically employ their money to drive ESG-related changes in investee companies. 
The question could accordingly be asked whether attention to ESG, and specifically corporate 
governance aspects, poses a threat to financial success, or whether non-financial aspects offer 
valuable opportunities for investors. Previous researchers reported inconclusive evidence on 
the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance (see Section 3.4 for 
more details). The question remains whether investors could be rewarded, after taking risk 
and return into account, from investing in firms with high levels of corporate governance 
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compliance. In the current study, the relationship between corporate governance and financial 
performance was examined in the South African context. 
The remainder of this chapter comprises six sections. The first section provides a brief 
overview of the study, followed by the main findings from the literature review and empirical 
investigation. In the fourth section, recommendations for various stakeholders are discussed, 
followed by the limitations of the research, and recommendations for future research. Finally, 
some concluding remarks are provided. 
8.2 Overview of the study 
In this section, the purpose of the research, the objectives that were formulated and the 
methodology that was used are briefly summarised. 
8.2.1 Purpose of the research 
If it could be established that there is a positive relationship between corporate governance 
and financial performance in the South African context, investors might be more likely to 
invest in firms with high corporate governance compliance. Two potential benefits associated 
with increased investor interest are that both the cost of capital and the need for legislation 
might be reduced. If more investors become interested in firms with sound corporate 
governance compliance, the demand for such firms’ shares might increase. If their share 
prices increase as a result of the increasing demand, their cost of capital might decrease, 
ceteris paribus (Soh, 2011).  
The enforcement of regulated corporate governance compliance in future could lead to higher 
compliance costs than what is currently the case. If companies realise that high corporate 
governance compliance is associated with high financial performance, they might have a 
material motive to comply with the voluntary King guidelines. As a result, enforcing 
corporate governance legislation might not be necessary in future. 
To make informed investment decisions, investors in general and responsible investors in 
particular need information regarding companies’ ESG practices. When this study 
commenced in 2010, there was a lack of publicly available, standardised ESG information for 
JSE-listed firms. Given the comprehensive South African corporate governance framework 
provided by the King Reports, the G-component of ESG (namely corporate governance) was 
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examined in the current study. The corporate governance compliance of the sample firms had 
to be measured. For this purpose, an existing research instrument was refined and used to 
gather comparable corporate governance data. The financial performance of the firms was 
evaluated by employing accounting-based and market-based measures favoured by previous 
corporate governance researchers as well as shareholders and managers. 
The current study was undertaken to investigate the relationship between corporate 
governance and the financial performance of selected JSE industries for the period 
20022010. This period coincided with the publication of the King II Report in 2002 and 
included the 20072009 global financial crisis. This study hence contributed to an 
improvement in the paucity of research on corporate governance and financial performance in 
the emerging market context. 
8.2.2 Research objectives 
In line with the problem statement, the primary research objective was to investigate the 
relationship between corporate governance and the financial performance of selected JSE 
industries. To give effect to the primary objective, the following secondary research 
objectives were formulated: 
 to conduct a thorough review of the literature on corporate governance, financial 
performance and financial crises; 
 to select the most appropriate research design and methodology for this study based on 
the primary research objective; 
 to formulate research hypotheses;  
 to refine the PIC Corporate Governance Rating Matrix to compile annual CGSs for 
each of the companies in the sample by means of content analysis; 
 to collect and analyse secondary data for this study; and 
 to provide pertinent conclusions and recommendations based on the literature review 
and empirical findings. 
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8.2.3 Research design and methodology 
As explained in Section 5.2, a nine-step research approach was followed. The current study 
was quantitative in nature. A combination of judgement and convenience sampling was used 
to gather the required data. The researcher used her judgement to draw a sample from six of 
the ten JSE industries. Firms that were listed in the Oil and Gas, Basic Materials and 
Financials industries were excluded from the sample. The reasons for the exclusion were that 
the format of the annual statements and the nature of the activities of these firms differed from 
those of the considered firms. The Financials industry is also more regulated than the 
considered industries. During the study period, no firms were listed in the Utilities industry. 
Listed firms and firms that delisted during the period under review were included in the 
sample to avoid survivorship bias. The complete sample consisted of 1 417 annual CGS 
observations for 227 firms. 
The required corporate governance data were not readily available. The researcher had to 
compile annual CGSs for each of the sample firms by means of content analysis of their 
annual reports. A refined research instrument, based on the recommendations of the King II 
Report and the PIC (2011) was used. See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of this 
instrument, which comprised nine categories and 39 factors. Due care was taken whilst 
compiling the CGSs, considering both reliability and validity aspects. To the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, she completed the most comprehensive South African corporate 
governance database for an academic study to date. 
The ROA, ROE and EPS accounting-based ratios and two market-based measures, namely 
TSR and risk-adjusted abnormal return were used as proxies for the financial performance of 
the sample firms. The financial data were sourced from McGregor BFA (2013) and the BER 
(2013). See Sections 5.9.45.9.5 for a detailed discussion of these financial performance 
variables. 
The secondary data were analysed by means of both descriptive and inferential statistics. 
Descriptive statistics, such as the mean, median and standard deviation, were employed to 
describe the dataset. A mixed-model ANOVA was used to determine whether the observed 
differences between the annual mean CGSs for the complete sample and for the two data sub-
sets (listed and delisted firms) were significant. Simple and multiple panel regression models 
(fixed effects, random effects and pooled OLS) were used to examine the relationship 
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between CGS and EPS, ROA, ROE and TSR respectively. Where applicable, adjustments 
were made for heteroskedasticity. Panel regression analyses were firstly conducted on the 
complete sample, followed by analyses on the two data sub-sets. Thereafter, one-year lag 
periods were built into the preferred regression models. This was done to determine whether 
the relationship between CGS and financial performance was perhaps not observed 
immediately, but only after a period of time. 
The TSR measure is not adjusted for risk. Risk-adjusted abnormal returns (alphas) were hence 
also considered as a market-based performance measure. Both the CAPM and FamaFrench 
three-factor model were employed to estimate alphas for four corporate governance-sorted 
portfolios. The FTSE/JSE ALSI (J203) revealed that a substantial decrease in JSE-listed 
firms’ share prices started during May 2008 as a result of the global financial crisis. The study 
period was hence divided into two sub-periods, namely the period before May 2008 and the 
period after May 2008. Alphas were also estimated for the four corporate governance 
portfolios for these two sub-periods. Specific attention was paid to whether the portfolio 
consisting of firms with the highest CGSs had positive alphas over the entire study period and 
for the two sub-periods. 
8.3 Main findings from the literature review 
Three main constructs were considered in this study, namely corporate governance, financial 
performance and the 2007–2009 global financial crisis.  
8.3.1 Corporate governance, financial performance and the 20072009 
global financial crisis 
Corporate governance is positioned in the field of RI. Mainstream and responsible investors 
should realise that, by owning a security and earning a return on it, they implicitly approve the 
actions of the investee firm’s managers. The approval of inappropriate actions in this capacity 
is, in effect, immoral (Larmer, 1997). As mentioned earlier, a growing number of investors 
are beginning to consider ESG aspects when making investment decisions and exercising 
their ownership rights. Corporate governance is often the first level of ESG engagement for 
investors (World Federation of Exchanges, 2010: 2). 
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An important objective of sound corporate governance is to ensure that financiers, such as 
shareholders, receive a sustainable return on their investment (Jostarndt, 2007; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). Previous studies (conducted by, amongst others, Babatunde & Olaniran, 2009; 
Klapper & Love, 2004; Ramdani & Van Witteloostuijn, 2010; Sanda et al., 2005; Velnampy, 
2013) considered whether there are financial benefits associated with corporate governance 
compliance. These studies yielded inconclusive evidence on the relationship between 
corporate governance and various financial performance measures.  
Most of the above-mentioned studies were conducted in developed countries. South Africa 
has a well-developed corporate governance framework to aid corporate governance research 
in the emerging market context. Former African researchers (see Ehikioya, 2009; Kajola, 
2008; Sanda et al., 2005) mainly focused on board-specific variables when conducting 
corporate governance research. In contrast, the researcher used a comprehensive corporate 
governance research instrument to compile CGSs for each of the considered JSE-listed firms 
over the period 20022010. 
The study period was marked by sound economic growth during the early 2000s, followed by 
a financial crisis period that started in 2007. Previous researchers found that sound corporate 
governance mechanisms mitigated the negative effects of a crisis (Chang et al., 1998; Moody-
Stewart, 2009). Unfortunately, inefficient corporate governance compliance was cited as one 
of the factors contributing to the 20072009 global financial crisis (Kirkpatrick, 2009). This 
crisis had a negative influence on the share performance of firms globally, including South 
Africa (Madubeko, 2010). The impact of the 20072009 crisis period on the considered 
relationship between corporate governance and financial performance could hence not be 
ignored. 
8.3.2 The South African regulatory environment 
The JSE Listing Requirements (JSE, 2005; 2012) oblige listed firms to disclose their 
compliance (or explain non-compliance) with the voluntary King guidelines in their annual 
reports. Not all stakeholders are, however, satisfied with the King Reports’ voluntary 
compliance approach. Theo Botha, a prominent South African shareholder activist, claimed in 
2009 that the (then newly released) King III Report is “too much carrot [voluntary principles] 
and not enough stick [legislation]” (Carte, 2009). 
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The South African regulatory environment has, in fact, changed rapidly since the publication 
of the King III Report. For example, Regulation 28 of the Pensions Fund Act (Act No. 24 of 
1956) was amended in 2011 to promote the inclusion of ESG considerations in pension funds’ 
investment analysis and ownership practices (Compliance Institute of South Africa, 2011). In 
the same year, the CRISA was introduced to provide institutional investors with guidance to 
give effect to the recommendations of the King III Report, as well as the UN PRI principles 
(IoDSA, 2011). As the South African regulatory environment is evolving rapidly, JSE-listed 
firms have to continue to adapt accordingly to survive and prosper. 
8.4 Main findings from the empirical investigation 
In this section, the main empirical findings of the study are summarised. 
8.4.1 Corporate governance compliance of the complete sample 
In 2002, the mean CGS was 39 (out of a maximum score of 74). By 2010, the mean CGS was 
59. The sample firms’ compliance with the King II guidelines thus improved substantially 
over time. A possible reason for this trend could be attributed to the JSE that enforced 
compliance, and the explanation of non-compliance with the King II guidelines through its 
2005 listing requirements. It should be noted that some sample companies might have 
employed corporate governance initiatives that were not specifically recommended by the 
King II Report or the PIC (2011). Compliance initiatives that did not form part of the 
discussed corporate governance categories were not scored. 
An encouraging result was that the disclosure and acceptability dimensions of the CGS more 
equally contributed to the mean score by 2010 than in 2002. Over time, the sample companies 
thus improved both their disclosure of corporate governance practices and the acceptability 
thereof. It is possible that some sample firms already had moderate corporate governance 
compliance at the beginning of the study period. Over time, these firms’ corporate role 
players could have learned how to disclose compliance practices properly in their annual 
reports. As a result, such firms could have received higher CGSs towards 2010. The actual 
corporate governance practices of such firms did not necessarily improve, but their disclosure 
did. Although the average CGSs and the disclosure and acceptability dimensions improved 
over the study period, the sample firms, on average, only complied with approximately 68 per 
cent of the corporate governance criteria for the overall period. 
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Firms that operated in the smaller, more regulated industries, namely Health Care and 
Telecommunications, seemed to have higher overall average compliance than firms listed in 
the large industries. Competition to comply with the King guidelines to attract investor 
attention might possibly be fiercer in small industries than in large industries. The mean CGSs 
of all six industries revealed an increasing trend. Consumer Goods and Industrials firms, 
however, had large persisting differences between their maximum and minimum CGSs. Some 
of the firms operating in these two industries showed a disconcerting lack of compliance at 
the end of the study period. 
8.4.2 Corporate governance compliance of the two data sub-sets 
Previous researchers (such as Chiraz & Anis, 2013: 125; Serve et al., 2012) found that 
delisted firms generally had weaker and less effective corporate governance mechanisms 
compared to listed firms. In line with this finding, in the current study, the sub-set of listed 
firms had higher mean CGSs for the largest part of the study period than their delisted 
counterparts. Some companies that remained listed perhaps had sufficient financial resources 
available to fund costly corporate governance initiatives, resulting in high average CGSs. On 
the other hand, some firms’ efficient corporate governance compliance could have resulted in 
improved financial performance. As a result, such firms “survived” and remained listed. 
Not all the sample firms were, however, interested in complying with the King guidelines. In 
the annual reports of some well-known listed and delisted firms, managers and directors 
questioned whether a “tick-box” compliance approach really aided corporate governance in 
practice. It was also questioned whether the standardised King guidelines are actually 
applicable to all firms. These are valid concerns. 
It was evident from the content analysis that corporate governance was regarded by some 
listed and delisted companies as red tape that costs them “unnecessary” time and money. If 
compliance initiatives are too costly, firms might decide not to comply with some of the King 
guidelines. As a result, companies might even decide to delist from the JSE. If the market also 
perceives corporate governance compliance as unnecessarily costly, shareholders’ perceptions 
with regard to high compliance firms could become negative. Such negative perceptions 
might have an adverse impact on TSRs. 
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8.4.3 Corporate governance compliance concerns 
It was apparent that certain companies presented their compliance initiatives in a very 
favourable light (perhaps too favourable). Despite a recommendation by the King II Report 
that corporate decision-makers should be credible and responsible individuals, it seemed as if 
not all managers and board members behaved in a truly responsible manner. The apparent 
lack of integrity of some sample firms’ directors and managers is disconcerting.  
Since 2011, the legal liability of directors increased, mainly as a result of the requirements of 
the new Companies Act (Act No. 71 of 2008). Directors can now be held personally liable for 
losses incurred through knowingly carrying on the firm’s operations recklessly or with the 
intent to defraud stakeholders (Levenstein, 2011; Marx, 2014). Corporate role players are thus 
forced to take responsibility for their actions. If an ethical business climate is cultivated, the 
need for more enforcing legislation might decrease in future. 
Most NEDs and executives have a finance background, as indicated in their CVs that are 
published in the sample firms’ annual reports. Such individuals often tend to measure 
corporate inputs and outputs only in monetary terms. However, the value of corporate 
governance compliance is difficult to measure. The author of the book Common stocks and 
uncommon profits, Philip Fisher (1996), claimed, “the share market is filled with individuals 
who know the price of everything, but the value of nothing”. Being a financial management 
academic herself, the researcher can associate with some board members’ and managers’ 
observed initial lack of understanding and appreciation of the possible value that corporate 
governance compliance can add to a firm and its relevant stakeholders. 
In line with Fisher’s remark, the 2012 Investment Solutions survey (conducted for 28 local 
and 17 global investment managers) (Investment Solutions, 2012) revealed a lack of clarity 
and frustration amongst respondents on the practicality of implementing ESG initiatives. 
Furthermore, the readiness of investors to accept that an ESG focus requires a shift from a 
short-term to a long-term view was doubted. The question could accordingly be asked 
whether the insufficient corporate governance compliance of some sample firms should be 
ascribed to the managers’ and directors’ reluctance to allocate time and money to compliance 
initiatives, and/or to a lack of understanding and appreciation by investors.  
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Some managers, directors and shareholders seemed not to understand that, if sustainable 
corporate practices are put into place, they can “do well by doing good” (The Nielsen 
Company, 2014). Furthermore, some investors might not have recognised or appreciated the 
reduction in risk that is associated with sound corporate governance compliance.  
The researcher believes that corporate governance (and environmental and social) compliance 
is of critical importance to the long-term sustainable performance of companies. Based on the 
findings of the current study, it is clear that investors and corporate decision-makers ought to 
reflect in more detail on the benefits of effective corporate governance compliance. Investors 
and corporate decision-makers should realise that the associated benefits are often not seen 
over the short term, but rather over a longer-term period. 
8.4.4 A relationship or not: that is the question 
The descriptive statistics showed that the mean EPS values were positive for all considered 
years. During the 20072009 global financial crisis, a slight decrease was observed in the 
mean EPS values. Irrespective of the crisis period, a positive relationship was observed 
between CGS and the accounting-based EPS measure, irrespective of whether CGS was 
considered the dependent or independent variable. When these variables were lagged, the 
positive relationship prevailed. 
A potential explanation for the positive lagged association is that more profitable firms could 
plow back more earnings into projects, including corporate governance initiatives, in the 
following year than their less profitable counterparts. It should be noted that a firm’s 
managers have some control over both EPS and the level of corporate governance 
compliance. The positive association between CGS and EPS could partly be ascribed to the 
actions of managers. 
In contrast to the above-mentioned positive association, a negative relationship was reported 
between CGS and the market-based TSR measure. The negative relationship prevailed 
irrespective of whether TSR was entered as the dependent or independent variable in the 
preferred regression model. The relationship also remained negative despite the lagging of the 
CGS and TSR variables.  
A surprising result was that no significant relationship was reported between CGS and TSR 
for the data sub-set of delisted firms. This result was in contrast to the significant negative 
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association reported between these two variables for the listed firms. The observed 
relationship between CGS and TSR was thus of more significance for listed firms than for 
delisted companies. Since the delisted companies provided such contrasting results compared 
to their listed counterparts, the exclusion of delisted firms could possibly expose the results of 
future corporate governance researchers to survivorship bias. 
Four possible explanations were considered for the negative relationship between CGS and 
TSR for the complete sample. Firstly, as mentioned in Section 8.4.2, corporate governance 
compliance can be costly, both in terms of time and money allocated to compliance 
initiatives. The market could perceive such costs as “unnecessary expenses”. Furthermore, 
certain sample firms probably employed window-dressing practices. Some shareholder 
activists are rather sceptical about the true nature of many JSE-listed firms’ compliance 
practices. The combination of high compliance costs and perceived window-dressing 
activities might have affected the market’s perception of corporate governance compliance. 
Thirdly, investors often follow the proverbial herd. Behavioural finance theory suggests that 
investors can influence each other’s perceptions, e.g. of a specific firm or industry’s corporate 
governance compliance practices, in a positive or negative manner. Herding behaviour is 
especially apparent during crisis periods. During the 20072009 global financial crisis, some 
of the sample firms probably continued to spend money on corporate governance practices, 
despite the fact that their performance declined. If an increasing number of investors 
perceived high CGSs in a negative light, mainly due to the considerable amount of time and 
money allocated to compliance initiatives, others might have followed. The mean TSRs were 
negatively affected by the 20072009 global financial crisis, while the CGSs continued to 
improve despite the crisis. As a fourth reason, it could be difficult to infer whether the 
observed negative relationship was due to the market’s negative reactions and a lack of 
appreciation for the firms’ corporate governance initiatives, or rather due to changes in the 
CGS and TSR variables over the study period. 
Erkens et al. (2012) reported results in line with the observation that the crisis possibly 
affected the association between TSR and CGS. These authors found that firms with more 
independent boards (a favourable corporate governance measure) sampled from 30 countries 
had significantly lower TSRs compared to other firms during this crisis period. They ascribed 
this result to the risk that firms with high institutional ownership took prior to the crisis 
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period. The firms’ risk-taking behaviour possibly resulted in large shareholder losses during 
the crisis. 
When interpreting the relationship between CGS and the considered financial performance 
measures, it should be noted that the TSR market-based measure is not adjusted for risk. Both 
the CAPM and FamaFrench three-factor model were hence employed to estimate risk-
adjusted abnormal share returns for four corporate governance-sorted portfolios.  
In an encouraging change of events, the CAPM-based regression revealed significant positive 
alphas for portfolio CG 4 (compiled of the firms with the highest CGSs) over the entire study 
period, as well as for the period before May 2008 (when the J203 was employed as the market 
proxy). When the FamaFrench three-factor model was used, portfolio CG 4 also had 
significant positive alphas for both the aforementioned periods. Drobetz et al. (2004) also 
applied the FamaFrench three-factor model and found a positive relationship between the 
corporate governance compliance and firm valuation of a sample of German firms over the 
period January 1998March 2002. 
The CAPM-based regression analyses showed significant positive alphas for portfolio CG 1 
(consisting of the firms with the lowest CGSs) for the period before May 2008. While the 
economy was doing well, investors who invested in portfolio CG 1 thus received positive 
risk-adjusted abnormal returns, despite the firms’ lack of corporate governance compliance. 
This situation, however, changed during the period after May 2008. The CAPM regression 
analysis for the period after May 2008 showed that portfolio CG 1 had a not significant 
negative alpha. On the other hand, portfolio CG 4 (including firms with the highest 
compliance) had a positive, albeit not significant, alpha. 
When the size and value/growth factors were taken into account, the FamaFrench three-
factor analyses showed negative not significant alphas for both portfolios CG 1 and CG 4 
after May 2008. The risk-adjusted returns of almost all the sample firms were hence 
negatively affected during the crisis period. 
In conclusion, both hypotheses (refer to Section 1.4.4) were rejected based on the empirical 
evidence. 
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8.5 Recommendations 
Based on the main findings, a number of recommendations are now presented for various 
stakeholder groups, namely directors and managers, private sector training providers and 
consultants, educators, investors, the media, policymakers and lobby groups, the King 
Committee and the PIC as well as ESG data providers. 
8.5.1 Recommendations for directors and managers 
It was evident from the content analysis that the philosophy behind the King Reports was not 
yet “sold” to the board members and managers of all the sample firms. Inefficient corporate 
governance compliance practices were furthermore observed in some annual reports. The 
researcher is thus of the opinion that directors and managers could benefit from corporate 
governance training on the correct and most efficient application of the King guidelines in 
practice. 
Although in-house training and development of directors increased over the research period, 
as reported in Table 6.8, approximately a quarter of the firms still had no board development 
programme by 2010. Furthermore, in cases where director development was offered, it was 
mostly offered to new and inexperienced directors. As the business environment is constantly 
changing, directors’ behaviour should be evaluated regularly to assess their specific training 
needs. The researcher recommends that firms consider bi-annual training or when necessitated 
due to the publication of new corporate governance guidelines or legislation. Firms could also 
consider providing training for the entire directorate and not just for inexperienced members. 
Some directors and managers are making a conscious effort to implement sustainable ESG-
practices. These corporate role players realise that sound ESG compliance might enhance 
their firms’ reputation (The Nielsen Company, 2014). On the other hand, inappropriate 
actions of managers and directors might damage a company’s reputation (Sweeting, 
2011: 109). If directors and managers are properly trained, they might be able to act more 
appropriately when faced with various challenges, including those in the corporate 
governance arena. Possible reputational damage might then be reduced. 
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8.5.2 Recommendations for private sector training providers and 
consultants 
Training for directors and managers is offered by various private sector training providers and 
consultants in South Africa. The IoDSA (2014) offers a range of workshops to equip directors 
with the necessary skills to carry out their responsibilities effectively. The Ethics Institute of 
South Africa (2014b) provides ethics-related training to managers. Common topics included 
in their training sessions are ethical decision-making, whistle-blowing and the prevention of 
corruption. It is recommended that more ethics-related training be provided to directors and 
managers. The focus should be placed on cultivating a credible, ethical and accountable 
corporate culture. The leaders of a firm determine its ethical climate. If a director or a 
manager acts contrary to the firm’s ethical values, his or her contract should not be renewed 
(or should even be terminated if the case warrants it). 
Training activities should ideally be customised to suit the needs of a specific firm. Based on 
the compliance concerns highlighted in Chapter 6, the following training topics are suggested: 
the role of independent NEDs, the risks of over-boardedness and the nature of non-financial 
reporting. As mentioned in Section 4.3.4, the increasing wage gap in South Africa has been 
drawing the attention of various stakeholders, most notably employees and trade unions. The 
growing gap between the remuneration of executives and other employees can have serious 
negative consequences, as illustrated by the Marikana incident in 2012.  
A firm’s remuneration committee is supposed to give shareholders confidence in the 
outcomes of the executive emolument process. This committee’s members should all be 
NEDs, of which more than 50 per cent should be independent. The committee’s chair should 
also be an independent NED (IoDSA, 2002). In addition to their important role on the 
remuneration committee, NEDs are also supposed to monitor executive directors’ actions and 
remove incompetent board members (Krantz, 2010). A lack of independent NEDs, both on 
boards and on committees, was unfortunately observed throughout the study period. The role 
and importance of independent NEDs could be highlighted during training sessions. 
The second training need is related to over-boardedness. Many of the observed directors 
seemed very “busy”. The problems associated with over-boardedness, such as schedule 
conflict and a lack of adequate involvement could hence be explained during training 
sessions.  
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The last training recommendation is related to integrated reporting. The sample firms 
obtained the lowest overall mean scores for the sustainability reporting category (see Table 
6.7) relative to the other eight categories. This observation is disconcerting, especially in the 
light of the required publication of integrated reports since 2011. Managers hence need to be 
trained in terms of how to report properly on their firms’ financial and on non-financial (ESG) 
considerations. 
8.5.3 Recommendations for educators 
Educators in commerce programmes mainly teach students core financial concepts. 
Unfortunately, very little attention is currently given to non-financial ESG considerations in 
mainstream financial and investment management modules, both at undergraduate and post-
graduate level. Commerce students thus typically lack knowledge and an understanding of 
ESG aspects. They should therefore receive exposure to topics such as responsible investing, 
the morality of incorporating ESG considerations into investment analysis and ownership 
practices, and the investment-related risks associated with poor corporate governance 
compliance. Since students are likely to become the next generation of shareholders, 
managers, directors, fund managers and pension fund trustees in South Africa, it is of the 
utmost importance that they be properly educated on financial, ESG and ethical 
considerations. 
Investors could be of the opinion that a firm and its operations should be viewed in an 
ethically neutral manner. Such individuals exhibit amoral behaviour when it comes to ESG 
considerations. An amoral individual is neither moral nor immoral and lacks moral standards 
and knowledge (Rossouw & Van Vuuren, 2013: 4445). Commerce educators typically teach 
large groups of students. They consequently have a considerable opportunity to change 
perceptions relating to the importance of ESG considerations as factors influencing 
sustainable returns. Education might sway students from being amoral to being moral when 
acting as shareholders, auditors, managers or directors of South African or global companies 
in future. 
8.5.4 Recommendations for investors 
In this study, the question was asked whether there is an association between corporate 
governance and financial performance. A negative relationship was reported between CGS 
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and TSR. It is possible that investors ignored the risks associated with low corporate 
governance compliance. The returns of firms with low CGSs are most likely less sustainable 
than the returns of high compliance firms. Rossouw and Van Vuuren (2013: 44) noted that 
shareholders are often amoral and consequently not very concerned about how ethically or 
sustainably their returns are generated. Corporate governance failures might thus partly be 
blamed on “absent” shareholders and their lack of monitoring managers’ actions (Heath, 
2014). 
On a more positive note, the researcher found that, when risk-adjusted market-based 
performance was considered, a portfolio of firms with the highest CGSs delivered a 
significant positive alpha over the nine-year study period. These encouraging results were 
reported for both the CAPM and FamaFrench three-factor estimations. Investors could have 
benefitted in risk-adjusted terms if they invested in the sample firms with sound corporate 
governance compliance practices over the study period. 
In addition to financial gains, shareholders can also derive non-financial benefits from their 
investment activities. Shareholders can promote changes in their investee firms by applying 
several mechanisms. They could, for example, engage in private negotiations, which is often 
the case in South Africa. Shareholders could also file shareholder resolutions, vote at AGMs 
and/or divest by selling all their shares in a specific firm. However, given the relatively small 
size of the JSE, divesting is not always a viable option for institutional investors in South 
Africa (Leeman, 2003). Baue (2002) explains that the exclusion of certain JSE-listed firms or 
entire industries will significantly reduce the investment universe and will result in poorly 
diversified portfolios. 
Engagement usually takes place behind closed doors (Bauer & Viehs, 2012). This is also the 
case in South Africa. Given the lack of transparency, more public engagement between 
shareholders, managers and directors should be encouraged. Solutions for corporate 
governance concerns might be found collectively. Despite the fact that South African 
shareholders are still relatively passive (Ernst & Young, 2007; OECD, 2012b), the researcher 
expects that shareholder activism will increase in future. Shareholder activists might then 
steer boards in the right compliance direction. The main driver of shareholder activism is 
likely to come from making current and future investors aware of the phenomenon and the 
different strategies available to them through education and the media. 
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8.5.5 Recommendations for the media 
A critical part of good corporate governance is good reporting (Hanks & Gardiner, 2012). 
Listed firms should therefore follow rigorous corporate governance compliance and reporting 
procedures. According to media reports (Heath, 2014; Lipton, 2013; Morar Incorporated, 
2014), the “obsession with tick-box compliance” can destroy room for corporate governance 
compliance flexibility in practice. An example is a CEO who also serves as chairperson and 
who delivers outstanding service. Some shareholders, directors and managers have also 
publicly questioned whether compliance with the King guidelines is truly an efficient measure 
of sound corporate governance practices.  
The media play an important informative role in South Africa (Lekhesa, 2009) and closely 
monitor the corporate governance compliance (or the lack thereof) of listed companies. Focus 
is, however, often placed on disclosure and not necessarily on the acceptability of the reported 
corporate governance practices. The media can also be used to promote discussions on the 
acceptability or unacceptability of the currently used corporate governance guidelines.  
Shareholder activists, such as Theo Botha, often employ the media to highlight corporate 
governance failures. Although such exposure in the media serves a purpose to inform the 
market of inappropriate actions, the market’s perception of corporate governance could be 
unduly affected by the inappropriate actions of a few firms. As part of its informative role, the 
media could also report on corporate governance success stories. Shareholders might then 
become familiar with and invest in well-governed firms. They can accordingly vote with their 
heads, instead of merely voting with their feet by selling the shares of poorly governed firms 
(Bauer & Guenster, 2003). 
8.5.6 Recommendations for policymakers and lobby groups 
The sample firms only complied with approximately 68 per cent of the corporate governance 
guidelines for the overall study period. The lack of compliance among some companies could 
lead to the question whether voluntary compliance guidelines, such as the King Reports, are 
sufficient in South Africa, or whether these guidelines should be legislated. If the observed 
lack of compliance continues in future, policymakers might have to consider the 
implementation of legislation to ensure corporate governance compliance. 
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On the other hand, the Greek philosopher Plato observed in 402 BC that “good people [firms] 
do not need laws to tell them to act responsibly, while bad people [firms] always find a way 
around the law” (cited in Parsons, 2004). In line with Plato’s argument, the researcher is of 
the opinion that legislation will not necessarily improve South African firms’ corporate 
governance compliance. She rather recommends corporate governance education and training 
to address insufficient and ineffective compliance practices. 
Lobby groups, such as the Association for Savings and Investment South Africa (2014), could 
exert more pressure on asset owners and managers to consider and evaluate the voluntary 
corporate governance compliance practices of JSE-listed firms. If the association determines 
that a specific investee company has insufficient corporate governance compliance practices, 
the lobby group should engage with the firm’s managers and directors to address the observed 
lack of compliance. 
8.5.7 Recommendations for the King Committee and the PIC 
In this study, it was evident that some directors held a considerable number of directorships. 
There was, however, a lack of guidelines to evaluate directors’ over-boardedness over the 
study period. The King III Report (IoDSA, 2009) only mentions that directors should not hold 
more directorships than is reasonable for them to exercise due care, skill and diligence. It is 
therefore recommended that the King Committee include a more detailed discussion on over-
boardedness and the associated risks in the forthcoming King IV Report. A specific limit 
could be provided on the maximum number of directorships that one director may hold. 
The King III Report refers only briefly to the interests of asset managers and institutional 
investors. In future King Reports, more details on the interests of these stakeholders could be 
provided. Furthermore, although the concept ‘integrated report’ is explained in the third King 
Report (IoDSA, 2009), limited reference is made to environmental and social considerations 
and guidelines. In practice, there is, however, considerable pressure on institutional investors 
and asset managers to consider ESG aspects when making investment decisions. Regulation 
28 of the Pensions Fund Act (Act No. 24 of 1956), for example, promotes the inclusion of 
ESG considerations in pension funds, investment analysis and ownership practices. It thus 
seems as if there is a gap between the theoretical King guidelines and the practical 
requirements. The King Committee should engage more closely with asset managers and 
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institutional investors to determine their specific corporate governance (as well as 
environmental and social) needs and concerns. 
The King II and III Reports and the PIC (2011) focused on corporate governance compliance. 
Both the King Committee and the PIC could extend their guidelines in future to include a 
detailed discussion on the value and possible measurement of social and environmental 
considerations as well. 
8.5.8 Recommendations for ESG data providers 
To date, a major limitation for responsible investors and researchers in South Africa has been 
a lack of available and verified ESG data (US SIF, 2009). The researcher also experienced 
this obstacle. Since there are only a few such data providers at present, including Bloomberg 
and MSCI, the costs associated with providing ESG data are high. Although institutional 
investors could possibly gain access to such data, individual investors might struggle to obtain 
access to ESG databases. The researcher therefore recommends that more data providers 
investigate the provision of ESG data for JSE-listed companies. 
8.6 Limitations of the research and recommendations for future 
research 
Four limitations became evident as this study unfolded. These are discussed in detail in the 
following section. 
8.6.1 Limitations of the research 
Firstly, the sample only included firms from six JSE industries. Three industries (Basic 
Materials, Oil and Gas and Financials) were excluded due to the nature of these firms’ 
financial reporting and activities that differ from those of the sample firms. Furthermore, the 
Financials industry is heavily regulated. During the research period, no firms were listed in 
Utilities, and this industry was therefore also omitted. Basic Materials and Financials are two 
large industries in the South African economy. The firms that were listed in the excluded 
industries could possibly have provided results that differed from those of the considered 
industries. The size of the excluded firms could have had an impact on the results. 
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Secondly, CGSs were compiled for the firms over a limited period of nine years (20022010). 
For this purpose, a comprehensive research instrument was developed, focusing on the G-
component of ESG, namely corporate governance. However, social and environmental factors 
might also influence investors’ decisions. There was a lack of reliable instruments to measure 
the environmental and social compliance of JSE-listed firms in 2010, when this study 
commenced. The researcher was thus limited to the inclusion of only corporate governance 
considerations, based on the recommendations of the King II Report and the PIC. It should be 
noted that the limited timeframe excluded the possible effect of the King III Report on issues 
such as integrated reporting. 
Thirdly, only the annual reports that were available on the McGregor BFA (2013) database 
were considered. Some firms might have published separate sustainability reports or 
unaudited sustainability-related information on their websites. For consistency purposes, only 
the data that were available on the McGregor BFA (2013) database were examined. The 
possible exclusion of separate sustainability reports could have affected the scores that were 
allocated for the sustainability reporting category. 
Lastly, focus was placed on specific accounting-based and market-based financial 
performance measures. These measures were selected based on previous research. There are 
different types of performance that could be evaluated by employing various performance 
measures. The inclusion of other performance measures might have resulted in different 
findings.  
Despite the acknowledged limitations, the research findings still contribute considerably to 
the body of knowledge regarding the relationship between corporate governance and financial 
performance. 
8.6.2 Recommendations for future research 
The researcher assessed the corporate governance compliance of a sample of JSE-listed firms 
by means of content analysis. Future researchers could conduct interviews with some of the 
firms’ managers and directors to determine their perceptions of value-adding corporate 
governance initiatives. This may be supplemented by interviews with local investment 
managers and institutional investors to determine how they perceive JSE-listed firms’ 
corporate governance compliance and what they regard as acceptable compliance practices. 
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The CGSs and the discussed corporate governance issues and recommended initiatives could 
then be compared to identify specific compliance areas that should be addressed. 
Future researchers could develop a questionnaire to determine the nature of the ESG data that 
institutional investors require. The research instrument that was used in the current study 
could then be adapted, in line with these recommendations and the King guidelines. The 
identified needs could also be communicated to data providers to address the lack of required 
data. 
Other corporate governance researchers could conduct a study, similar to this PhD, for the 
period after 2010. They could base their compliance criteria on the recommendations of the 
King III Report. Afterwards, they could compare their results with the results of the current 
study to determine whether the observed negative relationship between CGS and TSR and the 
positive relationship between CGS and EPS still prevail in “normal” market conditions. 
In the current study, very low and low to average minimum CGSs were observed for firms 
listed in the Consumer Goods and Industrials industries. Further investigation is required to 
determine the possible reasons for these firms’ observed lack of compliance. The researcher 
also observed some possibly over-boarded directors. Stürmer (2013) confirms that some JSE-
listed firms’ directors are indeed over-boarded. Other researchers might consider the 
relationship between over-boardedness and value-based performance. The excluded industries 
(Basic Materials, Oil and Gas and Financials) could furthermore be considered separately in 
future research to determine the relationship between their financial performance and 
corporate governance. 
8.7 Concluding remarks 
In the introduction to this study, Schopenhauer (1788–1860) was cited as saying, “there are 
three steps in the revelation of any truth, firstly, it is ridiculed; secondly, it is resisted and 
thirdly, it is considered self-evident” (cited in Viviers et al., 2009: 3). Based on the observed 
negative association between CGS and TSR, it seemed as if corporate governance compliance 
is, to a certain extent, not properly understood or appreciated. However, if more shareholders 
come “on board” by realising and appreciating the possible benefits associated with sound 
corporate governance compliance, such as positive risk-adjusted returns, the need to legislate 
corporate governance compliance in future could be avoided.  
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Directors, managers and stakeholders should realise that sound corporate governance 
compliance is essential – and not optional – to firms’ long-term success. Corporate 
governance education and training, alongside increased awareness created by the media, 
might change the mind-sets of corporate role players. They might then consider the valuable 
opportunities that corporate governance compliance might offer to them, rather than regarding 
such compliance as a mere obligation. As a result, acceptable corporate governance 
compliance might be considered self-evident in future. 
The researcher would like to conclude with the words of the executive Kitty D’Alessio who 
said, “Open the [corporate] windows, let in the year that we are living in” (QFINANCE, 
2014b). We are living in a time when sustainable performance is of the utmost importance for 
the long-term survival and prosperity of firms and their stakeholders. 
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APPENDIX 1 
SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH 
INSTRUMENT 
Not indicated due to a confidentiality agreement between the researcher and the 
Centre for Corporate Governance in Africa at the University of Stellenbosch 
Business School. 
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APPENDIX 2 
FTSE GLOBAL CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 
AND THE ICB 
The FTSE Global Classification System consisted of three tiers. Table 1 provides a 
breakdown of the three tiers into 10 economic groups, 36 industry sectors and 102 industry 
sub-sectors (JSE, 2004). 
Table 1: FTSE Global Classification System 
Economic 
group 
Industry sectors Industry sub-sectors 
Resources 
Mining 
(Coal)
*
; Gold Mining; (Platinum); Mining Finance; (Diamond); 
Other Mineral Extractors & Mines 
Oil & Gas 
Oil & Gas – Exploration & Production; Oil – Services; Oil – 
Integrated 
Basic 
Industries 
Chemicals 
Chemicals – Commodity; Chemicals – Advanced materials; 
Chemicals – Speciality 
Construction & 
Building Materials 
Builders Merchants; Building & Construction Materials; House 
Building; Other Construction 
Forestry & Paper Forestry; Paper 
Steel & Other Metals Non-ferrous Metals; Steel 
General 
Industrials 
Aerospace & Defence Aerospace; Defence 
Diversified Industrials Diversified Industrials 
Electronic & Electrical 
Equipment 
Electrical Equipment; Electronic Equipment 
Engineering & 
Machinery 
Commercial Vehicles & Trucks; Engineering – Contractors; 
Engineering Fabricators; Engineering – General 
Cyclical 
Consumer 
Goods 
Automobiles & Parts Automobiles; Auto Parts; Tyres & Rubber; Vehicle Distribution 
Household Goods & 
Textiles 
Clothing & Footwear; Furnishings & Floor Coverings; 
Household Appliances & Housewares; Leisure Equipment; Other 
Textiles & Leather Goods; Consumer Electronics 
Non-cyclical 
Consumer 
Goods 
Beverages 
Beverages – Brewers; Beverages – Distillers & Vintners; Soft 
Drinks 
Food Producers & 
Processors 
Farming & Fishing; Food Processors 
Health 
Health Maintenance Organisations; Hospital Management & 
Long Term Care; Medical Equipment & Supplies; Other Health 
Care 
Personal Care & 
Household Products 
Household Products; Personal Products 
Pharmaceuticals & 
Biotechnology 
Pharmaceuticals; Biotechnology 
Tobacco Tobacco 
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Economic 
group 
Industry sectors Industry sub-sectors 
Cyclical 
Services 
General Retailers 
Discount & Super Stores & Warehouses; Retailers e-Commerce; 
Retailers – Hardlines; Retailers – Multi Department; Retailers – 
Soft Goods 
Leisure & Hotels 
Gambling (Gaming); Hotels; Leisure Facilities; Restaurant & 
Pubs; (Home Entertainment, other than those classified in the 
Media & Photography Sector) 
Media & Photography 
Television, Radio & Filmed Entertainment (Broadcasting 
Contractors); Subscription Entertainment Network (Cable & 
Satellite); Media Agencies; Photography; Publishing & Printing 
Support Services 
Business Support Services; Delivery Services; Education, 
Business Training & Employment Agencies; Environmental 
Control; Transaction & Payroll Services; Security & Alarm 
Services; (Funerals & Cemeteries); (Laundries & Cleaners) 
Transport Airlines & Airports; Rail, Road & Freight; Shipping & Ports 
Non-cyclical 
Services 
Food & Drug Retailers Food & Drug Retailers 
Telecommunication 
Services 
Fixed-line Telecommunication Services; Wireless 
Telecommunication Services 
Utilities 
Electricity Electricity 
Utilities – other (Gas 
Distribution; Water) 
Water; Gas Distribution; Multi-Utilities 
Financials 
Banks Banks 
Insurance 
Insurance Brokers, Insurance – Non-Life; Re-insurance; Other 
Insurance 
Life Assurance Life Assurance 
Investment Companies Investment Companies (eligible for index inclusion) 
Real Estate 
Real Estate Holding & Development; Property Agencies; Real 
Estate Investment Trusts 
Speciality & Other 
Finance 
Asset Managers; Consumer Finance; Investment Banks; 
Mortgage Finance; Other Financial 
Investment Entities Investment Entities (eligible for index inclusion) 
Information 
Technology 
Information Technology 
Hardware 
Computer Hardware; Semiconductors; Telecommunications 
Equipment 
Software & Computer 
Services 
Computer Services; Internet; Software 
* 
The FTSE/JSE Global Classification System as used by the JSE (2002) differed slightly from the 
FTSE Global Classification System (FTSE, 2003). Differences are indicated in Table 1: 
 
 industry sub-sectors indicated by the JSE, but not by the FTSE Global Classification System are 
indicated in brackets;  
 if the JSE indicated a different name for a specific industry sub-sector, the name is indicated in brackets 
next to the name used by the FTSE Global Classification System; and  
 if the FTSE Global Classification System mentioned an industry sub-Sector, which was not indicated by 
the JSE, it is indicated in italics (FTSE, 2003). 
Source: FTSE (2003); JSE (2002) 
The ICB (JSE, 2004), which is currently used by the JSE, comprises four tiers, consisting of 
10 industries (previously known as “economic groups”), 18 super-sectors, 39 sectors 
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(previously “industry sectors”) and 104 sub-sectors (previously “industry sub-sectors”), as 
indicated in Table 2. 
Table 2: ICB industries, super-sectors, sectors and sub-sectors 
Industry Super-sector Sector Sub-sector 
Oil & Gas 
 
Oil & Gas 
 
Oil & Gas Producers 
Exploration & Production; Integrated 
Oil & Gas 
Oil Equipment, 
Services & 
Distribution 
Oil Equipment & Services; Pipelines 
Alternative Energy 
Renewable Energy Equipment; 
Alternative Fuels 
Basic Materials 
Chemicals Chemicals 
Commodity Chemicals; Specialty 
Chemicals 
Basic Resources 
 
Forestry & Paper Forestry; Paper 
Industrial Metals & 
Mining 
Aluminium; Nonferrous Metals; Iron 
& Steel 
Mining 
Coal; Diamonds & Gemstones; 
General Mining; Gold Mining; 
Platinum & Precious Metals 
Industrials 
Construction & 
Materials 
Construction & 
Materials 
Building Materials & Fixtures; Heavy 
Construction 
Industrial Goods & 
Services 
 
Aerospace & Defence Aerospace; Defence 
General Industrials 
Containers & Packaging; Diversified 
Industrials 
Electronic & 
Electrical Equipment 
Electrical Components & Equipment; 
Electronic Equipment 
Industrial Engineering 
Commercial Vehicles & Trucks; 
Industrial Machinery 
Industrial 
Transportation 
Delivery Services; Marine 
Transportation; Railroads; 
Transportation Services; Trucking 
Support Services 
Business Support Services; Business 
Training & Employment Agencies; 
Financial Administration; Industrial 
Suppliers; Waste & Disposal Services 
Consumer Goods 
Automobiles & Parts Automobiles & Parts Automobiles; Auto Parts; Tires 
Food & Beverage 
 
Beverages 
Brewers; Distillers & Vintners; Soft 
Drinks 
Food Producers Farming & Fishing; Food Products 
Personal & 
Household Goods 
 
Household Goods & 
Home Construction 
Durable Household Products; 
Nondurable Household Products; 
Furnishings; Home Construction 
Leisure Goods 
Consumer Electronics; Recreational 
Products; Toys 
Personal Goods 
Clothing & Accessories; Footwear; 
Personal Products 
Tobacco Tobacco 
Health Care 
Health Care 
 
Health Care 
Equipment & 
Services 
Health Care Providers; Medical 
Equipment; Medical Supplies 
Pharmaceuticals & 
Biotechnology 
Biotechnology; Pharmaceuticals 
Consumer Services 
Retail 
 
Food & Drug 
Retailers 
Drug Retailers; Food Retailers & 
Wholesalers 
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Industry Super-sector Sector Sub-sector 
General Retailers 
Apparel Retailers; Broadline 
Retailers; Home Improvement 
Retailers; Specialised Consumer 
Services; Specialty Retailers 
Media Media 
Broadcasting & Entertainment; Media 
Agencies; Publishing 
Travel & Leisure Travel & Leisure 
Airlines; Gambling; Hotels; 
Recreational Services; Restaurants & 
Bars; Travel & Tourism 
Telecommunications 
Telecommunications 
 
Fixed Line 
Telecommunications 
Fixed Line Telecommunications 
Mobile 
Telecommunications 
Mobile Telecommunications 
Utilities 
Utilities 
 
Electricity 
Conventional Electricity; Alternative 
Electricity 
Gas, Water & Multi 
utilities 
Gas Distribution; Multi utilities; 
Water 
Financials 
 
Banks Banks Banks 
Insurance Nonlife Insurance 
Full Line Insurance; Insurance 
Brokers; Property & Casualty 
Insurance; Reinsurance 
 
Life Insurance Life Insurance 
Real Estate 
 
Real Estate 
Investment & 
Services 
Real Estate Holding & Development; 
Real Estate Services 
Real Estate 
Investment Trusts 
Industrial & Office REITs; Retail 
REITs; Residential REITs; 
Diversified REITs; Specialty REITs; 
Mortgage REITs; Hotel & Lodging 
REITs 
Financial Services 
 
Financial Services 
Asset Managers; Consumer Finance; 
Specialty Finance; Investment 
Services; Mortgage Finance 
Equity Investment 
Instruments 
Equity Investment Instruments 
Nonequity Investment 
Instruments 
Nonequity Investment Instruments 
Technology 
Technology 
 
Software & Computer 
Services 
Computer Services; Internet; Software 
Technology Hardware 
& Equipment 
Computer Hardware; Electronic 
Office Equipment; Semiconductors; 
Telecommunications Equipment 
Source: JSE (2009) 
For the purposes of this study, during the period 2002–2005, the FTSE Global Classification 
System was used to group firms. During 2006–2010, the firms’ ICB classification was 
considered. Thereafter, the period 2002–2005 was compared with the period 2006–2010, in 
order to determine whether firms moved amongst the economic groups (or industries) during 
the nine-year study period. In Table 3, changes between the two classification systems that 
were of specific importance to this study are indicated.  
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Table 3:  Considerable changes between the FTSE/JSE Global Classification System 
and the ICB 
FTSE/JSE Global Classification System ICB 
Construction Renamed Construction and Materials, move to Industrials 
General Industrials Renamed Industrials 
Cyclical and Non-cyclical Consumer 
Goods 
Merged; new sector Consumer Goods 
Health, Pharmaceuticals and 
Biotechnology 
Move from Non-cyclical Consumer Goods; Health Care become 
new industry 
Cyclical and Non-cyclical Consumer 
Services 
Merged; new sector Consumer Services 
Telecommunication Services formed part 
of Non-cyclical Consumer Services 
Telecommunications new industry 
Information Technology Renamed Technology 
Support Services Moves from Cyclical Services to Industrials 
Construction and Building Materials 
Renamed Construction and Materials, moved from Basic 
Industries to Industrials 
Transport 
Renamed Industrial Transportation, moves to Industrials; Tourist 
and Consumer-related Transport firms move to the Travel and 
Leisure sector in the Consumer Services Industry 
Source: JSE (2006) 
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APPENDIX 3 
COMPANIES CONSIDERED IN THIS 
STUDY: 2002–2010 
C
o
m
p
a
n
ie
s 
co
n
si
d
er
ed
a
)  
L
is
te
d
/ 
D
el
is
te
d
 
In
d
u
st
ry
 
Y
ea
rs
 
co
n
si
d
er
ed
b
) 
N
u
m
b
er
  
o
f 
a
n
n
u
a
l 
o
b
se
r
v
a
ti
o
n
s 
A
d
d
it
io
n
a
l 
co
m
m
en
ts
 
Acuity Group Holdings 
(Acuity) 
0 6 2003–2002 2 2004 data not available on 
McGregor BFA (2013) 
Gandalf Trust took over control of 
the company on 18 March 2002  
Year end changed in 2002 (15 
months) 
Adcock Ingram Holdings 
(Adcock) 
1 1 2010–2009 2 List 25 August 2008 
Adcorp Holdings (Adcorp) 1 6 2010–2008; 
2006–2002 
8 Year end changed in 2008 (14 
months) 
No 2007 report 
Admiral Leisure World 
(Admiral) 
0 3 2003–2002 2 Year end changed in 2003 (16 
months) 
Advtech Group (Advtech) 1 6; 3 2005–2002 
2010–2008; 
2006 
8 
2010–2008 and 2006 Consumer 
services  
2007 data not completely available 
on McGregor BFA (2013) 
2005–2002 Industrials 
Africa Glass Industries/AG 
Industries (AGI) 
1 6 2009–2008; 
2006–2002 
7 
2010 data not available on 
McGregor BFA (2013)  
2007 annual report not completely 
available on McGregor BFA (2013) 
Renamed in 2002 to AG Industries 
African & Overseas 
Enterprises (Af & Ovr) 
1 3 2010–2002 9 
2010–2003 reported together with 
Rex Trueform Clothing Company 
(principal operating subsidiary) 
African Media 
Entertainment (AME) 
1 3 2010–2009; 
2007–2002 
8 
Year end changed in 2009 (17 
months) 
Afrimat 1 6 2010–2007 4 
List 7 November 2006 
AfroCentric Investment 
Corporation (Afro-C) 
1 2; 1 2010–2007 4 
List 19 May 2006  
2009–2007 Consumer Goods  
2010 Health Care 
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Afrox Healthcare (Ahealth) 0 1 2004–2002 3 
2001 Chemicals 
Alex White Holdings 
(Alexwyt) 
0 6 2005–2002 4 
 
Alliance Pharmaceuticals 
(Alliance) 
0 1 2003–2002 2 
Forim Holdings is the holding 
company 
Allied Electronics 
Corporation (Altron) 
1 6 2010–2008; 
2006–2002 
8 Complete 2007 report not available 
on McGregor BFA 
Allied Technologies 
(Altech) 
1 6; 5 2010–2002 9 2010–2006 Telecommunications  
2005–2002 Industrials 
Amalgamated Appliance 
Holdings (Amaps) 
1 2 2010–2002 9 Changed name to Home of Living 
Brands in 2013  
Year end changed in 2004 (16 
months) 
Amalgamated Beverage 
Industries (ABI) 
0 2 2003–2002 2 Sold to SAB in 2004 
Amalgamated Electronics 
Corporation (Amecor) 
1 6 2010–2006 5 List 29 August 2005 
Anbeeco Investment 
Holdings (Anbeeco) 
0 2 2005–2004; 
2002 
3 2007–2006 moved to Financials 
Year end changed in 2004 (18 
months) 
Anglovaal Industries 
(AVI)/AVI 
1 2 2010–2002 9 Changed name in 2003 to AVI  
ARB Holdings (ARB) 1 6 2010–2008 3 List 20 November 2007 
Argent Industrial (Argent) 1 6 2008–2002 7 2010–2009 Basic materials 
Aspen Pharmacare 
Holdings (Aspen) 
1 1 2010–2002 9  
AST Group (AST)/Gijima 
AST Group (Gijima 
AST)/Gijima Group 
(Gijima) 
1 4 2010–2002 9 Changed name in 2005 to 
GijimaAst and to Gijima Group in 
2010 
Astral Foods (Astral) 1 2 2010–2002 9  
Astrapak 1 6 2010–2002 9  
Austro Group (Austro) 1 6 2010–2008 3 List 1 February 2007 
Avis Southern Africa 
(Avis) 
0 6 2003–2002 2  
Avusa 1 3 2010–2009 2 List 31 March 2008  
Complete 2009 data not available 
on McGregor BFA (2013) 
Formerly known as Johnnic 
Communications  
Unbundled in 2008 from 
ElementOne 
Awethu Breweries 
(Awethu) 
1 2 2010–2002 9  
Barloworld (Barworld) 1 6 2010–2002 9  
Basil Read Holdings 
(Basread) 
1 6 2010–2002 9  
Bearing Man (Bearman) 0 3 2004–2002 3  
Bell Equipment (Bell) 1 6 2010–2002 9  
Blue Label Telecoms 
(Bluetel) 
1 5 2010–2008 3 List 14 November 2007 
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Bowler Metcalf (Bowcalf) 1 6 2010–2004; 
2002 
8 2003 data not available on 
McGregor BFA (2013) 
Year end changed in 2004 (18 
months) 
Brandcorp Holdings 
(Brandco) 
0 3 2006–2002 5  
Bridgestone Firestone 
Maxiprest (Bridgestn) 
0 2 2004–2002 3  
British American Tobacco 
Plc (BATS) 
1 2 2010–2009 2 List 28 October 2008 
Buildmax 1 6 2010–2002 9 Year end changed in 2008 (11 
months) 
Burlington Industries 
(Burlingt) 
0 2 2003–2002 2 2004 data not available on 
McGregor BFA (2013) 
Business Connexion Group 
(BCX) 
1 4 2010–2005 6 List 24 May 2004  
Year end changed in 2009 (15 
months) 
Bytes Technology Group 
(BTG) 
0 4 2007–2002 6 BTG is part of the Altron Group 
Cafca/Bicaf/Bicc Cafca 
(Cafca) 
1 6 2010; 2008; 
2004–2002 
5 2009 and 2007–2005 data not 
available on McGregor BFA (2013) 
Cargo Carriers (Cargo) 1 6 2010–2002 9  
Cashbuild (Cashbil) 1 6; 3 2010–2002 9 2005–2002 Industrials  
2010–2006 Consumer Services 
Ceramic Industries 
(Ceramic) 
1 6 2010–2002 9  
City Lodge Hotels 
(Cityldg) 
1 3 2010–2002 9  
Comair 1 3 2010–2002 9 2005–2002 Cyclical Services  
Tourist and Consumer-related 
transport moved to Consumer 
Goods 
Combined Motor Holdings 
(CMH) 
1 3; 2 2010–2002 9 2005–2002 Consumer goods  
2010–2006 Consumer Services 
Command Holdings 
(Command) 
1 6 2009–2002 8 2010 data not available on 
McGregor BFA (2013)  
Year end changed in 2003 (15 
months) 
Year end changed in 2009 (18 
months) 
Compagnie Financiere 
Richemont SA (Richemont) 
1 3; 2 2010–2002 9 2010–2009  
2007–2002 Consumer Goods  
Consumer Services 2008  
Proposed in 2002 that Compagnie 
Financière Richemont AG relocate 
to Geneva, Switzerland 
Comparex Holdings 
(Comparex) 
0 4 2003–2002 2  
Compu-Clearing 
Outsourcing (Compclear) 
1 4 2010–2002 9  
Conafex Holdings Société 
Anonyme (Conafex) 
0 2 2008–2005; 
2003–2002 
6 Year end changed in 2003 (11 
months)  
Year end changed in 2006 (13 
months) 
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Concor 0 6 2005–2002 4  
Connection Group 
Holdings (Connect) 
0 3 2004–2002 3 Year end changed in 2003 (15 
months) 
Control Instruments Group 
(Control) 
1 6 2010–2002 9  
Country Bird Holdings 
(CBH) 
1 2 2010–2008 3 List 3 May 2007 
Crookes Brothers (Crookes) 1 2 2010–2002 9  
CS Computer Services 
Holdings (CSholding) 
0 4 2003–2002 2 2004 data not available on 
McGregor 
CTP Holdings 
(CTP)/Caxton and CTP 
Publishers and Printers 
(Caxton) 
1 3 2010–2002 9 2003 pyramid structure eliminated  
Caxton became wholly owned 
subsidiary of CTP Holdings 
(Caxton delist from JSE) 
Cullinan Holdings 
(Culinan) 
1 3 2010–2009; 
2007–2002 
8 2008 data not available on 
McGregor BFA (2013) 
Datacentrix Holdings 
(Dcentrix) 
1 4 2010–2002 9  
Datatec 1 4 2010–2002 9 Year end changed in 2003 (11 
months) 
Delta EMD/Delta Electrical 
Industries (Delta) 
1 6 2008–2002 7 2010–2009 Basic Materials 
Digicore Holdings 
(Digicore) 
1 6 2009–2002 8 Complete 2010 report not available 
on McGregor BFA (2013) 
Dimension Data Holdings 
plc (Didata) 
0 4 2009–2002 8  
Distell Group (Distell) 1 2 2010–2002 9  
Distribution and 
Warehousing Network 
(DAWN) 
1 6 2010–2002 9  
DNA Supply Chain 
Investments (DNA Sup) 
0 6 2003–2002 2 2004 data not available on 
McGregor BFA (2013) 
Year end changed in 2003 (18 
months) 
Dorbyl 1 6; 2 2010–2002 9 2006–2002 Industrials  
2010–2007 Consumer Goods 
Edgars Consolidated Stores 
(Edcon) 
0 3 2006–2002 5 2005 Year end 2 April 
All other years 30 March 
Elb Group (Elbgroup) 1 6 2010–2002 9  
Electronic Media Network 
(M-Net) and Supersport 
International Holdings (SS) 
(Mnet/SS) 
0 3 2003–2002 2 M-Net and SS jointly listed 
Elexir Technology 
Holdings (Elexir) 
0 4 2005;  
2003–2002 
3 Reverse list in 2006 as PSV 
Holdings on Altx Year end changed 
in 2005 (18 months) 
Ellerine Holdings (Elerine) 0 3 2006–2002 5 2007 data not available on 
McGregor BFA (2013) 
Enaleni Pharmaceuticals 
(Enaleni)/Cipla Medpro 
South Africa (Ciplamed) 
1 1 2010–2006 5 List 10 June 2005  
Changed name in 2008 
Enviroserv Holdings 
(Enserv) 
0 6 2007–2002 6  
EOH Holdings (EOH) 1 4 2010–2002 9  
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Eqstra Holdings (Eqstra) 1 6 2010–2009 2 List 12 May 2008 
Erp.com Holdings 
(Erp.com)/SecureData 
Holdings (Secdata) 
1 4 2010–2002 9 Changed name in 2007 to 
SecureData Holdings 
Esorfranki (Esorfrank) 1 6 2010–2009 2 2008–2006 AltX 
Excellerate Holdings 
(Excell) 
1 6 2010–2002 9  
Faritec Holdings (Faritec) 1 4 2009–2002 8 2010 data not available on 
McGregor BFA (2013) 
Forim Holdings (Forim) 0 1 2003–2002 2 2001 Property 
Global Technology 
(Glotec) 
0 4 2003–2002 2 2004 data not available on 
McGregor BFA (2013) 
Global Village Holdings 
(Glovil) 
0 6; 3 2005–2002 4 2005–2003 Industrials  
2008–2006 and 2002 Consumer 
services  
2008–2006 data not available on 
McGregor BFA (2013) 
Glodina Holdings (Glodina) 0 2 2003–2002 2  
Gold Reef Casino Resorts 
(Goldreef) 
1 3 2009–2002 8 Renamed to Tsogo Sun Holdings on 
5 August 2011  
2010 report based on merger 
(reported until February 2011) 
Grindrod 1 6 2010–2002 9  
Grintek 0 6 2004–2002 3  
Group Five (Group5) 1 6 2010–2002 9  
Heritage Collection 
Holdings (Hercol) 
0 3 2005–2002 4  
Howden Africa Holdings 
(Howden) 
1 6 2010–2002 9  
Hudaco Industries 
(Hudaco) 
1 6 2010–2002 9  
Idion Technology Holdings 
(Idion) 
0 4 2005–2002 4  
IFA Hotels & Resorts (IFA) 1 3 2010–2007 4 List 27 February 2006 
Iliad Africa (Iliad) 1 6 2010–2002 9  
Illovo Sugar (Illovo) 1 2 2009–2002 8 2010 data not available on 
McGregor BFA (2013) 
Imperial Holdings 
(Imperial) 
1 6 2010–2002 9 2010–2008 separate sustainability 
reports available on company 
website 
Sustainability section in annual 
reports 
Infowave Holdings 
(Infowave)/Adaptit 
Holdings (Adaptit) 
1 4 2010–2009; 
2007; 2005 
4 Infowave Holdings merged with 
Adaptit Holdings in November 
2007 
2008 data not available on 
McGregor BFA (2013) 
Infowave 2006 Venture Capital, 
2004–2002 Development Capital  
Year end changed in 2010 (16 
months) 
Inmins 0 3 2003–2002 2 2004 data not available on 
McGregor 
Intertrading (Intrading) 1 2 2010–2002 9 Delisted after 2010 
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Intervid International 
(Intervid) 
0 4 2003–2002 2  
Invicta Holdings (Invicta) 1 6 2010–2002 9  
Italtile (Itltile) 1 6; 3 2010–2002 9 2005–2002 Industrials  
2010–2006 Consumer services 
Ixchange Technology 
Holdings 
(Ixchange)/Frontrange 
(Frontrnge) 
0 4 2005–2002 4 Changed name in 2002 to 
Frontrange  
Year end changed in 2005 (10 
months) 
Jasco Electronics Holdings 
(Jasco) 
1 6 2010–2002 9 Year end changed in 2009 (16 
months) 
JD Group (Jdgroup) 1 3 2010–2002 9  
Johnnic Communications 
(Johncom) 
0 3 2006–2002 5 Changed name to Avusa (which 
listed in 2008) which unbundled 
from Elementone 
Johnnic Holdings (Johnnic) 0 5; 3 2004–2002 3 2007–2005 Financials  
2002 Telecommunications 
2004–2003 Consumer services 
Kagiso Media (KGmedia) 1 3 2010–2002 9  
Kairos Industrial Holdings 
(Kairos) 
1 6 2010–2002 9 Delisted after 2010 
Kaydav Group (Kaydav) 1 6 2010–2008 3 List 15 November 2007 
Kelly Group (Kelly) 1 6 2010–2008 3 List 3 April 2007  
Previously known as Logical 
Options (Pty) Ltd 
Kersaf Investments 
(Kersaf)/Sun International 
(Sunint) 
1 3 2010–2002 9 Renamed to Sun International in 
2004  
2010–2008 separate sustainability 
reports 
King Consolidated 
Holdings (Kingco) 
0 3 2008–2002 7  
Kolosus Holdings 
(Kolosus)/Kap International 
Holdings (KAP) 
1 6; 2 2010–2007;  
2005–2004; 
2003–2002 
8 2003–2002 Consumer goods  
Year end changed in 2004 (2004 
report for a year) / Year end 
changed in 2007 (18 months) 
2010–2004 Industrials 
KWV Beleggings (KWV 
Bel)/Capevin Investments 
(Capevin) 
1 2 2010–2002 9 Changed name in 2009 to Capevin 
Investments  
L.A. Group (LA Group) 0 3 2005–2002 4  
Lewis Group (Lewis) 1 3 2010–2005 6 List 4 October 2004 
Masonite (Africa) 
(Masnite) 
1 6 2010–2002 9  
Massmart Holdings 
(Massmart) 
1 3 2010–2002 9  
Mathomo Group 
(Mathomo) 
0 3 2005; 
2003–2002 
3 Year end changed in 2005 (17 
months) 
Maxtec 0 4 2003–2002 2  
Mazor Group (Mazor) 1 6 2010–2009 2 2008–2007 AltX  
List 21 November 2007 
McCarthy (McCar) 0 2 2003–2002 2  
M-Cell/MTN Group (MTN 
Group) 
1 5 2010–2002 9 Changed name in 2003 to MTN 
Group  
9 months report published 
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December 2005  
Year end changed in 2006 (12 
months)  
Separate sustainability report 2010–
2007 
Medi-Clinic Group 
(Medclin) 
1 1 2010–2002 9  
Metair Investments 
(Metair) 
1 2 2010–2002 9  
Metro Cash and Carry 
(Metcash) 
0 3 2003–2002 2  
MGX Holdings 
(MGX)/Metrofile Holdings 
(Metrofile) 
1 6; 4 2010–2002 9 2010–2005 Industrials  
Changed name to Metrofile 
Holdings in 2005 2004–2002 
Technology 
MICROmega Holdings 
(MMG)/(Micromega) 
1 6 2010–2007 4 2006–2002 Financials 
Million Air Charter 
(Millair) 
0 3 2003–2002 2 2006–2004 data not available on 
McGregor BFA (2013) 
Tourist and consumer-related 
transport moved to Consumer 
Goods 
Mobile Industries (Mobile) 1 6 2010–2002 9 Mobile and Trencor reported 
together  
Mobile pyramid company of 
Trencor 
Moneyweb Holdings 
(Moneywb) 
1 3 2005–2002 4 2010–2006 moved to AltX 
Monteagle Holdings 
Société Anonyme 
(Monte)/Marshall 
Monteagle Holdings 
Société Anonyme 
(Martel)/(Marshall) 
1 6 2010–2002 9 Changed name in 2006 to Marshall 
Monteagle Holdings Société 
Anonyme 
Delisted after 2010 
Moribo Leisure (Moribo) 0 3 2004–2002 3 2005 data not available on 
McGregor BFA (2013) 
Mr Price Group (Mr Price) 1 3 2010–2002 9  
Murray & Roberts 
Holdings (M&R Hld) 
1 6 2010–2002 9  
Mustek 1 4 2010–2002 9  
Mvelaphanda Group 
(Mvela Grp) 
1 6 2010–2005 6 Changed name in November 2004 
to Mvelaphanda Group after merger 
with Mvelaphanda Holdings (Pty) 
Limited  
Rebserve Holdings delisted and 
Mvelaphanda Group listed in 2004  
Changed name in 2012 to New 
Bond Capital 
Namibian Sea Products 
(Namsea) 
0 2 2005–2002 4 2006 data not available on 
McGregor BFA (2013) 
Nampak  1 6 2010–2002 9  
Naspers 1 3 2010–2002 9 Separate sustainability report 2008–
2010 
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Net 1 Ueps Technologies, 
Inc. (Net1ueps) 
1 6 2010–2009 2 List 8 October 2008 
Network Healthcare 
Holdings (Netcare)/Netcare 
(Netcare) 
1 1 2010–2002 9 Changed name during 2008 to 
Netcare 
New Africa Investment 
(NAIL) 
1 3 2008–2002 7 2010 and 2009 data not available on 
McGregor BFA (2013) 
Delisted after 2010 
New Clicks Holdings 
(Nuclicks)/Clicks Group 
(Clicks) 
1 3 2010–2002 9 Changed name to Clicks Group in 
2009 
Nictus Group (Nictus) 1 3 2010–2002 9  
Nu-world Holdings 
(Nuworld) 
1 2 2010–2002 9  
Oceana Group (Oceana) 1 2 2010–2002 9  
Onelogix Group (Onelogix) 1 6 2003–2002 2 2010–2004 AltX 
OTK Holdings 
(Afgri)/Afgri 
1 2 2010–2002 9 Changed name in 2002 to Afgri  
Year end changed in 2008 (16 
months) 
Pals Holdings (Pals) 0 2 2007–2002 6 2008 data not available on 
McGregor BFA (2013) 
Paracon Holdings (Paracon) 1 4 2010–2002 9 Delisted after 2010 
Pasdec Resources SA 
(Pasdec) 
0 6 2005–2002 4 2006 data not available on 
McGregor BFA (2013) 
Phumelela Gaming and 
Leisure (Phumelela) 
1 3 2010–2003 8 List 14 June 2002 
Pick n Pay stores (Pick n 
Pay) 
1 3 2010–2002 9 Report together as a group for Pick 
n Pay stores and Pick n Pay 
holdings (Pikwik) 
Pinnacle Technology 
Holdings (Pinnacle) 
1 4 2010–2002 9  
Pioneer Food Group (Pnr 
Foods) 
1 2 2010–2009 2 List 22 April 2008 
Pretoria Portland Cement 
Company (PPC) 
1 6 2010–2002 9  
Primedia  0 3 2006–2002 5  
Primeserv Group 
(Primeserv) 
1 6 2009–2002 8 2010 data not available on 
McGregor BFA (2013)  
Year end changed in 2006 (18 
months) 
Prism Holdings (Prism) 0 4 2005–2002 4  
Protech Khuthele Holdings 
(Protech) 
1 6 2010–2008 3 List 7 August 2007 
Putco 0 6 2004–2002 3  
Quyn Holdings 
(Quyn)/Colliers South 
Africa Holdings (Colliers) 
1 6 2006–2003 4 2010–2007 Financials  
Year end changed in 2003 (17 
months)  
Changed name in 2007 to Colliers 
South Africa Holdings  
Changed name after 2010 to 
Adrenne Property Group 
Rainbow Chicken 
(Rainbow) 
1 2 2010–2002 9  
Raubex Group (Raubex) 1 6 2010–2008 3 List 20 March 2007 
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Rebserve Holdings 
(Rebserv) 
0 6 2003–2002 2 Delisted in 2004  
Changed name to Mvelaphanda 
Group after unconditional merger in 
November 2004 with Mvelaphanda 
Holdings (Pty) Limited 
Relyant Retail (Relyant) 0 3 2004–2002 3  
Remgro 1 6 2010–2007 4 2006–2002 Financials 
Reunert 1 6 2010–2002 9  
Rex Trueform Clothing 
Company (Rex True) 
1 3 2010–2002 9 2010–2003 reported with African 
and Overseas Enterprises 2004–
2003 
SABMiller plc (SAB) 1 2 2010–2002 9  
SAIL Group 0 3 2003–2002 2 2004 data not available on 
McGregor BFA (2013) 
Sanyati Holdings (Sanyati) 1 6 2010–2008 3 2007–2006 AltX 
List 2 June 2006 
Sasani 0 3 2004–2002 3  
Sea Kay Holdings (Seakay) 1 6 2010–2008 3 List 16 August 2007 
Seardel Investment 
Corporation (Seardel) 
1 2 2010–2002 9 Year end changed in 2009 (9 
months) 
Sekunjalo Investments 
(Sekunjalo) 
1 6 2008–2002 7 2010–2009 Financials 
Set Point Technology 
Holdings (Sethold)/Set 
Point Group (Setpoint) 
0 6 2009–2002 8 Changed name in 2009 to Set Point 
Group 
Shoprite Holdings (Shoprit) 1 3 2010–2002 9  
Sizafika Property 
Investments (Sizafika) / 
Adonis Knitwear Holdings 
(Adonis)/Emergent 
Properties (Emergent) 
0 2 2007; 2005–
2002 
5 2009–2008 data not available on 
McGregor BFA (2013) 
2006 Financials 
South Ocean Holdings 
(S.Ocean) 
1 6 2010–2008 3 List 28 February 2007 
Sovereign Food 
Investments (Sovfood) 
1 2 2010–2002 9  
Spescom 0 4 2009–2002 8 Merged in 2010 with Jasco  
Spescom delisted 
Spur Corporation 
(Spurcorp) 
1 3 2010–2002 9  
Square One Solutions 
Group (Sqone) 
1 4 2008–2002 7 2010–2009 data not available on 
McGregor BFA (2013) 
Steers Holdings/Famous 
Brands (Fambrands) 
1 3 2010–2002 9 2003–2002 known as Steers 
Holdings 
Changed name in 2004 to Famous 
Brands 
Stefanutti & Bressan 
(S&B)/Stefanutti Stocks 
Holdings (Stefstock) 
1 6 2010–2008 3 List 3 August 2007  
Changed name in 2008 to Stefanutti 
Stocks Holdings 
Steinhoff International 
Holdings (Steinhoff) 
1 2 2009–2002 8 2010 separate sustainability report 
not available on McGregor BFA 
(2013) 
Sun International (South 
Africa) (SISA) 
0 3 2003–2002 2  
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Super Group (Suprgrp) 1 6 2010–2002 9 2010–2009 separate sustainability 
reports Sustainability section in 
annual reports  
Year end changed in 2006 (15 
months) 
TeliMatrix (Matrix)/Mix 
Telematics (Mixtel) 
1 6 2010–2008 3 List 12 November 2007  
Changed name in 2009 to Mix 
Telematics Complete 2008 data not 
available on McGregor 
Telkom SA (Telkom) 1 5 2010–2004 7 List 4 March 2003  
2010–2006 separate sustainability 
reports available on McGregor BFA 
(2013) 
The Aveng Group (Aveng) 1 6 2010–2002 9  
The Bidvest Group 
(Bidvest) 
1 6 2010–2002 9 Separate sustainability reports 
available on McGregor BFA (2013) 
The Cementation Company 
(Africa) (Cemenco) 
0 6 2003–2002 2 Reported together with Cementation 
Mining Skanska (Pty) Limited 
The Don Group (Don) 1 3 2010–2002 9  
The Foshini Group (TFG) 1 3 2010–2002 9  
The House of Busby 
(Busby) 
0 2 2007–2002 6  
The Spar Group (Spar) 1 3 2010–2005 6 List 18 October 2004 
The Tongaat-Hulett Group 
(Tongaat)/Tongaat Hulett 
(Tongaat) 
1 2 2010; 2008–
2002 
8 Restructuring in 2007 
Unbundled from Hulamin 
Changed name to Tongaat Hulett  
Year end changed in 2010 (15 
months) 
Tiger Brands (Tigbrands) 1 2 2010–2002 9  
Tiger Wheels (Tiwheel) 0 2 2006–2002 5 2008–2007 data not available on 
McGregor BFA (2013)  
Tiger Automotive debundled 
Listed in 2006 
Tourism Investment 
Corporation (Tourvst) 
0 3 2007–2002 6  
Tradehold (Tradeh) 1 3 2009–2002 8 Year end changed in 2003 (eight 
months)  
2010 moved to Financials  
Investment holding company  
2009–2002 report with Brown & 
Jackson plc (B&J)/Instore plc, 
principle business indirect holding 
Transpaco (Trnpaco) 1 6 2010–2002 9  
Trencor 1 6 2010–2002 9 Mobile and Trencor reported 
together  
Mobile pyramid company of 
Trencor 
Truworths International 
(Truwths) 
1 3 2010–2002 9  
UCS Group (UCS) 1 4 2010–2002 9 Changed name in 2011 to Capital 
Eye Investments 
United Service 
Technologies/UTI 
Worldwide Inc. (Uniserv) 
0 6 2004–2002 3 Investment holding company of 
UTI Worldwide Inc.  
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Unitrans (Unitran) 0 6 2006–2002 5  
Universal Industries 
Corporation (Universal) 
1 6 2010–2008 3 List 29 November 2007  
Delisted after 2010 
Vaalauto (Valauto) 0 2 2003–2002 2 Valauto and Valcar reported 
together 
Vaaltrucar (Valcar) 0 2 2003–2002 2 Valauto and Valcar reported 
together   
Value Group (Value) 1 6 2010–2002 9  
Venter Leisure and 
Commercial Trailers 
(Ventel) 
/ 6; 2 2007–2002 6 2008 data not available on 
McGregor BFA (2013) 
2007–2006 Industrials  
2005–2002 Consumer Goods 
Verimark Holdings 
(Verimark) 
1 3 2010–2006 5 List 11 July 2005  
Nova Education and Technology 
holdings (Edutech) 
Reverse takeover Creditvision 
holdings (not listed on the main 
board) 
Vesta Technology Holdings 
(Vesta)/ConvergeNet 
Holdings (Converge) 
1 4 2010–2002 9 Disposed of business in Vesta 
Technology Holdings and changed 
name in 2007 
WB Holdings (Wbhold) 0 2 2005–2002 4 Year end changed in 2002 (6 
months) 
Wesco Investments 
(Wescob) 
0 2 2008–2003 6 Year end changed in 2003 (15 
months)  
2009 Year end not listed  
2009 data available on McGregor 
BFA (2013) 
Wilson Bayly Holmes-
Ovcon (WBHO) 
1 6 2010–2002 9  
Winhold Group (Winhold) 1 6; 3 2010–2002 9 2005–2002 Consumer Services  
2010–2006 Industrials 
Wooltru 0 3 2006–2002 5 2009–2007 moved to Financials  
2002 unbundled from Massmart, 
Truworths and Woolworths  
Now known as PBT Group 
Woolworths Holdings 
(Woolies) 
1 3 2010-2002 9 Separate sustainability report  
2010–2006 
Ythrk (Y3K) / ISA 
Holdings (ISA) 
1 4 2004-2002 3 2010–2005 ISA Holdings on AltX 
a)  As most companies had their primary listing on the JSE, Ltd was not shown. 
b)  The years were indicated in line with the most recent report available, followed by the preceding reports.  
 A firm had to be listed for at least two consecutive calendar years in order to form part of the sample. The 
2001 information was used to determine whether the firms had already been listed at the end of 2001. 
Source: Researcher’s own construction based on the listing information published in a local 
newspaper Die Burger for the last trading day of 2001 to 2010. 
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1time Holdings (1time) 1 3 2010 2009–2007 AltX; 2010 Main Board  
Only one year 
Accord Technologies (Accord) 0 2 2002 Only one year 
Data not available on McGregor BFA (2013) 
Advanced Technical Systems 
(Advanced) 
0 6 2004–2002 Data not available on McGregor BFA (2013) 
Afribrand Holdings (Afbrand) 0 2 2002 Only one year 
Data not available on McGregor BFA (2013) 
Amlac 0 2 2006–2002 No data available on McGregor BFA (2013) 
Bioscience Brands (Biosci) 1 2 2008 Main Board 2008  
Data for 2006–2010 
Other years AltX 
CCN Holdings (CCN) 0 6 2003 Only one year 
Choice Holdings/Mighty Meat 
(Choice) 
0 2 2004–2002 Data not available on McGregor BFA (2013) 
CIC Holdings (CIC) 0 6 2009 2008–2007  
AltX  
Listed 30 November 2007 
Clover Industries (Clover) 1 2 2010 List 14 December 2010 
Only one year 
Consol 0 6 2006–2005 List 4 March 2005 
Consolidated Infrastructure 
Group (CIL)/Buildworks Group 
1 6 2010 2009–2007 AltX 
Crux Technologies (Crux) 0 4 2002 Only one year 
Data not available on McGregor BFA (2013) 
Dynamo Retail (Dynamo) 0 3 2004–2002 Data not available on McGregor BFA (2013) 
Elementone (Element1) 0 3 2009–2008 List 18 March 2008  
Data only available for one year  
Formerly Johnnic Communications 
Ellies Holdings (Ellies) 1 6 2010 2009–2008 AltX 
Fashion Africa (Fashaf) 0 3 2004–2002 2004–2003 data not available on McGregor BFA 
(2013) 
Forza Group (Forza) 0 2 2002 Only one year 
Data not available on McGregor BFA (2013) 
Gubb and Ings (Gubbings) 0 2 2002 Only one year 
Home Choice Holdings 
(Homechoice) 
0 3 2002 Only one year 
IST Group (IST) 0 6 2003–2002 2002 data not available on McGregor BFA (2013) 
Kwikspace Modular Buildings 
(Kwikspace) 
0 6 2008 2007 AltX  
Only one year 
Leisurenet (Lesrnet) 0 3 2004–2002 Data not available on McGregor BFA (2013) 
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Life Healthcare Group 
Holdings (Life HC) 
1 1 2010 List 10 June 2010 
Only one year 
Previously known as Afrox Healthcare (changed 
name 2005) 
Malbak 0 6 2002 Only one year 
Metje & Ziegler (Metje) 0 3 2002 Only one year 
Metoz Holdings (Metoz) 0 3 2004 Only one year 
Data not available on McGregor BFA (2013) 
Mvelaserve (Mvelasv) 1 6 2010 Only one year 
Unbundled from Mvela Group 
Myriad Medical Holdings 
(Myriad)/Litha Healthcare 
Group (Litha) 
1 1 2010–2006 2009–2006 AltX 
Only one year on the Main Board 
Changed name in 2010 to Litha 
Namibian Fishing Industries 
(Namfish) 
0 2 2002 Only one year 
Data not available on McGregor BFA (2013) 
Nando’s Group Holdings 
(Nando’s) 
0 3 2002 Only one year 
Natural Health Holdings 0 1 2002 Only one year 
Nei Africa Holdings (Nei Afr) 0 6 2008–2002 Data not available on McGregor BFA (2013) 
Net 1 Applied Technology 
Holdings (Aplitec) 
0 4 2003–2002 Complete 2003 report not available on McGregor 
BFA (2013) 
Netactive (Netact) 0 4 2002 Only one year 
Ninian and Lester Holdings 
(Ninian) 
0 2 2002 Only one year 
Data not available on McGregor BFA (2013) 
Oakfields Thoroughbreds and 
Leisure Industries 
(Oakflds)/Goodhope Diamonds 
0 3 2008–2002 Only listed in Consumer Services for 2002 
Other years listed in Mining 
Omega Alpha Int Info 
Technology Holdings (OAI) 
0 4 2005–2002 Data not available on McGregor BFA (2013) 
OSI Holdings (OSI) 0 4 2002 Only one year 
Ozz 0 6 2002 Only one year 
PBT Group (PBT) 1 4 2010 List 15 November 2010  
Only one year 
Peermont Global (Peermont) 0 3 2006–2004 2006 data not available on McGregor BFA (2013) 
List 9 September 2004 
Pepkor 0 3 2003–2002 Complete 2003 data not available on McGregor 
BFA (2013) 
Planit Technology Holdings 
(PTH) 
0 4 2002 Only one year 
Data not available on McGregor BFA (2013) 
Profurn 0 3 2002 Only one year 
Queensgate Hotels and Leisure 
(Qleisure)/Cyberhost 
1 4 2008 Only listed on the Main Board for one year  
2007–2002 Venture Capital  
2010–2009 AltX 
Retail Apparel Group (RAG) 0 3 2006–2002 Data not available on McGregor BFA (2013) 
Shawcell Telecommunications 
(Shawcell) 
0 5 2006–2002 Data not available on McGregor BFA  (2013) 
Siltek 0 4 2004–2002 Data not available on McGregor BFA (2013) 
Softline 0 4 2002 Only one year 
Stocks Hotels & Resorts 
(Stochot) 
0 3 2006–2002 Data not available on McGregor BFA (2013) 
Sweets from Heaven (Heaven) 0 3 2002 Only one year 
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Terexko 0 3 2006–2002 Data only available for 2002 
2006–2003 data not available on McGregor BFA 
(2013) 
Terrafin Holdings (Ter-fin) 0 6 2006–2002 Data not available on McGregor BFA (2013) 
The Laser Group (Laser) 0 6 2002 Only one year 
Tiger Automotive (Tiauto) 0 3 2007 Only one year 
Top Info Technology Holdings 
(Top-tech) 
0 4 2006–2002 Data not available on McGregor BFA (2013) 
TWP Holdings (TWP) 0 6 2008–2007 2007 data not available on McGregor BFA (2013) 
Union Alliance Media (UAM) 0 3 2002 Only one year 
Universal Growth Holdings 
(Unigro) 
0 2 2004–2002 Data not available on McGregor BFA (2013) 
Vodacom Group (Vodacom) 1 5 2010–2009 List 18 May 2009 
Wetherleys Investment 
Holdings (Wethlys) 
0 3 2002 Only one year 
a)  As most companies had their primary listing on the JSE, Ltd was not shown. 
b)  The years were indicated in line with the most recent report available, followed by the preceding reports.  
 A firm had to be listed for at least two consecutive calendar years in order to form part of the sample. The 
2001 information was used to determine whether the firms had already been listed at the end of 2001. 
Source: Researcher’s own construction based on the listing information published in a local 
newspaper Die Burger for the last trading day of 2001
 
to 2010. 
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